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According to the Ottoman chronicles, the first sultan, Osman (1299-
1324) while sleeping in the house of a holy man named Edebali had a dream in 
which a tree emerged from his navel and its shade encompassed the world. 
Beneath the shade there were mountains and streams flowed from the foot of 
each mountain. Some people drank from these running waters, others watered 
gardens, while yet others caused fountains to flow. When Osman awoke, he 
narrated his dream to the holy man; the latter prophesied that Osman and his 
descendants will rule over a vast empire the prediction came true. After the 
conquest of Constantinople, the symbolic centre of eastern Christendom, in 
1453 by Sultan Muhammad II (the conqueror), the thrust of the Ottomans was 
limitless. The conquest of Constantinople (transfonned into Ottoman capital of 
Istanbul) stimulated in Muhammad II a desire to place under his dominion not 
only the Islamic and Turkic worlds but also a recreated Byzantine Empire and 
perhaps the entire world of Christendom.^ At the death of Suleyman, the 
magnificent, (1566), the Ottomans had created the largest and the most 
militarily powerful empire in the world at that period. The Empire extended 
over three continents and stood at the crossroads of the European West and the 
Asian East, playing a vital and unique role in world history. At its height, it 
included most of south-eastern Europe to the gates of Vienna, including 
modem Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Romania, Greece and Ukraine; Iraq, Syria, 
Israel and Egypt; North Africa as far west as Algeria; and most of the Arab 
Peninsula.^ 
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During the sixteenth century, the central IslaiTiic lands which had been 
devastated by the Mongols recovered their political entity and cultural vitality 
through the three great empires: the Indian Mughal Empire in the east; the 
Persian Safavid Empire in the centre; and the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the 
west (in fact, it was European, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf 
power) Each of these three empires made lasting cultural, political and social 
contributions to the areas under their domain. The emergence of these three 
states shows that Islam had not reached the limits of its expansion during the 
classical Abbasid caliphate. Marshall Hodgson, in his seminal study, observes 
that a visitor from Mars who arrived on earth during the sixteenth century 
would probably have concluded that the world was on the verge of becoming 
Muslim.^ He is referring to the very extensive territorial expansion of these 
empires in the world and to their power and prosperity. Compared to other 
Muslim empires and states, the Ottoman Empire was strong, long-lived and 
glorious. The Ottomans administered more than two million square miles of 
earth and many millions more in adjacent vassal territories. The Empire was a 
universe unto itself. Within its dominion were Arabs, Byzantines and Greeks, 
Serbians and Bosnians and Croats, Poles and Ukranians and Czechs, Slovaks 
and Hungarians and Austrians, Romanians and Persians and people from the 
Caucasus, Berbers and Azerbaijanis, and Amienians, Georgians and Somalis 
and Ethiopians. The languages and dialects are too many to count. 
The Ottomans had built up a strong navy and a well-equipped anny. 
Besides the Sipahi cavalry, which made up the bulk of the Ottoman anny, the 
most efficient imperial unit was the professional standing infantry corps known 
as the Janissaries. They equipped their infantry, the Janissaries, with 
gunpowder weapons to such an extent that in the sixteenth century they 
deployed more firearais than any other armed force in the world. Known for 
their discipline, morale and professionalism, the janissary corps was the most 
outstanding military unit in Europe. During the reign of Suleyman, the 
Magnificent, the corps comprised 40,000 troops and had expanded from an 
infantry force to include specialized artillery units.^ Their number had swelled 
to 2,00,000 by mid-seventeenth century. These technical advantages, coupled 
with a disciplined and well-trained army Qanissary) and the broader devsirme 
cadre of administrative officials and the valiant ghazi spirit that inspired the 
rulers and their warriors, enabled the Ottomans to defeat the armies of Europe 
and Middle East in campaign after campaign. 
In the administration of the empire, so large and varied, Ottomans were 
concerned with efficiency rather than uniformity. The principle that they 
followed was that in governing diverse territories, flexible administrative 
practices should be adopted that could cater to the needs of different regions 
and cultures. The ruling class respected the customs and mores of the diverse 
groups so as to win over their appreciation of the benefits of the Ottoman rule. 
Under Ottoman rule, partly out of the Islamic principle of toleration and partly 
out of pragmatic reasons, the major religious groups were allowed to establish 
their own self-governing communities, called millets, each retaining its own 
religious laws, traditions and language under the general protection of the 
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sultan. The millet system was a very significant administrative institution to 
deal with a community comprising diverse religious groups (In Istanbul alone 
during 16'*' century, the population of 7 lakhs comprised 58% Muslims, 32% 
Christians and 10% Jews).'" By permitting non-Muslims to retain their 
religious laws and allowing their own leaders to deal with matters relating to 
education, justice and religious affairs, Ottomans administered such diverse 
religious groups quite peacefully. Many Jews who were being persecuted in 
Spain migrated and sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. How waraily the 
Ottomans received them is dealt with by several observers" who acknowledge 
that the Turks will not only be remembered for their ability to create an empire 
that lasted for more than 600 years right upto the 20"" century, they will also be 
remembered "for their diversity and inclusion, merit over privilege, and 
fairness."'^ 
The Ottoman Slave Elite (the Devshirme system) was a unique feature 
of their administration. In addition to providing soldiers for the Janissaries, it 
furnished top-ranking military commanders and civilian administrators to the 
state. After rigorous screening, the cream of these young Christian converts 
was given intensive training and then given responsible positions in 
administration. From mid-fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, most of the 
grand viziers and other top officials came through devshirme levy. These elite 
were constantly renewed by newly committed warrior-statesmen as the levy 
was periodic. They were slaves in name only - slaves of the sultan. Ottomans, 
thus, managed to have a very efficient and dynamic bureaucracy and capable 
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civil service which drew on the administrative traditions of the Byzantines, the 
Iranians and the Arabs.'^ Alongwith the military and civil service, the third 
pillar of the government was the religious establishment. The Ottomans 
estabUshed Sharia'h nonns of justice through a hierarchy of qadis with Sheikh 
al-lslam as the chief religious dignitary of the empire, holding office at the 
pleasure of the sultan. The Ottomans had, thus, established a vast empire, with 
a strong military force, an efficient bureaucracy and a fair administration of 
justice. Sixteenth century was the period of expansion, the seventeenth century 
a period of preservation, but the eighteenth century and onwards was a period 
of decline and defeats what went wrong? 
It may not be irrelevant to point out here that some western writers have 
characterized the Ottoman Empire as "oriental despotism" or "The Sick Man of 
Europe". These prejudicial remarks were made in the heat of confrontation 
between western states and the Ottomans at a particular moment in time to suit 
particular purposes. But these 'soundbites' have been so repeatedly made and 
recycled as if they encompass the whole of Ottoman history.'"* Similarly, we 
find in European sources observations against Ottomans suggesting as if it is a 
class of "salacious sultans, evil pashas,, hapless harem women, obscurantist 
clerics ... a tale of an alien and exotic universe"'^ Of course, not all sultans 
were alike; Some of them may not be upto the mark, but sweeping 
generalizations would be wrong and untrue. How come that despite heavy 
odds — serious internal problems, revolts and uprising from non-Muslim 
Ottomans, whose cause championed by foreign powers, external aggression 
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and continuous wars with European powers, industrial decline and financial 
debacle — it took two-and-a-half centuries for "the sick man of Europe" to 
die. (Actually not died but reincarnated into a successor smaller Republic, 
occupying a unique geographic position, lying partly in Asia and partly in 
Europe). How then the Empire survived until the First World War, outlasting 
the Safavid and Mughul empires by more than 150 years? It shows that the 
Ottoman Empire had a strong base, a strong military and bureaucracy. 
A researcher meets some practical hurdles while working on Ottoman 
history. A good deal of basic source material is in ottoman language. The 
change of alphabet by Ataturk in 1928 from the Arabic script to the Roman 
alphabet and the expunging of Arabic and Persian words have made the 
original material inaccessible to the present day Turkish student. Further, in the 
earlier years of Republic, the Ottoman centuries were considered as a closed 
book and were looked down with contempt. However, there is a revival and 
researchers are digging into the rich material which shows that barring a few 
'sot' or 'crazy' rulers, the Ottoman dynasty was invincible and its sultan's all-
powerful.'^ Fuad Pasha, a grand vizier and foreign minister in Ottoman Empire, 
once remarked to a European diplomat: "Our state is the strongest state. For 
you are trying to cause its collapse from the outside, and we from the inside, 
but still it does not collapse."'^ 
However, the Ottoman Empire, once the terror of Europe, started losing 
its superiority, after its Golden Age (1453-1566). A very significant factor was 
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eluding the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Ottoman society and government 
the fact that the Europe which the Ottomans now faced was far more powerful 
than that which the great Sultans of the past had defeated. 
The confrontation was now with European modernity which had 
undergone four epoch-making thrusts towards modernization: The scientific 
and philosophical revolution; the cultural and theological revolution; the 
political and democratic revolution; and the technological and industrial 
revolution."* Such modernization did not take place in the Muslim world, 
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suffered from a number of factors (spelled out in chapter I infra) that led to 
internal decay and decline. Now, Europe was in a position of strength to 
challenge the world of Islam, including the Ottomans. With technological 
advancement, Europe developed more sophisticated weapons. In 1571, when 
the Ottomans were besieging Cyprus, the Ottoman naval fleet was badly beaten 
by the combined Christian fleet at Lepanto. But the Ottomans took Cyprus and 
rebuilt their fleet within one year. The Russian victory in 1681 took back most 
of the Ukraine which Ottomans had conquered in 1676. In 1683, the Ottoman 
forces advanced to the gates of Vienna (this was the second assault) but were 
defeated by the Christians. In a ruinous 16 year war, beginning in 1682, the 
Holy League (comprising Austria, Poland and Venice and organized under the 
aegis of the pope) and Russia defeated the Ottomans and by the Treaty of 
Karlowitz, 1699, the Ottomans lost Podolia to Poland, Hungary and 
Transylvania to Austria, Morea to Venice. Three Russian wars in the 
eighteenth century resulted in the victory of Catherine the Great and 
culminated in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja, 1774. Incorporating terms quite 
humiliating to the Ottomans, Catherine championed the cause of Christian 
Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire and tried to rouse the Greeks to revolt. 
The superiority in arms gave the Western powers an edge over Ottomans 
and the latter were convinced that if the empire was to survive reforms, mainly 
military reforms, must be undertaken immediately. Like the Western countries, 
they have to modernize their weapons, their government and society. So the 
process of Westernization started with a modest beginning in the early 
eighteenth century and continued till the end of the empire in the early 
twentieth century and further accelerated by Ataturk in a bold and sometimes 
rash manner in the Republic of Turkey. It may also be noted that each reform 
effort in the history of the Ottoman Empire has provoked opposition and 
produced reaction from vested interests. The first sultan (Selim III), whose 
reign is often taken to mark the start of westernization, was accused of failing 
to respect the religion of Islam and the tradition of the Ottomans and was 
deposed and eventually murdered. At the other end, Mustafa Kemal, who is 
honoured as Father-Turk, was opposed, but being a War Hero and savior of 
Turkey, he overpowered his opponents. But Turkey today stands divided on 
some of Ataturk's reforms, e.g., the "headscarves" case decided a few months 
ago by the Constitutional Court sets the stage for a showdown between the 
Turkish secular elites (the military, the Constitutional Court, the Republican 
Peoples' Party), the self-appointed guardians of 'Kemalism', and the pro-
Islamic governing Party of Prime Minster Recap Tayyip Erdogan (AKP -
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Justice and Development Party). The Court held that the law enacted by 
Turkish Parliament in February, 2008, allowing women to attend Universities 
wearing headscarves was unconstitutional (New York Times, June 6, 2008). 
Chapter 1 deals with the beginning of Ottoman Refomiation by first 
providing the background - the rise of the Ottoman Empire as a world power, 
its Decline and the causes of Decline. The efforts of certain Grand Viziers, the 
reforms were introduced by Sultan Salim III (1789-1806) and Sultan Mahmud 
II (1808-1839) to remove the internal decay and improve the military capability 
is discussed. Salim introduced a series of reforms to reorganize the armed 
forces on European model, involving employment of foreign advisers, 
imparting training in new methods and tactics and purchasing and deploying 
new weapons. A new infantry corps, Nizam-e-Jadid was created which was 
trained and equipped according to European standards. Exposure to the West 
was attempted through the newly established diplomatic channels. Opposition 
to these refonns came from the dereby- ulama- janissary coalition who accused 
the sultan of failure to respect the religion of Islam and the tradition of 
Ottomans. The sultan was deposed and later murdered. 
Although the Ottoman Empire suffered territorial losses during Mahmud 
IPs reign his reforms strengthened the military and administrative arms of the 
state. As the sultan became committed to European reforms and as European 
economic and military pressures increased, the so-called 'French-knowers' and 
those well-versed in European languages and way of life received favoured 
treatment and got higher government jobs. This new elite continued Mahmud's 
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reforms even after his death and this heralded a new phase (the Tanzimat 
reforms) in the modernization of the Ottoman system. Mahmud was one of the 
most effective rulers who acted decisively. The Janissaries, who were an 
obstacle to reforni, were eliminated, the autonomy of the derebeys was curbed, 
the bureaucracy reorganized and brought under direct authority of the sultan, 
and the office of sheikh al-Islam made part of the state bureaucracy. 
Chapter 2: The period from 1839 to 1856 is known in Ottoman history 
as the Tanzimat (Reordering/Re-organisation), programme of refonn and 
marks the most intensive phase of the nineteenth century Ottoman reformist 
activity. These reforms were inspired by the bureaucrats who were career 
diplomats, the so-called 'French-knowers'. Sultan Mahmud IPs younger son, 
Abdul Majid (1839-61) promulgated what came to be known as the Gulhane 
Edict of 1839. Rather than a legislative programme, this document was an 
statement of royal intent promising continued institutional reform, an end to 
corruption in government, abolition of tax farming, the standardization of 
military conscription, equal treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, and 
a years later in 1856 another royal decree was issued in which the principles of 
1839 edict were repeated and the guarantees of equality of all subjects were 
made more explicit. All subjects of the state regardless of religion will now 
have equal obligations in terms of military service and equal opportunities for 
state employment and admission to state schools. The main purpose of these 
edicts was to win over the loyalty of the Ottoman Christians at a time when 
nationalist movement was growing amongst them. Another purpose was to 
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placate European powers whose influence had increased in the empire after the 
Crimean War. Tanzimat period is also significant for promulgation of new 
penal and commercial codes on the lines of French civil code and the 
establishment of secular courts called Nizame. The work on Mejelle was 
going on for quite sometime and it was completed in 1876. The fonn was 
European, but the contents were consistent with Sharia'h. This was the first 
attempt to codify Muslim civil law in the Islamic world. 
The implementation of the Edicts foundered due to traditionalist 
resistance. It led to the crisis of identity. The rifts between Muslims and Non-
Muslims aggravated. The implementation of the reforms entailed huge 
expenditure, but the state revenues did not proportionately increase, compelling 
the Empire to make heavy borrowings on the European money markets, 
burdening the empire with such heavy servicing of these debts that the 
government was virtually bankrupt. This meant surrendering of Ottoman 
financial independence to European interests. One consequence of Tanzimat 
reforms was that Ottoman reforms were no more an internal affair. They now 
came on international stage and provided an opportunity to European powers to 
monitor these reforms. These failures necessitated another movement and it 
came in the form of Young Turk Movement. 
Chapters 3 and 4, deal with the Young Ottoman Movement and their 
Ideological Orientation. In the wake of opposition which erupted as a 
consequence of Tanzimat reforms, a group of Ottoman nationalist intellectuals 
emerged in 1865 which was influenced by such Western thinkers as 
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Montesquieu and Rousseau and the French Revolution. They developed the 
concept of Ottomanism, aligned with these thinkers. They advocated a 
constitutional, parliamentary government. The Young Ottomans were 
bureaucrats resulting from the Tanzimat refonns that were dissatisfied with its 
bureaucratic absolutism and sought a more democratic solution. They sought to 
reform the government while maintaining the empire's Islamic traditions. Also 
known as the new men from elite families who were journalists, poets, 
playwrights, and government functionaries? In the early and mid-1860s they 
began publishing newspapers, poems, and plays that called for an end to the 
absolute rule of the sultan and the adoption of a constitution. Among their 
published journals were Tasvir-i Efkar (published first by the poet and 
journalist Ibrahim Sinasi Efendi, and later by the poet and prose writer Namik 
Kemal) and Muhbir (published by the journalist Ali Suavi). 
In 1865 a small number of Young Ottomans in Istanbul fornied an 
underground society led by Mehmed Bey, the nephew of Mahmud Nedim Pa§a, 
an Ottoman grand vizier. This organization came to spearhead the Young 
Ottoman movement and within two years included §inasi, Kemal, Suavi, and 
Mustafa Fazil, the brother of Ismail Pa§a, the khedive (Turkish viceroy) of 
Egypt. Many of its members had trained or served in the government's 
Translation Bureau and had some firsthand experience of Western Europe. 
They were opposed to the successive grand viziers, Ali Pa§a and Fuad Pa§a, 
who were seeking to refonn and strengthen the central government along 
Western lines. The Young Ottomans accused these men of constructing an 
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absolutist regime under Sultan Abd al-Aziz, who was also one of their targets, 
and attempting to destroy Ottoman Turkish culture. They wanted the empire to 
reform democratically without becoming subservient to any European power or 
to European culture. These refomiists took Japan as their model society, which 
they considered as having modernized without discarding Japanese culture. 
The Young Ottomans were targeted by the govermnent; some were 
jailed, and many were exiled and continued their agitation from abroad. 
Popular demands for a constitution grew in the empire. Abd al-Aziz was 
overthrown in 1876 and the Ottoman constitution was drafted later that year. 
The ideological orientation of the Young Ottomans (ch.4) was the result 
of reaction and deep protest against the traditional as well as the western 
extremes, as they were the first among the ottomans to graft the western 
influence in the Islamic traditional streamline. They induced the western 
approach, and tried to balance it with the Islamic orthodoxy, as they viewed to 
liberalise it to ottoman society. These intellectuals felt that the success of 
Europe was not merely in its technological advancement, but also in their 
poUtical organisation. They favoured a constitutional parliamentary system, 
rule of law. They were all out for reform, but without undermining Islamic 
traditions and Ottoman patriotism. 
The prominent refomier or flag bearer of the modernization were 
Mehmed Bey, Halil §erif, Mustafa Fazil Pa§a, Namik Kemal, Ziya Pa§a, Ali 
Suavi, and many others, whose ideologies have been discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
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Chapter 5 of the thesis discusses (a) the rehgious assertiveness and 
authoritarian refonns of Sultan Abdul Hammid II, (b) the emergence of the 
'Young Turks' and their Revolt of 1908, (c) the First World War and the 
Emergence of Mustafa Kemal. 
In contrast to secularism and Ottomanism, developed during the period 
of Tanzimat and Young Ottomans, Abdul Hamid, during his 33-years' long 
and repressive sultanate/caliphate, adopted Pan-Islamism. The first ten years of 
his reign saw very significant development in higher education, including the 
setting up of the University of Istanbul, and transportation and communication. 
The surrounding hostile atmosphere in which he ruled led him to adopt 
authoritarian and repressive measures, but he was a reformer and an Ottoman 
patriot. Soon after ascending the throne, the constitution drafted under the 
direction of Midhat Pasha was promulgated. This was the first written 
constitution in Ottoman history. It embodied the substance of the Young 
Ottoman's programme. Details are spelled out in chapter 5. However, the 
acceptance of constitutionalism appeared only a temporary expedient to gain 
the throne. Parliament was dissolved within a year. The Tanzimat and 
achievements of Young Ottomans came to an end. The repressive measures of 
the suhan created opposition and small groups of students and young officers 
who conspired against the sultan's regime sprang up. Mustafa Kemal, then a 
young officer, organised a secret society of his fellow officers during his 
posting in Damascus and later in Salonoka (his birth-place now in Greece). 
Kemal's group later merged with the national group in 1907 to form the 
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Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also known as the Young Turks. 
They wanted the restoration of 1876 constitutions and unification of the various 
diverse elements into a homogeneous nation tluough a greater centralization 
under a parliamentary system. In 1908, the Army units in Macedonia revolted 
demanding the restoration of the constitution. The Sultan conceded the 
demand; elections were held and the CUP won almost all the seats. However, 
the traditionalist forces, at the instance of Sultan, staged a counter-revolt in 
Istanbul and overthrew the CUP government. The CUP leaders managed to 
despatch forces from Salonika, which restored the CUP government and 
deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II. 
The CUP government made some positive contribution initially but soon 
became a sort of military dictatorship with power concentrated into the hands 
of Mehmed Talat Pasha, Ahmet Cemal Pasha and Enver, the War minister. 
Mustafa Kemal could not get along well with Enver and he had dissociated 
himself from the CUP. In domestic matters the CUP government introduced 
reforms in the field of education, law, trade and commerce (spelled out in 
chapter 5) and undertook programmes which may not have produced 
immediate results, but had long-term effects on the fiiture development of the 
Turkish Republic. 
When World War I broke out, it was at Enver's advice that the Ottoman 
Empire entered the war on Germany's side which had disastrous consequences. 
Kemal was opposed to this and he proved to be a better strategist. Enver's 
winter offensive against the Russians in 1914-15 was ill-planned causing heavy 
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losses to Ottoman forces. While retreating, the Ottoman anny massacred many 
Armenians, who had given assistance to Russians. Armenians have not 
forgotten this tragedy and want the world opinion to declare it as a genocide 
committed by Turks. About 3,25,000 Turks lost their lives in this war and 
about 2 million civilians died in war-related causes.'^ Enver, Talat and Cemal 
fled the country when Allies entered the defeated Turkey. Enver was killed 
while fighting in Turkistan and the other two were assassinated by Armenians. 
Mustafa Kemal emerges as the most successful commander and hero during 
and in the aftennath of World War I. 
The Ottomans fought well during the first two years of the war although 
they suffered defeats at the hands of Russia in eastern Asia Minor. Once the 
Russian counter-attack on the eastern front gained success, the Allies opened 
two new fronts against the Ottomans: at Istanbul and Mesopotamia. The 
Ottomans repulsed both. The Gallipoli campaign started in February 1915 with 
2,00,000 British and French troops. The Ottoman army under the command of 
Mustafa Kemal did an excellent job and after causing heavy casualties forced 
the Allied troops to evacuate. This established the reputation of Kemal as the 
most successful military commander. But in 1917-1918 when new British 
offensives began in Iraq and Syria, the Ottoman forces began to decline and by 
the time of the Armistice of Mudros (October 1918) the Ottomans had lost 
everything but Anatolia. Consequently the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and it 
was close to being wiped off from the map of the world when Mustafa Kemal 
started the resistance movement. The Ottomans were forced to sign the Treaty 
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of Sevres (1920), by which they lost not only the Arab provinces but suffered a 
partition of Anatolia. In opposition to Allied plans, and in particular to the 
invasion of Smyrna by Greece in May 1919, a nationalist movement had grown 
up under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, and this movement carried 
on armed resistance until in 1922 the Greeks were defeated and driven out of 
Anatolia and eastern Thrace. The sultan had been compromised by his 
acquiescence in Allied policies, and on November 1, 1922 the Ottoman dynasty 
was abolished and the empire came to an end. A year later there stood in its 
place the Republic of Turkey. 
At the end of the war, the Allies occupied Istanbul and the Ottoman 
government collapsed. The Treaty of Sevres, a plan designed by the Allies to 
dismember the remaining Ottoman territories, was signed on August 10, 1920 
though never ratified by the Sultan. 
On the western front, when Greece, with the backing of Britain, 
invaded deep into Anatolia in an attempt to deal a blow to the revolutionaries, 
the latter foiled the attempt. After Turkish resistance gained control over 
Anatolia and Istanbul, the Sevres treaty was superseded by the Treaty of 
Lausanne which formally ended all hostilities and led to the creation of the 
modem Turkish republic. As a result, Turkey became the only power of 
World War I to overturn the terms of its defeat, and negotiate with the Allies 
as an equal. Ataturk demonstrated his qualities as a charismatic leader. A 
brief discussion of his early life and military career as given in chapter 5 
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shows that he was a bom soldier and destined to be an outstanding 
commander. 
Chapter 6, the last chapter of the thesis is devoted to a discussion of 
Ataturk's Reforms, as President of tiie Turkish RepubHc during 1923 to 1938. 
Mustafa Kemal united the whole army and nation of the Ottoman Empire 
through his ideas of secularism and nationalism. He stated that all are Turks 
who are residing inside the boundaries of the Turkey and fiirther that state 
and religion or state and church are separate. Mustafa Kemal was very much 
influenced by the thoughts of the young ottomans in the forni of nationalism 
and populism. He also stated that the aim of the refonns which we have 
already carried out and are continuing to carry out was to transform the 
Turkish society into a modem society in every aspect. This was the basis of 
the Kemalist reforms. In April 1931, Mustafa Kemal set forth six principles 
which he proclaimed as fundamental. They were shortly adopted by the 
People's Party and in 1937 were written into the constitution of the Republic. 
The "six arrows'", as People's Party symbolism depicts them are 
Republicanism (the form of government), Nationalism (the nation state), 
Populism (the sovereignty of the people and also that people were one 
without class distinction), Statism or Etatism (a controlling role of the state in 
economy, state capitalism and modem legislation on work and social 
welfare), Secularism (laicism) and Reformism (or Revolutionism - rapid, 
continuing but non-violent change). These six principles are discussed in 
chapter 6. 
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The principle of 'secularism' has remained a controversial and 
debatable issue. Ataturk wanted "a modern, bourgeois, secular Turkish 
republic on the model of laicist France and its separation of church and state." 
Although such a state had already been introduced by the de facto 
secularisation of the reforming Ottoman sultans, Ataturk's was "a bold, 
indeed rash project", keeping in view that the majority of the Turks consist 
of Anatolian rural population with predominantly traditional leaning. It was 
the urban elite which had been most affected by Ataturk's revolution. As we 
look at the current political scenario of Turkey, there exists what Samuel 
Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations calls "tier." We have already referred 
to this above, arising out of he two recent decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, the highest court of Turkey. The pro-Islamic ruling party having a 
majority in parliament represented the grass-roots of the Turkish society take 
a different stand from the elites - the military and the top judiciary. However, 
we should also keep in mind the circumstances and enviromnent in which 
Ataturk was operating. His actions "were informed by the perils of the years 
during which he was in power." If Ataturk would have been living today, he 
probably might have thought that as times have changed, the solutions 
prompted by the ideals and the fears of 1920s are not best suited to the 
problems and challenges of the twenty-first century. Despite all said and 
done, Mustafa Kemal - the father-Turk- remains a "unique man" not only in 
Turkey but on the global level. 
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THE DECLINE OF OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE AND THE 
BEGINNING OF REFORMS 
The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and most influential empires 
in world history. With time it became the third greatest Muslim 
empire/caliphate after the Umayyad and the Abbasid. It extended over three 
continents - Asia, Europe and Africa. Standing at the crossroads of the 
European West and the Asian East, the Ottoman Empire played a very 
significant role in world history.' Looking at the world map of the early 
sixteenth century, we find three great Muslim empires: the Mughal Empire in 
India, the Safavid Empire in Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Compared to the 
other two, the Ottoman Empire was strong, expansive, glorious and long-lived 
(survived for more than six centuries until its' destruction in the twentieth 
century). 
Three major military achievements elevated the Ottoman state to a world 
power: 
(i) The conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) --the symbolic centre of 
eastern Cliristendom ~ in 1453 by Sultan Mehmet II (1451-81), providing 
the Ottomans with a strong strategic base to control the Black Sea and the 
eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Ottomans had a strong modem navy 
supported by arnied forces (the Sipahi cavalry and the Janissary infantry) 
which were known for their discipline, morale and professionalism and 
were well equipped with modernized artillery and elite infantry. 
(ii) The successful Ottoman military campaigns towards the east during the 
reign of Sultan Selim I (1512-20) and the conquest of Azerbaijan, 
northern Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt. In subsequent decades, Ottoman 
supremacy was extended to Arabia, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, 
Yemen and the states of East Africa as far as Morocco. 
(iii) The European military campaigns of Sultan Suleyman I (the Magnificent) 
who ruled the Ottoman Empire for 46 years (1520 -66) longer than any 
other sultan, and led his amiy on thirteen campaigns to the frontiers of his 
domain.^  Ottomans conquered Belgrade, Rhodes, Budapest and most of 
Hungary. He even laid siege, though unsuccessfully, of the capital of 
Habsburg Empire, Vienna. At the time of Suleyman's death in 1566, the 
Ottoman Empire was a major European, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, 
and Persian Gulf power 
The sixteenth century was the century of expansion of the Ottoman 
Empire and historians consider the period 1453 to 1566 as its Golden Age. The 
seventeenth century was the century of preservation and the eighteenth century 
was the century of defeats. Altliough the Ottoman navy was defeated by a 
coalition of Western states at Lepanto in 1571—only five years after 
Suleyman's death—the Ottoman navy was able to re-establish its naval 
presence by taking Cyprus from Venice later in the same year. Not only the 
sultans, the grand viziers too (e.g., the Koprulu family which provided at least 
five talented grand viziers during 1656 to 1716)^  took measures to arrest the 
decline. The gradual decline was arrested and lost territories regained but lost 
again and these ups and downs continued for a very long time. 
Determined to capture Vienna, the Ottoman army led by Kara 
Mustafa, a grand vazier of Koprulu dynasty, made a second siege of Vienna in 
1683 but were defeated ending in the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz which 
granted Austria the provinces of Hungary and Transylvania and marked for the 
first time in history that the Ottoman Empire actually relinquished territory. 
Russians kept pushing into Ottoman territory in order to capture the Black Sea 
power. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans achieved many 
successes, including the defeat of Peter the Great at the Prut River in 1711. 
This might have made the Ottomans self-complacent. In 1690's, Ottomans 
were simultaneously at war with Austria and Russia and they were defeated on 
both fronts, culminating in the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca_(1774). The treaty 
was an enonnous blow to the Ottomans. Besides amiexing European territories 
ruled by Ottomans, it granted the Russians extensive commercial privileges in 
the Black Sea, a diplomatic presence in Istanbul, and the protection of the 
Orthodox Christian faith on Turkish soil. These provisions could have enabled 
Russia to be the protector of the Greek Orthodox millet within the Ottoman 
Empire. These unfortunate developments clearly showed that the Ottoman 
armed forces and its naval power had lost the technological advantages which 
they once possessed. Modernization of the Ottoman military was the urgent 
need for survival. The Ottoman Empire had perhaps over-extended its power— 
a mistake which those in power sometimes make. The Empire having extended 
to three continents and having a very long coastline created problems of 
external defence and internal cohesion. It was not able to properly maintain the 
great disciplined armies and could no longer finance them. Once the terror of 
Europe as the Ottoman forces steadily advanced towards Vienna, the Empire 
started going down after its Golden Age (1453-1566) and eventually collapsed 
with World War I, enabling the European colonial powers to carve it up leaving 
only that small portion which is now the Republic of Turkey. 
Before going into the causes of decline, we may first have a cursory 
look at the developments taking place in Europe at that time which gave 
Europe a position of strength. An eminent scholar has nicely analysed these 
developments by observing that during the period sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries, Europe experienced the thrust towards modernization, ushering in: 
(a) the scientific and philosophical revolution, (b) the cultural and theological 
revolution, (c) the political and democratic revolution, and (d) the 
technological and industrial revolution."* The industrial revolution brought with 
it revolution in technology, production processes, the generation of energy, 
transport, the markets, agricultural revolution, urbanization and all round 
commercial expansion. The Ottomans allowed penetration of European 
commerce into their empire which had a crippling effect on the native craft 
industries, shifted the balance of trade against Ottomans and made them 
dependent on European traders. The grant of capitulations to various European 
countries not only gave them commercial privileges but made the residents of 
those countries subject to the jurisdiction of their country's law (not the 
Ottoman law) and they could claim a right of hearing in a consular court. All 
this gave a relative superiority to the West. 
The eighteenth century defeats on battleground placed Turkey on the 
defensive; a general decay was apparent; loss of military glory had resulted in 
loss of political importance; and loss of power had demoralized the nation. 
Intellectual life had been affected too. It appeared as if Ottomans have lost their 
absorptive and expansionist power. It was Tsar Nicholas I of Russia who in 
1833 described the Ottoman Empire as "the Sick Man of Europe." 
What led to this unfortunate state of affairs? Internal decay preceded 
military defeats. The Ottoman historians date the decline of the Ottoman 
Empu-e from the death of Suleyman the Magnificent. As they noticed the first 
signs of breakdown in the Ottoman institutional structure, e.g., the decay of the 
sipahi class ^ some writers would push back the date to Suleyman's own reign.^ 
According to a Turkish proverb, "The fish stinks from the head." It 
began at the top. The Ottoman society was extremely traditional with a 
legitimized hierarchy comprising the Sultan, the Ulema, the army, and the 
administrative elite at the top. Occupational groups like peasants, craftsmen 
and tradesmen formed the lower stratum of the society. That society had a 
totalitarian and centralized state which controlled the whole socio-economic 
and cultural-political life from above. In such a set-up of society, decay at the 
top will disintegrate the entire system. 
The seventeen sultans after Suleyman who ruled for more than two 
centuries (Appendix-I gives the list of Ottoman sultans and Appendix-II 
highlights the chronology of important events during the reign of each of the 
sultans) were not all of high calibre to effectively administer such a vast and 
complex empire as the Ottomans held. Until 1600, succession depended on 
merit and when the practice of fratricide was discontinued in favour of 
seclusion, the princes raised in palaces were recluse with no military and 
administrative training.^ The great ghazi spirit with which the early sultans 
themselves led the armies was on the wane. During the reign of weak sultans, 
the grand viziers and army commanders sometimes arrogated to themselves 
wide powers without being authorized by the Sultan. Starting with Hurrem 
Sultana (Roxelana), wife of Suleyman, palace control of government, mainly 
by mothers of sultans and heirs presumptive, increased, giving rise to bribery, 
favouritism and corruption causing intrigues in public offices. Merit which was 
the hallmark of Ottoman administration was under eclipse. 
Another cause of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was that the 
original purity of Islam had been forgotten and many new ideas and practices 
had crept into it. Moral standards had also gone down at least in big cities and 
the ruling group. The need for refomi was felt in order to restore to Islam to its 
original purity. How the Umayyad caliph, Umar II ibn Abdul Aziz (717-20) 
bailed out the ummah in very difficult situations was to be emulated instead of 
just external expansion. For Umar II, it was more important to return to the 
original principles of Islam and restore the internal unity of Ummah and he was 
successful. 
The janissary, which at one time was the pride of Ottoman military, and 
its most efficient unit, now became corrupt, unruly and rebellious. When 
Osman II wanted to control their excesses, he was deposed and then executed 
by them. This weakened the military, the Ottoman economy, and the system of 
government. The series of defeats suffered by Ottomans, particularly from 
Russians, clearly showed that the janissaries were of little use in the defence of 
the Empire. 
The timur (feudal-like system of government) was also affected by the 
internal degeneration. To meet the needs of an expanding empire, the timur 
system was converted to a tax-based system of farm units, requiring 
administrators to send a portion of their tax revenues to Istanbul. Local 
administrators treated land as their private property, siphoned tax money, and 
removed any incentive for the peasant population to produce. The effects were 
not only economically disastrous, but this weakening of the centralised 
government also encouraged local bandit raids and peasant revolts, 
consequences which the government was ill-equipped to afford. 
The situation was the same in all the institutions of the ruling class. 
Most members of the Kapikulu corps and the feudal sipahis married, left the 
barracks, became merchants, artisans or estate owners, and abandoned military 
training altogether, and kept their corps memberships only for the revenues or 
privileges they received in return. They sent inferior substitutes when called to 
duty. 
Overpopulation was also a factor for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
The problems of overpopulation resulted mainly from radical increases in the 
birth rate and declines in the death rates, a result most likely of the era of peace 
and security that the Ottoman Empire had brought and a decline in the 
frequency of the plague.^ 
Moreover, the economy of the Empire declined. The financing of the 
wars was a great drain on the state exchequer and resulted in general inflation. 
The villages were depopulated in favour of cities and towns, where there were 
not enough jobs for everyone. The guilds, which formed the backbone of the 
Ottoman craft industry, had become so entrenched and less enterprising that 
they could no longer compete in the international market.^ 
"Economic decline had pushed the fiscal administrative-
military institutions, basic to Ottoman rule, out of gear. This 
was reflected in internal and external failures: military, 
economic, etc. the statesmen of that century were sucked into 
the vortex at each attempt to make refomis. The eighteenth 
century was to face the task of deciding at which point the 
screws could be broken and turned into a linear path towards a 
new order. ° 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the economic field, 
and the rise of the West was due to the thrust of modernisation, bringing about 
a new consciousness in the ruling class, which began to think in terais of 
"reforms on western model". 
The process of westernisation had started in the eighteenth century in a 
modest way. Scholars of Ottoman history generally take the view that the 
military failures evident from the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz 
(1718) which confirmed Western military superiority made the Ottomans look 
West-wards. The grand vizir Nevsehirli Ibrahim Pa§a (1718-30) also favoured 
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this tendency. A memorandum emphasizing the need to catch up with the 
European military progress was submitted to Sultan Ahmed III (1703-30). The 
year 1718 is, from this perspective, taken as the beginning of westernisation." 
Many observers especially students were sent to Europe by the Ottoman 
Sultans to know about the nature and method of material progress there and to 
find out solutions to the existing Ottoman problems. As early as 1720, Mehmet 
Faizi, known as Yirmisekiz Celebi or Celebi Mehmet was sent to Europe by the 
Sultan to seek and adopt whatever was of utility to the Turks. His son, who 
accompanied, Celebi, got permission from Sheik - ul - Islam for Ibrahim 
Muteferrika to set up the first printing press in the Empire to produce books 
in Turkish and the seventeen books that he published were mostly related to 
scientific and military subjects.''' This initiative had a significant impact on the 
cultural and social life of the Ottomans. Subsequently the French revolution 
had a decisive impact on the Turkish intellectuals and affected to a greater or 
lesser degree every layer of that Muslim society.'"* 
The above discussion clearly brings out that it is wrong to believe that 
the ruling class faced the internal decline without making any efforts to amend 
the situation. There were reformers and reforms at crucial times during the 17"^  
and 18 centuries, though many of them were under the illusion that the 
Ottoman system was far superior to any thing that the infidels might develop -
an attitude that had considerable justification only when first evolved in the 16' 
century. According to this idea, the reason for Ottoman decline was a failure to 
apply the techniques and forms of organizations that had achieved success at 
the peak of the Ottoman power, normally equated with the reign of Suleyman 
the Magnificent. To the traditionalist reformers of the 17"^  and 18"^  centuries, 
then, reforms could be achieved by making the system work as it had 
previously, by eliminating those who squandered public money and property, 
ending bribery and corruption, making appointments only according to merit, 
reforming and revitalizing the traditional military corps, and throwing out all 
those who refused to perfonn the duties required of them. For example, Sultan 
Murad IV (1623-1640) and grand vazier Mehmed Koprulu (1656-61) were 
mainly concerned with eliminating corruption and other social and economic 
evils. These reformers were often ruthless in their methods, but to a surprising 
extent they were successful, restoring things sufficiently well for the Empire to 
recover from the worst effects of disorganisation, but these reforms alone were 
not enough. The Ottoman Empire had to match the increasing superiority of the 
West brought by the thrust of modernisation, particularly in scientific and 
technological fields. This they had to borrow from the West to effectively 
oppose the West. 
The long years of war had so badly drained the Empire of its resources 
and the loss of territories long considered integral parts of the Empire had so 
much demoralized the people that any efforts to save the Empire seemed 
impossible. However, for the first time a few Ottomans began to see that 
reform was possible if only the Empire could discover what Europe had done 
to achieve its new supremacy and incorporate what was the best into the 
Ottoman system. Reformers now began to accept the possibility that might be 
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used to strengthen and preserve the traditional ways, particularly new fonns of 
military organisation and weapons. Traditionalistic reform, therefore, became a 
combination of old and new style of modem reforni during the nineteenth 
century. Even this limited change was to develop only hesitantly and gradually 
in response to new challenges and in the face of continued opposition from 
those who felt that any "innovations" would only weaken the entire Ottoman 
structure. Therefore, reforms had their ups and downs during the eighteenth 
century; temporary successes usually led to disaster for the reformers, but 
enough traces remained to provide models and experience for those who 
followed.'^  
The Reforms of Amca Zade Huseyin Pa§a: 
The Ottoman history of the second half of the seventeenth century is 
dominated by the name of Koprulu. The appointment of Koprulu Mehmed Pa§a 
as grand vazier in 1656 marked the beginning of a period during which many 
members of his family were to hold this office.'^  
Amca Zade Huseyin Pa§a (1644-1702), son of Mehmed Koprulu's 
eldest brother, served as grand vizier from 1697 to 1702 during the period 
following the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 '^  Amca Zade Huseyin Pa§a sought 
to meet the needs of the common people as well as those of the army and 
government by emphasising economic and financial solutions. The excise taxes 
on tobacco and coffee - which had been doubled and then doubled again 
during the war to provide the treasury with ready cash - were substantially 
reduced along with impositions on essentials such as oil and soap. Efforts again 
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were made to restore the value of coinage by replacing the debased wartime 
issues with coins of full value. Tax arrears owed to the treasury for all special 
wartime impositions were excused without penalty, and the impositions 
themselves were abolished, while the traditional taxes were geared more to the 
ability to pay. The concessions were given to induce cultivators to return to 
their fields and merchants to their trades. Efforts were made to develop 
factories to compete with European manufactured imports that had devastated 
the traditional Ottoman craft industries. 
Huseyin Pa§a also took steps to make the Ottoman anny effective and 
reliable. Members of the amiy no longer perfomiing their duties were 
dismissed and replaced by those who were required to remain under discipline 
and training at all times. The previous practice of taking artisans into the corps 
to serve on a part-time basis was abolished. 
Efforts were also made to revive the Ottoman Navy. The fleet was 
divided into squadrons, each under a derya-bey {bey of the sea), who had to 
supervise the captains and their ships and ensure that each man was paid and 
trained and that each ship had sufficient ammunitions and supplies. A general 
staff, between the grand admiral and his captains, was created, including three 
main assistants of the grand admiral, the Kapudane (rear Admiral), the 
Patrona, (Vice-Admiral), and the Riyale (Staff Admiral). All vacancies filled 
according to ability and experience. A special artillery corps was also 
established to end the navy's dependence on the Kapikulu Artillery and enable 
it to develop a service more responsive to its own needs. 
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The Reforms of Halil Hamit: 
Halil Hamit was a Turkish Muslim whose experience was shaped 
largely by long years of service in the Scribal Institution, particularly in the 
office of the Reis-ul-Kuttap, in-charge of the Sultan's correspondence and 
governments. He gained a wider view of the Ottoman system only after 1781, 
when he was appointed lieutenant {Kethuda) of the Grand Vizir. He was grand 
vizir from 1782 to 1785. 
During the conflict with Russia over Crimea, Halil Hamit attempted to 
strengthen the existing Ottoman forces against the war that he thought would 
follow. Soldiers were mobilized and sent with supplies and ammunition to the 
major border forts, which were repaired and, in a few instances, entirely 
reconstructed under his supervision. Systematic efforts were made to establish 
standing reserves of supplies and men at major rear-guard posts at Edime, 
Sofia, and Isakgi to provide reinforcements to whichever front first met the 
enemy attack and to enable the army to regroup in case the enemy broke 
through front line positions. 
Halil Hamit attempted to end the old-new dualism by coordinating the 
two groups and giving the older corps the organisation, discipline, and weapons 
associated with the new corps and schools. De Tott's Rapid - Fire Artillery 
corps was revived and enlarged along with the mathematics school with the 
help of French technicians. French technicians largely appointed in the 
Engineering school. French fortification experts modernised the major frontier 
forts, published Turkish translations of French textbooks and built a 
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fortification school that became the basis for the later Army Engineering 
School. 
Efforts were also made to restore the traditional institutions. Inspectors 
were sent to the provinces to force the timar holders to live on their lands, train, 
and come to the army when called. Those of their officers found to be 
committing violations or concealing vacancies were subjected to instant 
execution. Members of the Janissary'^  corps refusing to accept training and 
discipline were dismissed. Children of members were not allowed to enrol in 
the corps unless they were found to have particular ability and interest in the 
service. Halil Hamit dismissed as many as two-thirds of the men listed on the 
Janissary rolls, raising the salaries of the balance to make them cooperate in 
modernising the corps. He also established groups of Janissaries and sipahis to 
be trained in the new weapons and tactics of the European - style infantry and 
artillery. 
Halil Hamit devoted considerable attention to the Empire's economic 
problems. Though orders to restore the value of the currency and to control 
prices were traditional, he encouraged the revival of Ottoman craft industries, 
which had been overwhelmed by European competition during the previous 
century. The cloth-manufacturing guilds were encouraged to increase 
production in order to meet the current need. °^ Ibrahim Mutaferrika's ' old 
printing press, which had long since fallen into disuse, resumed printing, and 
treasury funds were used to begin publication with the official chronicles of 
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Siiphi and Izzi, who described the development of the empire in the two 
decades after the Patrona Revoh. 
On 27'^  April, 1785, Halil Hamit was dismissed and soon after executed 
by order of the Sultan. Without his encouragement and stimulus the impetus for 
reform was lost. In 1787 the French technicians were withdrawn from Ottoman 
reformation. ^^  
The New Reforms of Selim III, 1789-1807: 
Reform in Turkey was a complex phenomenon as solution to the old 
problems created new problems but the process brought the Empire close to 
contemporary European society and culture. Sultan Selim III was the first ruler 
of Turkey who conceived that without reforms the Empire could not regain its 
lost vigour. He therefore introduced a series of refomis that were far-reaching 
and were considered radical. He separated the administrative and military 
functions in the army and established new hierarchies. He also established 
military drills under foreign advice and tried to reduce the number of 
Janissaries. This ruler realised that the Janissaries were too slow and reluctant 
to accept the reforms and he created a new corps, known as 'New Order" 
{Nizam- i - Jadid), gave them the latest weapons, and employed teachers for 
them from France and England. He separated the new corps from the rest of the 
army both in command and financing. Reforms along the same lines were 
instituted in the navy and artillery. He modernised the existing cannon 
foundries. He also established land and naval engineering schools. 
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The reforms of Sultan Selim III, even though radical for the army, did 
not encompass the social, economic and governmental sectors of the Empire. 
He was very much impressed by the Austrian and French military movements. 
He tried to make the old institutions work better and more honestly. He 
discouraged nepotism and established a hiring system based on ability."^ 
Sultan Selim III was the first ruler who tried to transfomi the Empire, 
along western line. He realised the necessity of making more comprehensive 
reforms. Modernization, it was felt, would require a thoroughgoing 
examination of the basic traditional institutions themselves. It came to be 
realised that a policy of innovation could not be carried out while the 
traditional system remained entirely intact, and that it would necessitate some 
alterations in those institutions that were the main obstacle to change. 
In addition to external challenges the new phase of refonn was 
stimulated by certain economic and political trends which were products of the 
silent and indirect impact of the West. They were: 
i) The increasing impoverishment of the people, and the increasing 
financial difficulties of the government. 
ii) The rise of strong local lords to challenge the central authority, and 
iii) Uprisings followed by movements for independence among the non-
Muslim peoples. 
In-spite of stately intentions, Sultan Salim III was a man lacking in 
determination. From this personal weakness emerged something which we 
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might call an innovation: his habit of organising councils and committees to 
discuss the affairs of the state, in which he invited his advisors to submit 
projects of reform and insisted on having them express their opinions in 
absolute freedom. 
Under Sultan Selim's regime, the scope of reforni was widened to 
include the following points of view: 
i) That the problem of rehabilitation was not merely a matter of military 
refonns but also a matter of civil reform; 
ii) That a comprehensive reform plan should be devised by deliberation and 
universal consent; 
iii) That economic recovery should occupy a major place in the reforms. 
Above all, most of the reports were concerned with military reforms. On 
this major topic the opinions were divided into the following three groups: '^* 
i) That the Janissaries and other military orders must be restored to their 
original forms; 
ii) That the reforms were not possible in the older military institutions and 
in their out fashioned methods and, therefore they must be abolished and 
replaced by new methods; ^^  
iii) Those new and modem methods should be introduced under the pretext 
of restoring them to their original forms. 
A majority of advisors were in favour of continuing the training of new 
military forces and gradually converting the entire military organisation to the 
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type of those new forces. Nearly all agreed on the absolute necessity of inviting 
more European military officers as trainers the majority of them French and 
English. Translations from European works on military science were also 
mentioned in some of the reports as one of the urgent needs. 
Most of the reports contained details about the needs of the various 
branches of the military forces, such as artillery, arms equipment, topography 
and map-making, ship- building and arsenals, etc. 
A second major topic handled in many of the reports was the problem of 
reforming the timars and other beneficiaries. However, there were no new and 
far-reaching proposals regarding the solution of the difficulties. As many 
repeated the necessity of enforcing the law (previously passed under Halil 
Hamit) to reform the timar system, a modified form of the same law was 
prepared later following the suggestions given in the reports. Many of the 
reports emphasised die point that the beneficiaries fallen vacant should not be 
sold or farmed; their revenues should be collected directly by the Imperial 
Mint. 
The third major point discussed was the need for refonning the 
currency. The idea suggested was that of liquidating the debased currency and 
restoring the real value of coins. Yet Selim, under the economic pressure of the 
Russian war, had to resort to the old policy and issued debased money. 
Although this had secured some additional income to the treasury, it led 
ultimately to further economic difficulties. 
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In a close agreement in the discussion it was resolved that the West 
should be taken as the source and model of anything to be introduced.^ ^ 
It has its own significance and importance as the traditional (old) 
institutions and systems were gradually decaying under various reforms giving 
rise to new forms which were quasi-modern in their character and, in many 
cases, were a prelude to the European cultural dominance over the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The Turning point in Ottoman Reformation: 
The emergence in the early eighteenth century of the idea that it would 
be necessary to reform the existing organisation by introducing new methods 
marked a turning point in Ottoman reformation. 
The period of progressive reforms following the Treaty of Kaynarca was 
ended by a conservative reaction and another war with Russia in 1787. This 
war, in which (with the outbreak of the French Revolution) Turkey was entirely 
isolated, ^^  and this situation compelled the Turks to reflect upon their 
weaknesses and backwardness. 
Sultan Selim III was the first Sultan to attempt to transfomi his empire 
along western lines rather then to try to go back to the good old days of 
Suleyman the Magnificent, (1520-1566). He attempted and planned a large-
scale westernization in the administration, military, judiciary and commerce, 
which were considered the initial stages of the process of modernization in the 
Empire. Sultan Selim III failed because of the opposition of military and 
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religious vested interests, the janissaries, and the Ulem^. His successor. Sultan 
Mahmud II (1808-1839), was more successful in ae$troying the Janissaries 
completely, which reflected a significant victory for the|modemist intelligentsia 
against the conservative religious forces.^' Sultan Mahiiiud II did not transfomi 
his Empire, but he did clear the grounds for later refdrmers by removing two 
great obstacles to change -- the Janissaries and the provincial lords.^° 
I 
Military Reforms: 
Sultan Selim III was a true Ottoman reformer c^ t the eighteenth century, 
who devoted most of his attention and energy to thej military. Selim and his 
reform cadre were able to proceed with the task of carrying out those proposals 
they chose to accept. Orders were issued to reforri^iall the existing military 
corps, including the Janissaries. The basic principle |uf organizational refonn 
was the separation of the administrative and militar>j functions in each corps, 
with a separate supervisors being appointed to hanjdle the commanders, the 
Agas (high officials) were left with military duties.j New organisations were 
established to assure the maximum ability of each [corps. Officials and men 
were subjected to examinations, and those found lacking in ability and honesty 
were replaced. Efforts were made to assure that app(j)intments were made only 
according to ability, but promotions were made on seniority basis. The barracks 
of the corps were enlarged and modernised. All members were required to do 
exercises regularly. 
In addition to the general reforms applied to all the corps, there also 
were specific ones for the special needs of each. Efforts were made to issue 
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new rotational system: one of each ten sipahis from the same district was sent 
home to administer the holdings of the others, while the rest stayed in the field, 
at advance bases along the frontiers, or in the service of the provincial 
governors. The provincial governors were ordered to train youths from their 
own followers or attendants to provide replacements as and when needed. Sons 
of the members were allowed to enter the corps only if they had ability. Efforts 
were made to issue new European - type rifles and ammunition to the 
janissaries, with each regiment being given eight trained riflemen to provide 
leadership and instruction in their use. Their barracks were rebuilt and 
enlarged, and their officers were won over with special gifts and tax farnis. 
Reforms were far more successful in the older Artillery (Topcu), Mortar 
(Humbaraci), Mine-Laying (Lagimci), and Cannon-Wagon {Top Arabaci) 
corps already influenced by the work of de Tott and others. They were 
completely reorganised and put under the command of able young Ottoman 
officers trained by de Tott, assisted by French advisors brought in after 1794. 
Discipline was restored; the men were not allowed to marry and had to remain 
in their barracks; and more money was provided to attract the best youths into 
the service. 
Sultan Selim III developed and established an entirely new force or new 
army, called Nizam -i - Jadid (New order), entirely separate and independent of 
the Janissary system. The force was organised, trained, and clothed in the 
European style, with European tactics, discipline, and weapons applied under 
the direction of experts brought from France, England and Germany. To 
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finance the corps, an independent treasury was created, the Irad - i - Jadid 
(New Revenue), with funds from new sources Hke lands brought into 
cuhivation. The new institution was created to supply revenues not previously 
collected by the treasury, leaving the latter intact and unreformed. 
By the end of Selim's reign, then, the Nizam - i - Jadid anny had a large 
number of men armed with new weapons and trained and commanded by 
European officers, and they were praised for their efficiency by almost all the 
Europeans who saw them. Together with the reformed Artillery Corps it should 
have provided the Sultan with an efficient military force, able to meet the 
enemy on equal terms. '^ 
Economic Reforms: 
In the eighteenth century, many outstanding innovations in the thinking 
underlying the reports were the major place given to economic measures. Some 
of the measures considered will clear this as well as the inadequacy of the 
means chosen. 
Much of the financial troubles had come from the treasury's traditional 
systems, with specified revenues assigned to particular expenditures and 
promissory notes issued to care for additional obligations, to be paid from the 
first available revenues. There was no overall budget, and the resuh was 
periodic financial chaos. Selim responded to the problem, not by trying to 
establish a budgetary system but simple by making the old system work. 
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The idea of getting foreign loans as a relief for the financial crisis was 
raised for the first time. However, receiving a loan from a European country 
met with opposition on the ground that it would be degrading for a Muslim 
government. Some advised arranging a loan from a Muslim country, but there 
was found none able to lend. Secret negotiations with the representatives of the 
Netherlands met with no success. There remained, then the three traditional 
fiscal methods: confiscation of the property; compulsory donation; and the 
debasement (mis) of the coinage; however, these did not change the conditions 
consistently, but only led to inflation and the devaluation of the money paid by 
the government. 
The prohibition of export of precious metals and stones and the 
exploitation of mines were recommended by the reports in connection with the 
financial crisis. 
Many of them advised to concentrate on the trade because trade was the 
main source of the Economic development. Efforts were made to create a 
Turkish merchant marine. Among the Muslims, those who had money should 
invest in the merchant marine; they should buy ships and establish companies. 
None of the measures taken in accordance with the recommendations of 
the reports produced any tangible economic reform; they only implied the birth 
of consciousness that the lack of a modem national economy lay at the root of 
the troubles.^ '* 
Selim's most important economic successes came in his efforts to 
regulate the provision of grain, coffee, and other food to the cities, thus partly 
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counteracting inflation, though these continued to be endemic to the end of his 
reign.^ ^ 
Technical Reforms: 
Technical reforms were introduced into the Empire to provide the 
Sultan's armies with modern weapons. The cannon foundries and rifle works 
were modernised by officers brought from France and England. 
Technical schools were established to train young ottomans in the 
services and techniques of the West. Selim was much slow in expanding 
technical schools because he concentrated on the mihtary reforms particularly 
the Nizam - i - Jadid (New Order). In 1795 Sultan Selim established the new 
Muhendishane - / - Berri - i - Humayun (Land Engineering School), to train 
army officers in the theoretical and practical aspects of artillery, fortification, 
mine lying, and engineering. All graduates who did not stay to teach or assist 
were assured of positions as officers in the cannon. Mortar, and Mine laying 
corps, and all the officers of these corps, in turn, were required to go to the 
school at regular intervals for refresher courses. As far as can be made out, 
none of its foreign teachers or Turkish graduates were allowed to serve with the 
janissaries, but they did take most of the posts of the Nizam - i - Jadid army and 
the Artillery and associated corps, providing a nucleus of well trained, modem 
and refonning officers to help Sultan Selim and his successors in their efforts.^ ^ 
24 
Navy (Naval) Reforms: 
Gazi Hassan was able to build 22 modem ships of the line by Selim's 
accession, though he was much less successful in creating a cadre for able 
officers and men. Also he provided the plan and cadre for further refonns 
undertaken by Selim's boyhood companion Kucuk Husain Pa§a, who was 
grand admiral through most of the Sultan's period between March 11, 1792 and 
January 7, 1803. Several laws were passed and enforced to attract and retain 
able officers, with promotions based on ability, and promotion maintained to 
assure that the best men would rise to the top. Inspectors were sent out to 
prevent the captains from diverting the food, equipment, and money assigned 
to their ships to their own profit. High salaries, regular training, and a system of 
discipline and control were adopted to encourage the development of sailors 
into a professional and permanent force. The Imperial Naval Arsenal (Tersane) 
was enlarged under the direction of French naval architects. New provincial 
arsenals were opened. The old ships were modernised, and many modem ships 
were built according to the latest standards of naval architecture. The naval 
school at Haskoy was enlarged and modernised; lessons in geometry and 
arithmetic now accompanied by more practical subjects in seamanship and 
navigation were made compulsory; and a separate division was created to 
provide training in naval architecture, geography, and cartography. 
A superintendent was appointed by the government, for the naval affairs 
{iimur - u - bahriye - naziriP), he was also in-charge of an Admiralty 
department with its own treasury (Tersane Hazinesi). Under him separate 
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military and administrative departments were organised, with the grand admiral 
in-charge of naval organisation, arrangement, equipment, training and military 
command as well as the assignment, promotion and demotion of men and the 
maintenance and administration of ships; the director of the naval treasury was 
responsible for all matters regarding provisions, supplies, and weapons of the 
arsenal. A separate naval medical service was established, and doctors and 
surgeons were assigned to take care of people of each ship. European medical 
books were translated into Turkish; instruments and books were purchased 
from Europe; and each of the medical students was required to gain practical 
experience by serving, which were very usefiil for the treatment of infectious 
diseases, particularly the plague. Thus as part of the process, the navy was 
modernised, and developed. 
Administrative and Social Reforms: 
Most of Selim's reforms were only partly successful. There were no 
general efforts at governmental or social modernization, only piecemeal 
attempts were made to meet the old problems in the old ways. Government 
officials always had been relatively independent in their posts and were 
allowed to spend as much as they wanted without either administrative or 
financial supervision. Selim responded to the problem, by reorganising the 
scribal service into an expanded administrative department of the grand Vezir, 
called Bab - i - Asafi, subjecting the scribes to new standards of honesty and 
efficiency, and dismissing those unable or unwilling to comply. Bribery was 
considerably eliminated; scribes were appointed and promoted once again 
26 
according to ability; and the reis - ui - kuttap, now administrative assistant to 
the grand Vazir, was put in charge of niaicing the system work. Selim's only 
other important administrative reform involved a reduction of the number of 
Ottoman holding the rank of Vezir. Efforts were made to reduce the 
appointment gifts given to the Sultan by Ottomans appointed to administrative 
positions in the hope that they in turn would no longer be forced to demand and 
accept bribes and extra legally taxed to recoup the expense of obtaining and 
maintaining their positions. 
Sultan Selim's social reforms were not irmovative. The urban and rural 
problems were met with regulations attempting to suppress their most serious 
results. Rural labour that came from the countryside was forced to return to 
their homes, whether or not there were land and jobs waiting for them there. An 
order was issued from authority, closing hotels, taverns, and coffeehouses to 
prevent transients from finding lodging and food in the cities, and also forcing 
them to leave. Increased tension among different religious groups, largely 
consequent on the economic difficulties of the time, were "solved" with 
regulations requiring persons to wear only the traditional clothing allowed to 
them according to their class and rank, assuming that if everyone knew the 
position and place of every other person, there would be fewer conflicts.^ ^ 
Educational Reforms: 
As in every other field, Selim's measures in education were expansions 
upon the developments of the preceding period. 
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In 1769 the school of Engineering (Muhendishane) was established for 
training engineers and officers. This school expanded in 1792 and in 1795 
under Sultan Selim III. Most of the teaching in this school was done by Turks. 
Foreign^^ help was provided chiefly by Frenchmen, and also few English and 
Swedish names among those listed as teachers, in the school. Two foreign 
languages, Arabic and French, one representing the Islamic sciences and the 
other new European science, were compulsory for all students. 
Selim III took a direct interest in the books and liberty. He donated some 
instruments and a number of books on mathematical sciences. He encouraged 
the translation of books from French; one was a work by Vauban, the French 
engineer of fortifications that were considered impenetrable in Louis XIV's 
time. 
It was at this time that books in Western languages came into use. The 
engineering school had an attached library. Most of its holdings were in 
French. Dictionaries and works on mathematics and military sciences 
predominated. It is reported that there was also a set of the French 
Encyclopaedia. 
In 1793, permanent embassies were established at the leading European 
capitals (London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid). Ambassadors were 
instructed to study both the military situation in the countries to which they 
were assigned and the administration and civil organization. To each were to be 
assigned a few young men to learn the language of the country and other 
knowledge useful to the state. 
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Meanwhile, some of those educated in the new schools, or in contact 
with European life, began to write on scientific subjects in French and Turkish. 
Selim sent young Turks to Europe with his ambassadors, ordering them 
to learn European languages and get acquainted with European institutions. 
Selim seems to have been heedless (careless) of the 
psychological disturbances created among the people by his 
innovations. There are indications that his ambitions were 
wider than his achievements. According to Leangles, 'that 
beside his desire to have a modernised army Selim intended to 
crush the resistance of the Ulama, and that he wanted to 
restrict the authority of the Seykh ul - Islam in order to be an 
independent enlightened monarch, and finally, that he wished 
to benefit from the developments which the Europeans had 
achieved in sciences and arts. After Selim's downfall, 
Mahmud II, carried reforms of far-reaching consequences in 
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the empire. 
The Modern Reforms of Mahmud 11 (1808-1839): 
The new era of modem Turkish reforms was started in the last decade of 
the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). He was one of the more effective 
and forceful rulers in the Ottoman Empire. As already discussed above, 
janissaries had become a serious threat to the empire. Faced with a series of 
defeats, mainly from Russians, the janissaries were of little use in the defence 
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of the empire. They had become so powerful, corrupt, and violent that they 
deposed and elevated sultans at their will, beheaded grand vaziers, and opposed 
every attempt at refomis. Mahmud prepared the ground before he took the vital 
step of eliminating them. He formed a new artillery group trained by German 
military advisors with modem weapons and then he issued a decree abolishing 
the corps.'*' Thus we can say that where Sultan Selim III failed because of the 
opposition of the janissaries, the Ulema and other vested interests, his 
successor, Sultan Mahmud II, was more successful in destroying the janissaries 
completely and reducing the hold of ulema by bypassing them which reflected 
a significant victory for the modernist intelligentsia against the conservative 
religious forces."*^  Mahmud did pay some attention to education of the new 
bureaucrats and towards the end of his reign he set up another "higher "school 
for educating officials, in which French and other secular subjects were taught. 
He developed two other channels to gain knowledge of French and some other 
western learning: re-established permanent embassies in Europe which were 
closed after the death of Selim III enabling young ottomans serving abroad to 
have opportunities of western learning and the establishment of a new 
translation bureau to handle increasing diplomatic correspondence. Sultan 
Mahmud II, did not transform his empire, but through this historic event, he 
opened the way for other reforms in Turkey."*^  Thus we see that his work was 
extended and at least partially completed during the Tanzimat reform period, 
which encompassed the reigns of his sons Sultan Abdul Majid (1839-1861), 
and Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876). This era of refonns in the history of the 
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Ottoman Empire came to be known as the period of Tanzimat, which forms 
part of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
TANZIMAT (1839- 1856) 
The history of the Middle East over the past two hundred years, whether 
it is of Turkey, or the Arabic-speaking world, is largely the story of the reaction 
of the governments and people of the region to the challenges of western 
civilization. These challenges have been political, technological, social, 
religious, economic, literary, and artistic in nature. 
The encounter of the people of the Middle East with Western 
civilization has produced two types of revolutions which may be identified as 
the two aspects of the same phenomenon called Nationalism. 
i) The revolution for independence from a colonial power, and 
ii) The revolution for change. 
The revolution for independence is relatively short, spectacular, and 
cohesive; whereas the revolution for change is long, tedious, and divisive. 
Unlike the Arab world, Turkey has never been ruled directly by a 
European power. Therefore, the revolution for independence did not occur but 
revolution for change did. The eighteenth century was the century of defeats 
and during the 18"^  and 19*'' centuries the Ottomans were forced to give up a 
good deal of what they had conquered during the previous centuries.' With 
Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire which had already begun was further accelerated. The invasion once 
again proved western superiority and showed that the Ottoman Empire was just 
as vulnerable in the south as in the north. This compelled the Turks to look into 
their weaknesses and adopt measures to reverse the process. 
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We have already discussed in chapter I, the reforms introduced by 
Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and some 
grand viziers. Inspired by the developments in the West, they sought to 
modernize the military and other governmental institutions. These earlier 
reforais prepared the ground for the more important refomis known as the 
Tanzimat.'^  
Tanzimat was thus the second phase of the Ottoman Reforms. During 
the Tanzimat period from 1839 to 1877, the Ottoman reformers attempted 
serious reforms on western model but within the Ottoman framework. In fact, it 
meant the accommodation of western changes in the "whole Ottoman culture" 
or the introduction of western changes without negating the "Ottoman 
particularity". In this way, the Ottoman reformers represented "a mixture of 
East and West".^ In the spirit of the liberal tradition, they introduced modem 
schools. Western literary and theatrical adaptation, scientific books, and 
magazines and new concepts like individual freedom and participation in the 
government.'' They had to build up a legal system to ensure the equality and 
security of all the peoples, and emphasized, by implication, the improvement in 
all fields, particularly military, financial, and judicial.^ Tanzimat reforms gave 
the idea of state Nationalism and democracy. The reformists took up 
democracy and the non-Muslims took up Nationalism and the latter spread 
throughout the Empire and had the support of foreign powers.^ 
With the beginning of Tanzimat reforms in 1839, the doors were thrown 
wide open to the West infiltrating the Turkish economic, political, legal, and 
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educational institutions impacting the basic social values for the first time.'' A 
distinctive feature of Tanzimat Reforais is that they were inspired by the 
bureaucrats who were career diplomats, the so-called "French knowers" who 
had had exposure to European environment. Increase in secularisation occurred 
as more and more European ways were superimposed on the Ottoman society. 
Sultan Mahmud II was succeeded by his younger son, Abdul Majid 
(1839-1861). He clearly conceived the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire. On 
November 3, 1839, in the Giilhane, or 'Rose Bower,' in the outer gardens of 
Topkapi Palace, he promulgated what came to be known as the Giilhane Edict, 
which formally inaugurated the era of Tanzimat. The Edict was proclaimed by 
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his foreign minister, Mustafa Rashid Pasha, m the presence of the Sultan and 
an assemblage of foreign ambassadors, statesmen and clerics. The Edict (in 
vernacular, Hatti Sharif of Gulhanef was notified in the official gazette 
Takvim - i - vikayi and governors were instructed to arrange its ceremonial 
readings in public places in towns and cities of the Empire. The Sultan 
announced that he wished the honour and property of all his subjects to remain 
secure; that the tax-farming would be abolished and the recruiting for the army 
would be done in a more regular fashion; all criminals would be tried in public 
and all subjects, of whatever religion, would be considered equal before the 
law.'° Seventeen years later, on February 18, 1856, the same Sultan issued 
another Royal Decree that is known as the "Imperial rescript" {Hatti 
Humayyun). Two bureaucrats (Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha) and three European 
ambassadors played a major role in preparing this second Edict. Both these 
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statements, though issued under pressure, nevertheless started an era of reform 
in the Ottoman Empire that is called Tanzimat." The Hatt -i Humayiin was 
basically a reaffirmation of the earlier charter of 1839, it went even further by 
assuring non-Muslims of religious liberty and equality in the administration of 
justice, taxation, public employment and military service as well as admission 
to the civil and military schools. The Hatt -i Hiimayiin, however, ignored the 
rising tide of nationalism among non-Muslims and failed to appreciate the 
effects of reforms based upon the millet system.'^  
Definition and Meaning 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the word Tanzimat is the 
name given to the 'Programme of Reforms' which began in the reign of Sultan 
Abdul Mejit on November 3, 1839, with the proclamation of a decree known as 
'Hatt - i - Sherif of Gulhane', which sought to modernise the Ottoman State 
and Society. The word Tanzimat is the plural of Tanzim which means ordering. 
Tanzimat meant a series of acts that would give a new order to the organisation 
of the state. It is derived from the Turkish word "ITMIK" which means 
"Drafting the Law"'.'^  
Causes Behind - the raison deter. 
These refonn measures which, in fact, were a logical outcome and 
continuation of the reforms initiated by Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II 
were aimed at: 
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a) saving the Ottoman Empire from foreign intervention in its internal 
matters; 
b) making the Empire internally strong and united; 
c) pacifying the hostile sentiments of all Ottoman subjects (who were 
constantly involved in revolutionary activities) by providing them 
justice and equality before law. At a time when Ottomans were facing 
the nationalist independence movements and nationalist uprisings, 
supported by European powers, these two Edicts were aimed at 
securing the loyalty of its Christian subjects and placating the foreign 
powers; and 
d) making the Empire strong militarily and otherwise to meet European 
challenges which was possible by emulating European modernism. 
The Three Phases of the Tanzimat Period: 
The entire Tanzimat period has been divided into three phases: 
Phase I: (From 1839 to 1856). In this period the main responsibility of the 
reforms rested on the shoulders of Mustafa Rasheed Pasha who 
became grand vizier (prime-minister) for six times and twice served 
as foreign minister 
Phase II: (From 1856 to 1871). In this phase the active leaders of these 
reforms were Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, disciples of Rasheed Pasha, 
who held diplomatic positions overseas and served as grand 
viziers/foreign minister; 
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Phase III: (From 1871 till the end). The great personality of this period was 
Midhat Pasha., who also worked as grand vizier and was also called 
the "father of the constitution" promulgated in 1876. He was 
murdered in 1884 at the instance of SuUan Abdul Hamid. 
Hatt-i-Sharif of Gulhane 
Abdul Majeed became the new Sultan of the Ottoman Empire at the age 
of sixteen years. In view of his upbringing "in seclusion" he, like many other 
Ottoman Sultans, was not proficient in state matters. He felt more at home in 
the company of eunuchs and women of the palace. However he had a kind 
disposition towards his subjects and wished for their well-being. He was 
fortunate to have a galaxy of very able and competent bureaucrats, grand 
viziers and governors. As already discussed (supra p. 37 of this chapter), four 
months later of his accession on November 3, 1839, Sultan Abdul Majeed 
through his foreign minister Mustafa Rasheed Pasha issued the first Imperial 
Decree by the name of "Noble rescript of the Rose chamber" (Hatt - i - Sharif 
of Gulhane), which is regarded as the beginning of the Tanzimat period. The 
chief architect of these reforms was Mustafa Rasheed Pasha, who was a 
dominant figure in the government. So he is often called the father of the 
Tanzimat.'^  
This order prepared by a consultative council (Mejlis - i - Shura) stated 
that: 
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i) the old discarded system had to be replaced by new laws (Kavanin - i -
Jadid), 
ii) these laws would be in accordance with the Sharia 'h; 
iii) they would be based upon the inviolability of life, property, and honour 
as legal fundamentals; and 
iv) they would be equally applicable to all Muslims and to the peoples of 
the millets.'^ 
Under the above guidelines, further refomis were undertaken which may 
be summarized as under: 
i) It abolished capital punishment without a trial; 
ii) It guaranteed justice to all citizens with respect to their life, honour and 
property; 
iii) It established a council of justice to frame laws and a new penal code 
against which no infringement would be tolerated because of personal 
ranks or influence; 
iv) It abolished the tax on farming and instituted the collection of taxes by 
government officials; 
v) Methods of Army recRiitmcnt and length of services were to be 
reviewed by the Imperial Military Council and new procedures were 
promised to ensure regularity and impartiality for all the parts of the 
Empire; 
41 
vi) It was also embodied in the decree that its provisions pertain to all 
I 7 
subjects irrespective of religion or sect. 
These refonns served the dual purpose of appeasing the European 
powers, which had started meddling in the domestic affairs of Turkey, win over 
the loyalty of Ottoman Christians, and to re-establish confidence in the home 
government.'^ 
The ''Halt - i - Sherif of Gillhane'^ was also very significant as for the 
first time it ensured equality among the Ottoman subjects, introduced secular 
education and allowed selection of non-Muslims in the military. In addition, 
representation of non-Muslim subjects to Provincial Mejlis or Council of the 
Governors made the promises of the ^'Hatt - / - Sherif more realistic. 
Developments in the area of Law were remarkable. The European law is 
generally codified (as opposed to English common law which was largely 
judge-made). Codification is the quickest way of bringing about reform in the 
legal system whereas judge-made law depends on the accident of litigation - if 
a case comes for adjudication before the judge only then he will have 
opportunity to change the law and that too subject to limitations. The Tanzimat 
reformers did well to adopt the European method of codification rather than the 
British common law developed by judicial precedents. Legal developments 
under Tanzimat have been discussed in some detail elsewhere in this chapter— 
infra. With these reforms, Ottomans had a dual system of law and law courts -
the Shariah courts under the supervision of Sheykhul Islam and the state 
-\r\ 
courts under the secular ministry of justice. 
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The charter had two important aspects - political and religious. The 
charter did not provide for any popular representation, the source of legislation 
would be the Councils of Deliberations {mesveret). The members of these were 
all appointed by the ruler for the duration at his will. These were only the 
advisory bodies, with no lawmaking powers. Now they were invested with 
such powers, but the laws accepted by them through free discussion and 
majority decision acquired legal sanction only through ratification by the 
ruler.^' 
The second facet of the Charter was even more pregnant with problems. 
This was the acceptance in one breath of both the Sharia'h and secular 
approaches to laws. On the one hand, a return to the reign of the Sharia'h was 
implied, and on the other hand, the need was declared to institute new laws 
based on non-customary rights conferred by the temporal ruler. It is significant 
that a traditional practice was forgotten when the Charter was proclaimed; 
although it obviously concerned the Sharia'h it was not accompanied by a 
fetM;a that would bring about its legitimization by the Seykhul - Islam. Thus, 
the Charter created first formal breach between the "temporal" and the 
"religious". The separative characteristic of the Tanzimat— secularism was 
thus formalised with the Charter. The task of separating, the "temporal" and 
"religious" is by no means easy. The economic interests of the European 
powers pressed for secularization while the political — cum - religious 
interests of the same powers demanded the perpetuation of communal 
differentiations ranging from the legal and political to the educational field. 
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The two interests were so contradictory and impelling that the application of 
the Tanzimat ideas became a matter, not simply of governmental 
administration or of politics, but of a religious - cultural nature transcending 
the political, administration and even economic problems. 
Hatt - i - Humayun - Imperial Rescript: 
On the whole the Tanzimat were carried out in an uncertain and troubled 
atmosphere in which the Grand Vizier was changed as quickly as he returned to 
power. This was also the period when foreign intervention (British, French, and 
Italian) had increased. Calls for new efforts were being made by soldiers, 
government officials, merchants, journalists and tourists. This was the case 
with the deliberations which preceded the Peace Conference in Paris.^ ^ Thus, to 
save Ottoman state from this situation, Sultan Abdul Majid issued a new royal 
statement on 18'*^  February, 1856, which came to be known as the "Imperial 
rescripf or ^'Islahat - i - Fermani" or Hatt-i- Humayun.^ '* The charter of 1839 
was reaffirmed by the charter of 1856. This Charter went even further and 
assured the non-Muslims of religious liberty, and equality in the administration 
of Justice, taxation, public employment and military service.^ ^ In other words 
we can say that the edict implied political, legal, religious, educational, 
economic and moral reforms in which equality, freedom, material progress and 
rational enlightenment would be emphasised. 
The Reform Edict {Islahat Fermani) included: 
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a) a reaffirmation of the rights granted by the earlier Charter and the need 
to take measures for their fullest implementation, 
b) a reaffirmation of all ancient privileges and spiritual immunities granted 
to the non-Muslim religious communities, 
c) a guarantee of complete freedom in the exercise of all religious beliefs 
and rites. 
d) the prohibition of all designations for any class of people on account of 
religion, language, or race, 
e) a guarantee of equal treatment of all peoples of the communities in all 
matters of education, appointment to government posts, administration 
of Justice, taxation and military services, 
f) a promise of reform of judicial tribunals and the creation of mixed 
tribunals, the reform of penal and commercial codes to be administered 
on a uniform basis and the reforai of prisons, 
g) a guarantee of the right of foreigners to own real property, 
h) the representation of religious communities in the deliberation of the 
Supreme Council and 
i) a proposal for devising the necessary measures for the commercial and 
agricultural improvement of the provinces with the help to be 
forthcoming from education, the sciences, and European funds. 
The central theme in the rivalries of the European powers over the 
Eastern Question was the position of the non-Muslim millets and their 
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relationship with the reforms. The Russian thesis, stated clearly in 1867, was 
the extension of the privileges of the millets to the point of autonomy or 
mdependence. 
According to the Tanzimat statement, the millet privileges that were of a 
purely religious nature would be preserved as they concerned the freedom of 
conscience, but those relating to civil and judicial affairs ought to be eliminated 
as incompatible with the uniform execution of the reforms. The Ottoman state 
could be secularised only when the millets became religious congregations 
(Jemmat) and each Ottoman subject was individually responsible and equal 
before the laws. Then Sharia'h would cease to be the basic law. It would 
remain only as the private law of the Muslims while the state would be 
administered according to newly enacted administrative, procedural, criminal, 
civil and commercial codes.'^ ^ 
To say that the two Royal rescripts of the Tanzimat period were Charters 
of individual liberty would be to exaggerate, for both Sultan Mahmud II (who 
prepared the way), and Sultan Abdul Majid (who made the Tanzimat possible) 
who were autocrats and the Charters were issued under pressures from foreign 
powers and to win over the loyalty of disgruntled Ottoman Christians. 
The Problem of the Government: 
The implementation of the Tanzimat reforms was a gigantic task for the 
then Ottoman government. It required great statesmanship, huge financial 
resources, a very competent and dedicated bureaucracy and full cooperation 
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from all sections of the society. The government lacked that. Lack of 
personnel trained to carry out the reforms, inertia coupled with an attitude of 
resistance to change coming from above, a bankrupt state exchequer, a weak 
infrastructure, a population suffering from illiteracy, lack of effective channels 
of communication to convey the new Tanzimat values to remote and diverse 
lands of the Empire - all these created difficulties in implementing the refomis. 
The reform of the government itself was the first priority. But, the Tanzimat 
did not bring about any substantial change in the highest institution of the state 
and this was one important reason that the government failed to bring about the 
desired westernisation effects in this vital area. 
The Tanzimat provided no constitutional framework for regulating 
relations between the governments and governed, between the sovereign and 
administration, or between the legislative and administrative organs on the one 
hand, and the judiciary on the other.^ ^ 
Most of the problems to be found in the secular and religious institution 
started from the threefold consequences of this situation: 
a) there was no autonomous development in the religious institution, 
b) the secularization of the state took place in the form of a duality, or 
dichotomy, within the cultural institutions, not in the form of a state and 
church duality, and state became increasingly devoid of a national 
substratum, hence, of a popular basis. Removed from its traditional 
foundations, the state remained baseless in a constitutional sense and 
rootless in a national sense. 
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The Muslims, especially the Turks, did not benefit constitutionally from 
the Tanzimat secularism or Reforni Edict. There was no communal 
organization of the Muslims outside the state apparatus. Neither the Islamic 
conception of Ummah nor the Tanzimat conception of refonn proved helpful. 
While Muslims in other parts of the world, e.g. in Russia, India and Indonesia, 
developed community organization closely resembling those of the millets in 
the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Turks continued to place themselves directly 
under the state which was no longer an Islamic state. 
The end of the political Tanzimat came when the Turkish element 
showed signs of revolt against its economic and political existence. The anti 
Tanzimat movement took the form of a mixture of constitutionalism and 
religious nationalism as was represented by the Young Ottoman Movement. It 
was more progressive than the Tanzimat. The anti-Tanzimat movement could 
perhaps have led to the formation of an Islamic state. 
Codification and Changes Brought About By the Tanzimat: 
The Tanzimat brought law codification rather than parliamentary 
legislation as its distinctive feature. Its attempts at codification constituted the 
first such experiments in a Muslim country. 
Codification is putting the laws into writing with some degree of 
systematization in form and substance. The Tanzimat codification was also 
used in the sense of reducing to written form by making a selection from 
among diverse rules, by unifying or reconciling contradictory rules, and by 
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introducing new rules. Codified law is more easily accessible, intelligible and 
precise as compared to law scattered injudicial decisions or fatawas. 
The Tanzimat Charter had declared loyalty to the Sharia'h and at the 
same time had emphasised the necessity of framing new laws. It stated that the 
major cause of misrule, injustice, and disorder was the lack of laws as written 
instruments, declared and accessible to the public. Neither the Sharia'h nor the 
laws (Kanuns) fulfilled these conditions. 
The secularization of law began in an area that was traditionally outside 
the scope of the Sharia'h with formation of the first completely secular code. 
The Coimnercial Treaty of 1838 led to the codification of commercial law—the 
Commercial Code of 1850— and to the organization of the first tribunal 
independent of the Shariat courts on the lines of courts in Christian European 
countries.^ ^ 
The supreme council prepared a penal code for promulgation in 1840. It 
was a marked improvement over the one drawn up in Sultan Mahmud 11's time. 
It was both the first legal expression of the Charter and the first expression of 
the duality of the Tanzimat. It contained provisions emanating from modem 
secular criminal codes side by side with others taken from the Sharia'h. It 
confirmed the principle of equality and followed the principle that no one 
would be punished without a trial and court sentence; it ruled that trials would 
be held in public and that the impartiality of the judges would be ensured; it 
revived Sharia'h provisions such as blood money (Qasas and Diyat).^^ 
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The work on civil code (the Mejelle) had started in 1868 and was 
completed in 1876. The contents were within the framework of Islamic law of 
obligations and contract but the form, organisation and arrangements were 
inspired by the European legal codes. Its administration was placed within the 
jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of Justice. The Mejelle was the first 
attempt in any Muslim country towards codifying Islamic law of obligations. 
Ali Pasha perhaps toyed with the idea of having a comprehensive civil code on 
the lines of Code Napoleon, but this would have encountered great opposition. 
The law relating to civil status of individuals, i.e., law relating to marriage, 
divorce, inheritance etc., remained untouched under the jurisdiction of the 
religious courts. 
The new codes were applied by the secular courts called nizamiya 
(statutory) or adliye, which were under the jurisdiction of the ministry of 
justice. As a result of the policy of separating the secular from the religious, 
these operated side by side with the Sharia'h courts which were left to the 
jurisdiction of the Seykhul - Islam.'^ 
After a long battle between those who desired the adoption of the French 
civil code and those who wanted to codify a law from Islamic jurisprudence, 
the government decided upon "drawing up a book in Turkish to be known as 
Metn - i - Metin (Basic Text) covering the fiqh and written in a language 
comprehensible to every man. 
With the extension of the statutory courts (penal, commercial, and civil), 
the jurisdiction of the Sharia'h courts was severely contracted. The jurisdiction 
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of the office of the Seykhid - Islam was also curtailed in favour of the new 
ministry of justice. On the other hand, the statutory courts did not have 
jurisdiction over cases to be judged according to the ecclesiastical laws of the 
millets which were administered in their courts." 
The Tanzimat codification secularized the externals of social life by 
legalizing innovations. By codifying the most secular parts of the Sharai'h, we 
can say that it put a new border line between secular life and the Sharia'h. 
The Tanzimat and Education: 
Like the field of Law, the Tanzimat accomplished something significant. 
There was expansion and improvement over the developments of the preceding 
period. The Tanzimat's view of education was limited by external factors and 
by its conception of secularism.'''' 
A few good secondary schools were started, including the well known 
Lycee of Galatasaray. Some special schools for women, for the poor and for 
the training of teachers, and a new civil service school for teaching public and 
international affairs for the new bureaucrats were also set up. Addressing the 
supreme council in 1845, Abdul Mejid defined the aims of education: 'To 
circulate religious knowledge and useful sciences, which are necessities for 
religion and the world, so as to abolish the ignorance of the people". The report 
drafted by the council expressed the same view in another way: "It is a 
necessity for every human being to learn first his own religion and that 
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education which will enable him to be independent of the help of others and, 
then, to acquire useful sciences and arts".^ ^ 
In contrast with the absence of any sign of change in the medreses and 
the slow and confounded developments in primary and secondary education, 
the institutions of higher learning became more finnly established and enjoyed 
expansion. The two secular institutions of the previous periods experienced 
significant development during the Tanzimat. The Muhendishane underwent 
reorganisation and was expanded in 1846-47. Several of its graduates were sent 
to France, England, Austria, and Germany for study in 1846, 1850, 1854, and 
1855 respectively.^ ^ 
The school of Medicine continued to be the favourite institution of 
higher learning. In 1843 it produced its first graduates. The number of years 
needed to complete the study of medicine was increased to nine - four of which 
were preparatory. In the preparatory phase, students were taught general 
courses, among which French literature, geometry, algebra, history and 
geography were taught in French. The majority of the teaching staff was 
composed of Europeans, converts and non-Muslim natives. '^ In 1840 a Board 
of Medical Affairs was founded within the school to survey, control and 
supervise the practitioners of medicine, pharmacy, and surgery and midwives 
and vaccinators. Those who carried a certificate or diploma, or proved their 
qualifications by examination, were allowed to practice - others were 
forbidden. This Board also acted as a court for professional cases involving 
pharmacists, and as a council of legal medicine. 
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In 1851, an institution was established called Encumen - i - Danis 
(Society of the Learned), with the object of working out an integration, within 
the educational field, between the "Secular" and "religious", or between the 
"new" and the "traditional". Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, intellectual and statesman, 
was assigned the task of formulating the function of this institution. According 
to him, the Encumen - i - Danis was founded to provide the ultimate aims for 
discussions, scholarly studies, and recommendations directed towards 
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eradicating ignorance and promoting sciences. 
The Language Development during Tanzimat: 
The last phase of the Tanzimat was the innovations in language and 
scripts, journalism and literature. 
The governmental and literary language inlierited by the Tanzimat 
period was called not Turkish but Ottoman. There was no official national 
language called Turkish. Arabic was the language of the madaris learning. 
Schools taught Arabic, and Persian. Turkish was the language of only the 
subject class {raaya), in many places even of the non-Muslims. The Ottoman 
language emerged as the language of secular learning, of modem government, 
and of modem education. With its non-National and composite character it also 
seemed to fit the international character of the Tanzimat Ottomanism.^ ^ 
The language developments of the Tanzimat were tried out in school-
teaching, in literature and in the press. A prominent figure during the Tanzimat, 
Cevdet Pasa wrote the first Ottoman Turkish grammar in 1850 in collaboration 
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with Fuad. Cevdet used the new Ottoman Turkish as the medium for teaching 
the religion of Islam in a way different from that of the madaris. In his Kisas - i 
Enbiya the Tarih - i- Hulefa, he used Turkish to make religion understandable 
to the common literate people. It seems that, at this juncture, question was also 
raised on the issue of translating the Qur 'an into Ottoman Turkish language. 
The madaris opposed the translation of the Qur 'an into Turkish language; they 
also opposed writing in a language comprehensible to the people. They 
believed that the Qur 'an was revealed in its Arabic form, so nobody dared to 
translate it. 
Ibrahim Sinasi (1824-71) was the first modem Turkish writer. His 
journalistic contribution did not stop with creating a public taste for reading. 
He also opened a new phase in the history of Turkish prose. He not only 
established a new style of prose that was grammatically revolutionary, but also 
a new mode of thinking, and new words to express it, such as citizens' rights, 
freedom of expression, public opinion, liberal ideas, national consciousness, 
constitutional government, liberty, natural rights of the people, etc. The Turkish 
language owes to him the first use of the word millet in the sense of "nation".'*' 
The translations from European languages had been largely confined to 
the scientific and technical fields. Interest turned to literary works during the 
Tanzimat. 
The importance of these early movements in language, script, literature, 
and translation can hardly be exaggerated. Their results will be found in the 
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subsequent periods. If one were to select the most important cjdhtribution of tKe 
Tanzimat, it would be found in this area of culture.'*^ ' ' ''[^ "^ ^ 
We conclude this chapter with the observation that 'thei Tanzimat 
refonns largely failed to achieve their desired goals. Instead, they resulted in 
what we may call the crisis of identity. They exacerbated the growing rift 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. These failures necessitating another 
movement - the Young Ottoman Movement - the subject matter of the next 
chapter. 
A society which has deep-seated traditions cannot be reformed overnight 
by royal edicts. First the mind-set of the people should be changed and a 
climate of social preparedness be instilled in them and thereafter laws should 
be promulgated. For Muslims, the best living example is of their own Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW). How in a period of 23 years he completely transformed 
the Arab society - a society notorious for its uncivilized customs and traditions 
making them leaders and torch-bearers of the world. There is no parallel in 
history where such a great and enduring transforaiation might have taken place 
in such a short time. He first worked for almost 13 years during his stay in 
Mecca in changing their mind-set, strengthening their faith (Iman) and once the 
groundwork was done then, came the detailed rules of conduct which were 
faithfully obeyed without any hesitation and without recourse to state 
sanctions. 
Another important factor of which we have to take note is: How long 
and how far will Muslims survive on the cooked dish of others? We want to 
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compete with the West or want to face the challenges of the West by importing 
the advance technology of the West, including their weaponry. How can we 
expect them to make us their equal? Further, importing their technology means 
economic and political strings which are inevitably attached to it. We have to 
develop ourselves. The legacy of earlier Muslim thinkers is before us and 
their original contribution to Mathematics, physical sciences, life sciences, 
social sciences and humanities at a time when Europe was in the grip of dark 
ages is all before us and is duly acknowledged by Western scholars. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE YOUNG OTTOMANS 
THE BEGINNING 
Each reform effort in the history of Ottoman Empire had provoked 
opposition. So was the case with the Tanzimat reforms. One consequence of 
the two royal decrees was that Ottoman refonns no more remained an internal 
affair of the Empire; by responding to outside pressures, the process of reforni 
was now brought to international stage and was opened up to foreign 
monitoring. For example, the Treaty of Paris 1856 made copious references to 
the Tanzimat Edict of 1856, and dwelt at length with the position of non-
Muslims in Ottoman Empire. This had to happen as the Edicts were 
promulgated under pressures from foreign powers and the purpose was to 
placate them and also to gain the loyalty of Ottoman Christians. Once the 
Tanzimat decrees were promulgated, there were strong pressures for their quick 
implementation, but this was not an easy task. Lack of qualified and trained 
personnel to implement refonns, the difficulty in grafting Christian European 
values on to the Ottoman Islamic culture, an attitude of resistance and a sort of 
inertia towards any change dictated from above, a virtually bankrupt state 
exchequer, an underdeveloped infrastructure, a largely illiterate population all 
these and other factors led to a slow and halting implementation of the 
Tanzimat reforms. The Ottoman Muslims felt neglected and the reforms 
widened the gap between them and the Christians. 
The promise of equality for all Ottomans before the law could not be so 
easily assimilated by the Ottoman society. For example, the payment of poll-
tax by non-Muslims and their conscription in military were criticized by 
Ottoman Christians and their European champions as contrary to the Tanzimat 
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promise of equality. The European press highlighted the unsatisfactory nature 
of Ottoman tax system, publicized other defects in the Tanzimat system and 
brought out defects in its application. The poll-tax was an important source of 
state revenue and was a principle coming down from earlier times. The 
problem was diffused: provision had been made for particular cases in which 
individual non-Muslims were permitted to send a substitute in their place; the 
1856 Edict specifically admitted substitution as a general principle, and 
provided for the purchase of exemption. Thus the poll-tax abolished by the 
Giilhane Edict continued to be collected but under a new name, as an 
exemption which relieved eligible non-Muslims of the duty of military service. 
The principle of equality of all before the law created problems relating to 
conversion and apostasy. One result of the 1856 Edict was that Christian 
missionaries became more active in the Empire and they started converting 
Muslims as well. However, in cases where individuals left Islam for 
Christianity, they could be arrested and punished and here the government did 
not care for foreign intervention.' 
Mustafa Rasheed Pasha who had an important role in the Giilhane Edict 
himself became apprehensive of the reforni movement when within less than 
two decades the 1856 Edict was brought out With the best will in the world, 
there was no way the multi-confessional, geographically incoherent and 
economically backward Ottoman Empire, whose institutions and legal 
framework had evolved to accommodate the demands of its own particular 
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culture and concerns, could hope to implement within a short space of time 
promises exacted by foreign powers under conditions of extreme pressure. 
Duing the Tanzimat period, Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) succeeded 
Sultan Abdul Majid, He proved to be a weak and inept ruler and was eventually 
deposed. His successor, Murad V (1876) was insane and deposed after three 
moths. It was during the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz that a movement called 
"the Young Ottoman Movement," spearheaded by some Western-oriented 
intellectuals, emerged. With increasing exposure to Europe, a sort of 
environment of literary renaissance was developing which found expression 
through the privately owned press during the last two decades of Tanzimat. 
The views of these intellectuals, mostly bureaucrats, advocating a strong 
centralized government, an elected parliament, a written constitution and 
loyalty to "Ottomanism." were presented through journalism. They sought to 
bring about a synthesis of the new institutions of Tanzimat and the Ottoman 
and Islamic traditions. As the inspiration for Tanzimat came from the 
bureaucrats some of their top policy-makers became too dominating which 
these intellectuals did not like, as they did not like the autocratic rule of the 
sultans. These European-oriented intellectuals felt that the success of Europe 
was not only in their technological superiority but also in their political 
organisation. They favoured a constitutional parliamentary system, rule of law 
and not rule of man. They wanted reform but without eroding Islamic traditions 
and Ottoman patriotism. In their view the hasty adoption of Western 
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institutions liad not brought any efficiency in the government and had eroded 
Islamic values. 
The Ottomans needed Western technology to meet the challenges of the 
West, but technology is not given without economic and political strings. For 
example, foreign investors built railway in some parts of Ottoman Empire, but 
their main purpose was to bring cash crops from interior to sea ports for 
shipment overseas. As interaction with European powers increased, they found 
ready markets for their factory manufactured mass products which were 
cheaper and so priced out the locally made goods. Further, heavy expenditure 
was incurred in buying weapons and warships to modernize the army and navy. 
Sultan Abdul Aziz wanted to strengthen the Ottoman fleet and to bring it at par 
with that of France and Britain. (Towards the end of his rule, the fleet 
comprised 20 battleships, 4 ships of the line, 5 frigates, 7 corvettes and 43 
cargo ships)^ Without augmenting revenue, the Ottoman Empire had to take 
out loans on the European money markets to meet their budget deficits. Within 
two decades since the Crimean War, foreign debts had run so high as to throw 
the government into great financial crisis. Starting with the first loan of 3.3 
million Ottoman lire taken in 1854 during the Crimean War, additional loans 
amounting to 200 million lire (about 180 million pound sterling) were taken 
within the next two decades. The result was that 60% of the state's total 
expenditure had gone to servicing these debts which the Ottomans were unable 
to pay."* In this situation of bankruptcy, protection of European creditors was 
secured by appointing the Ottoman Public Debt Administration which reserved 
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certain state revenue to service the debts. This was a surrender of Ottoman 
financial independence to European interests. 
Economic progress, on the whole, was negligible during the Tanzimat 
period and so was the case with agriculture. However, as discussed earlier, 
developments in the field of law and education were significant. Those 
educated in schools established during the Tanzimat period included Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk and other progressive leaders and thinkers of the Republic of 
Turkey. The introduction of the western concept of private property with the 
enactment of land law of 1858 resulted in Muslims losing their land to 
Christians and others who had the money to buy.^  Incidentally land reform, 
specially the change in land ownership structure, enabled Russian Jews to buy 
land in Palestine, signalling the beginning of Zionism. 
As already observed in the previous chapter, during the Tanzimat period 
from 1839 to 1877, the Ottoman reformers no doubt attempted serious reforms 
on the basis of western model but within the Ottoman framework, "a mixture of 
east and west".^ Thus process of change was initiated. But, it continued along 
with the old system which created an institutional duality in the Ottoman 
society. This process of change lacked originality and realism primarily 
because the Tanzimatists were more idealistic than experimental an 
orientation.^ Under the direct and indirect impact of the processes of 
democratization and wider political and economic consequences of the contact 
with the West, the Tanzimatists failed to pursue their programme of 
modernization systematically according to their ideological expectations. This 
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resulted in the cultural initiation, material opportunism and ideological 
inconsistency among them. Although the Tanzimat refonns proved only 
partially successful due to the religious opposition, peasant conservatism, and 
failure to understand the roots of European social refonns and scientific 
technology, yet these reforms built solid bases for fiiture modernization. The 
attempts of modernization resulted in two major groups which were: 
i) A new group of intellectuals called the 'Young Ottomans' emerged from 
the newly created educational institutions and represented the liberal 
socio-political ideas; 
ii) A group of 'fundamentalists'. They gradually acquired different 
meanings for different people. 
The 'Young Ottoman ideology' was the manifestation of a serious 
reaction to, and deep protest against, the traditional as well as the western 
extremes. The intellectuals were the first ideologues in the Empire in the sense 
that they tried to make the western ideas of enlightenment as part of the 
Turkish reading public and to work out a synthesis between these ideas and 
Islam.'° They tried to maintain the 'balance' by observing that while the 
extreme conservative ideas or orders were detrimental to the progress of the 
existing Ottoman society, the Tanzimat reformers ignored the richness of 
traditional culture. The major components of the ideology of the 'Young 
Ottomans' were patriotism, constitutionalism, nationalism, (with Islamic 
orientation), liberalism, freedom and separation of state from religion." 
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The 'Young Ottomans' represented a form of political protest for which 
there had been no rule in the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, an organized 
group of the Turkish 'intelligentsia' (the body of educated persons qualified to 
form public opinion) was making use of the mass communication to voice 
extremely separate criticisms of the government of the Empire. " 
The Young Ottomans: 
The most important opponents of the Tanzimat were the 'Young 
Ottomans' they wanted to transform the Ottoman government into a 
constitutional monarchy and revitalize Islam. They stand distinguished from 
the Tanzimat people. 
Most of these young men were familiar with the European ideas; some 
of them were influenced by such Western thinkers as Montesquieu and 
Rousseau and the French Revolution. They had accepted the principles of 
nationalism as well as of democracy. They set out to weld its constituent 
elements into a nation. It was quite natural that they should choose Islam as a 
spiritual - ideological base for their nationalism, but they also knew that they 
would not attract the non-Muslim population of the Empire. They however 
hoped to gain the support of the non Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
on the basis of pan - Ottomanism. They believed in a limited form of pan-
Islamism that would be welded together by the power of the Ottoman Empire. 
"Ottomanism" was the subject which was frequently discussed in their 
gatherings, and they based their ideas almost entirely on the Qur'an. They 
wanted to put forward the theory of "Ottomanism". On the whole, the Young 
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Ottomans became suspects in the eyes of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. By the 
order of the Suhan some of the Young Ottomans were banished from the 
Empire.'^  (Interestingly, the seeds of the movement were sown by six young 
men at a picnic party in the forests of Belgrade in the summer of 1865.)''* 
The Patriotic Alliance: 
The above group was the origin of a secret society called the "Patriotic 
Alliance" (Ittifak - i - Hamiyet), a small but influential group of dissenters. It 
was formed along the lines of similar groups prevalent in Europe at that time. 
They were not satisfied with modernising the machinery of the state, but 
wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy within Islamic framework.'^  In 
Europe they were known as Jeunes Turcs. 
According to the oral infomiation gathered by one of the students of the 
movement, Midhat Jamal Kuntay, from the niece (daughter of a brother or 
sister) of Mehmet Bey, the Patriotic Alliance was founded by the following 
persons: Mustafa Fazil Pa§a brother of Khedive Ismail of Egypt), Mehmet Bey, 
Namik Kemal Bey (poet and journalist) Nuru Bey, Ayatullah Bey, Resat Bey, 
Agah Efendi, Refik Bey, Ziya Bey Pa§a (poet) Ibrahim Sinasi and Pazarkoylu 
Ahmed Agah whose task was to spread the ideas of the Alliance throughout the 
countryside.'^  
According to Ebuzziyah, the chief but not always reliable source of 
information, the society was originally formed by five or six persons as a 
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"revolutionary society" that would take measures "to change the absolutistic 
regime to a constitutional regime". 
Ali Pa§a and Fuad Pa§a had worked in the offices of the Grand Vizierate 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also held in their grip the formulation 
of the policies of the Porte (Ottoman Government). They were accused of 
personal rule, of producing wrong policies sitting in an ivory tower, and of 
building an exclusive class of sycophants. 
Almost all members present at the picnic had been working in the 
Translation Bureau of the Porte, and most of them had been given the 
opportunity to inform themselves with European political systems as well as 
with the way the foreign policy of the Empire was being conducted. Their 
targets were the policies of Ali and Fuad. 
There is no doubt, however, that the founding members of the Patriotic 
Alliance followed the political lead of Europe, but their intense patriotism 
made them think that it was a refonn for Ottomans by Ottomans along Islamic 
lines. 
In 1866 a man who was to become the patron of the founding members 
of the Patriotic Alliance, Mustafa Fazil Pa§a, set the king of Italy as an example 
for the Sultan. All of his life was spent at the Porte. Most of his education was 
received at the bureaus of the Porte, where at the age of sixteen he had started 
his governmental career, being first appointed to the Bureau of the Grand 
Vizier. He had been appointed to the following posts: 
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Minister of Education in 1862 
Minister of Finance in 1864 
Chairman of the Council of the Treasury; when this body was 
established in October 1865. 
After few months Mustafa Fazil was dismissed from his post in 
February 7, 1866, because he criticised Fuad's financial policy and presented to 
the Sultan a memorandum accusing the Porte of its incompetence in financial 
matters. Then he was asked to leave the capital within twenty-four hours on 
April 4, 1866. Thus Mustafa Fazil Pa§a was now out of picture, leaving the 
Sultan to have his way in dealing with the Egyptian succession, where his 
brother (Ismail Pa§a) was Khedive ("hereditary governor") of Egypt. 
After his exile, Mustafa Fazil continued his interest in Patriotic Alliance, 
and wrote a lengthy letter addressed to the ruler, Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1867. It 
is doubtful that the letter ever reached Abdul Aziz. It was thereafter published 
in the daily Liberte (on March 24, 1867). Namik Kemal and his friends had 
obtained the text of the letter and undertook to translate it for distribution. 
The task of translation was assigned to Namik Kemal's friend, Sadullah 
Bey. After the translation, 50,000 copies were printed in the shop of the French 
printer Cayol and distributed in the capital. There is no doubt that the ideas of 
the letter created a sensation in the capital. The idea was that this may 
pressurize the Sultan to take the lead in the constitutional - representative 
movement.'*^ 
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Mustafa Fazil Pa§a's financial support of the Young Ottomans provides 
one of the important keys to the subsequent history of the Hurriyet. He had 
deposited 2,50,000 Franc's in Ziya's name in a bank in Paris or London.^° 
Namik Kemal (d. 1887) was the most important intellectual, 
theoretician, and writer of the Young Ottomans. He was an effective critic of 
Tanzimat. All his life he tried to blend Islam and the ideas of Enlightenment. 
He wrote extensively in the newspaper Hurriyet, which was the organ of 
Young Ottomans and which approached problems from the Islamic point of 
view. He also talked about the importance of the Shari 'ah and the observance 
of the basic principles of Islam. He was credited with having used the words 
"fatherland", and millet, "nation", in their modem sense.^' 
Tasvir - / - Ejkar (newspaper) edited by Kemal, at the time of the crisis, 
had become the first Turkish newspaper to carry sophisticated analyses of 
foreign affairs and to go into such matters as the impact of new methods of 
warfare on the European balance of power. It also took up more controversial 
matters, such as the mixing of foreign elites in Ottoman diplomatic affairs, but 
was as yet aggressive in its treatment of the subject. 
Tasvir - i - Ejkar was closed by the order of Ali Pa§a because of the 
controversial matters and articles by Namik Kemal criticising foreign 
intervention in the affairs. 
Mehmed Bey was a leading person of the Young Ottomans. He had 
received his education at the Ottoman school in Paris, and had returned well 
permeated with the ideas of constitutionalism and popular representation. 
69 
Mehmed Bey and his two younger friends, Nur'u Bey and Resad Bey were 
employed in the Translation Bureau of the Mejlis - i - Vala, the first modem 
consultative governmental machinery established in 1837 by Mustafa Rasheed 
Pa§a. 
Another member of the young Ottoman's group was Ayetullah Bey. He 
was the product of a household but quite knowledgeable. He had full 
opportunity to acquire a solid understanding of western as well as eastern 
cultures. His admiration and attitude for the achievements of Napoleon (in the 
sense of Restoration of France) made him join the ranks of the political 
opposition. 
Ali Suavi (d. 1878), who is considered the 'real' representative of the 
Young Ottomans, expressed the hostility of the middle - lower sections of the 
society towards the type of westernization which had only fringe benefits for 
them. " He promoted a new ideological trend among the lower classes, which 
was the result of the introduction of westernization in the Empire. 
Ziya Pa§a, who was a man of the palace, was primarily antagonistic to 
the ministers of the Porte. His ideological contribution to the Young Ottomans 
was less significant.^ ^ 
Nine of the Young Ottomans within Turkey succeeded in escaping to 
Paris during April and May 1867. Their closest associates were Leon Cahur 
and Arminius Vambery; both were interested in Turkey or in the Turks. They 
found in addition other Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects already in 
France and connected with the Young Ottomans. 
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Under pressure from both the governments (French and Ottoman), the 
Young Ottomans were forced to move to London where they established their 
headquarters and papers. They quickly split into rival groups and then into rival 
individuals. This dissolution as a group was due to the difficulties arising from 
Mustafa Fazil's reconciliation with the Turkish government resulting in his 
withdrawal of financial support, and to the differences in the views of the 
members. 
The Young Ottomans were in full agreement in demanding a 
"constitutional" government. They wanted to put an end to the absolutism of 
the Padishah since they believed that it was not possible to retain the absolute 
rights of the ruler while reforming the laws of the state. 
The views expressed in the principal organs Hurriyet (Liberty) and 
Miihbir (Messenger), they emphasized the need for a nizam - i - serbestane 
(liberal regime), for the establishment of a kanun - u - esasi (fundamental law), 
and for a sura - yi - ummet (national assembly). They pressed strongly on three 
points: 
i) the economic crises of the Muslim peoples, 
ii) the increasing dependence of Turkey upon the rivalries of the great 
powers, and increasing interference of these powers in the internal 
affairs of Turkey, which intensified the bitterness between the Muslim 
and Christian peoples of the Empire, and 
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iii) the irresponsible policies of the government and the financial 
foolishness of the rulers. 
The Young Ottomans were confused over the matter of achieving their 
aims. Their intellectual confusion revolved around the question of how the 
desired constitutional regime, implying the sovereignty of the people, could be 
reconciled with the historic tradition of the Ottoman political system. The latter 
stage they always identified as Islamic, and based upon the Shari'ah. They 
accused the Tanzimatists that their reforms were nothing but an appeasement of 
the European powers. They also charged that the Tanzimatists had opened the 
gates to European economic and political intervention by failing to introduce 
genuine measures, on their own initiative. They believed that the rulers were 
not seriously interested in the recovery of the Muslim nation. The Young 
Ottomans were deeply irritated by the anti-Muslim prejudices growing in the 
West and held the Tanzimat policies largely responsible. They thought that the 
Tanzimat proved to the Europeans that the Muslims were incapable of reforni 
and that Islam was an obstacle to progress. 
Young Ottomans were neither revolutionaries nor revolutionists. 
Perhaps this was because they did not belong to any class or potential power. 
Their education separated them from the impoverished peasants and artisans, 
and there was as yet no middle of professional class in Turkey. The 
intellectuals could not live except as servants of the government or with the 
financial support of relatives. 
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The following quotation from Nuru Bey shows the ideological 
confusion as well as the desperation among the Young Ottomans about the 
feasibility of a constitutional revolution emanating from the people; 
"Nuru Bey: I had fallen into much doubt as to the possibility of realising the 
aims for which we were working when I began to consider the 
fact that a country would not easily change due to the wishes of a 
few men. Realising that without education the finding of truth 
would be impossible; 1 began to consider myself a student who 
should take this opportunity of going to Paris to study". 
"Mehmed Bey believed that the tmc establishment of freedom in our country 
would only be possible with the support of a national movement". 
"Ziya Pa§a believed that the realization of our aims would depend upon gaining 
power by reconciliation with the Sultan". 
"Agah Efendi thought that in order to arrive at key positions in the furtherance 
of our aims, we should try to reach reconciliation with the 
government". 
"Namik Kemal convinced that 'the Ottoman nation was loyal to its Ottoman 
rulers; with us nothing was done unless the Padisah really wanted 
it' and therefore he was of the opinion that there was no means 
other than bringing to the throne a Padisah determined to enforce 
the desired reforms". 
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"Rifat Bey stated that any attempt sliouid be carried out according to law; He 
did not consider any ideas except his own to be reasonable. 
"Resad Bey was conscious of the fact that we were in an insolvable dilemma, 
and without making any recommendation, found the most useful 
course of action in the enrichment of his knowledge through as 
much study as possible". 
"Ali Suavi's craziness, his moral faults, to all of us, and one of our concerns 
was to treat him tactfully to prevent him from any kind of action 
that would create bad impressions against all of us.^ '* 
The practical impasse to which the members of the society of the Young 
Ottomans were led was perhaps the primary cause of disunity in the group and 
the ultimate reason for the dissolution of the society in exile. 
Young Ottoman Society: 
A group composed of Mustafa Fazil, Rifat Bey and the above eight 
persons met on August 10, 1867. Rifat Bey was a newcomer into the ranks of 
the reformers. They decided that a new organization would be created which 
would adopt as its programme the principles of reforms mentioned in Mustafa 
Fazil's letter to the Sultan. Ziya Bey was appointed head of this new group, 
known as New or Young Ottoman Society. Ali Suavi was to proceed 
immediately to revive the Muhbir which had to be published in London instead 
of Paris, because of the strict press regulation of France. First issue of the new 
Muhbir (messenger) published in London and appeared on August 31, 1867. 
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The Muhbir criticised the principle of Supreme Court and pointed out that none 
of the resources of the Shari 'ah had been tapped in efforts at modernization. 
Mustafa Fazil not satisfied of this criticism; he wanted a more tactful 
opposition to the government. After some time Ziya Pasha sent two letters on 
this subject, which were widely publicised. Mustafa Fazil replied by 
condemning Ziya Pa§a but still complaining of the "blundering" of the Muhbir. 
That problem created confusion in the minds of the Young Ottomans. 
Kemal tried his best to handle this situation. Sometime later definite orders 
came from Mustafa Fazil for Kemal to start another newspaper. Finally 
Hurriyet (Liberty) was started by Kemal on June 29, 1868. 
Mustafa Fazil was no more satisfied with the Hurriyet than the Muhbir. 
This, in turn, would have meant stopping the publication of the Hurriyet from 
the group of anti - Fazil. 
In 1869, Ziya Pa§a ordered to Sakakini that the printing press of the 
Hurriyet, established in the name of the Young Ottoman, Agah Effendi, would 
continue to serve the purpose of the Young Ottoman Society. After having 
overseen the printing of a series of three articles which he had written, Kemal 
handed over the administration of the press to Agah Efendi on September 6, 
1869. 
After Namik Kemal's resignation from the Hurriyet, he still lived in 
London, and supervising a printing of the Qiir'dn, in which Mustafa Fazil also 
had engaged. Namik Kemal left London and returned to the capital Istanbul on 
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November 25, 1870, and he had promised Ali Pa§a that he would not resume 
his journalistic writings. This was the end of the first phase of the Young 
Ottomans.^^ 
Emergence of Istiklal: 
Ali Pa§a died in September 1871, Mehmed Bey's uncle, Mahmud Nadin 
Pa§a, was made Grand Vizier. From this time on the Young Ottoman members 
were more active than before, and the Young Ottoman movement was 
associated with the activities of Namik Kemal. Under Mahmud Nadin Papa's 
rule, Kemal started a newspaper which was known as Istiklal (independence). 
But since it had been closed, the existing press law did not allow him to own a 
newspaper. At that point, the Young Ottomans decided to rent the name of a 
newspaper which was appearing under the name of Ibret. 
The publication of the Ibret had been made possible, by the generosity 
of Mustafa Fazil Pa§a. The printing plant of the Tasvir - i - Efkar was 
purchased by the prince, just after a week of Ali Pa§a's death. Mustafa Fazil 
Pa§a appointed two Young Ottomans for the supervision of the press. One of 
these was Kemal; the other was Ebuzziya Tevfik, the author of the only extant 
history of the Young Ottoman movement. Ebuzziya was a former colleague of 
Kemal from the days of the Patriotic Alliance. 
Namik Kemal had a second clash with bureaucrats, and the price he had 
to pay was to leave Istanbul for having criticised the government. Kemal had 
come under the influence of a Halveti mystic group, whose founder was 
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Ibrahim Kusadali. He was to act as a prayer leader. When Ejj>5r2Biya^dseme ^ « 
of his friends failed to appear at prayer time they were dismissed- V j l j / ^ r : ^ ^^"^  
Ebuzziya thus decided to make a living by publishing books. This first 
of these publication was a drama entitled "Ecel ve Kaza" (Fate and Fatality), a 
patriotic piece which Ebuzziya claimed to be the first work of its kind in 
Turkey During these days, the idea of a renaissance of the Muslims was in the 
air. Later he worked more on the theory of the political unification of Muslims. 
It is important that the Young Ottomans had been appointed to 
administrative posts in various parts of the Empire. They thought that as 
administrators they could try to improve the country from a position of 
personal strength.^ ^ 
Proclamation of Dastur: 
The floods, drought and famine occurred in rural Anatolia resulting in 
the collapse of agricultural economy and to compensate that, taxation in other 
areas had to be increased which led to uprisings. These together witti the 
criticism of the government policy of appeasement towards foreign powers 
caused general dissatisfaction amongst Ottoman Muslims. In March 1876, a 
pamphlet entitled "Manifesto for Muslim Patriots", calling for a representative 
consultative assembly, gained wide circulation in Istanbul. It was thought that 
Midhat Pasha who was in the forefront for reforms was behind this.^' The 
theological students, influenced by the young patriots, held street 
demonstrations and organized meetings in mosques demanding the removal of 
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the pro-Russian grand vizier and Sheikhul Islam and the pdace acceded to 
their demands. Now, several important officials conspired to remove Sultana 
Abdul Aziz. A favourable ruling from the new Sheikhul Islam was obtained 
and the Sultan was deposed in a bloodless coup d'etat in 1876. The Sultan's 
successor, Sultan Murad V, had a nervous breakdown and within three months 
was deposed and replaced by his brother Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). 
The new Sultan appointed Midhat Pa§a as grand vizier, and proclaimed the 
constitution (Dastur) that was drawn up by the Young Ottomans on December 
3, 1876. The Sultan also promised to appoint Namik Kemal as his personal 
secretary. 
A year after promulgating the constitution, the Sultan suspended it under 
his emergency powers, on the pretext of crisis created by the Russo - Turkish 
war 1877-78,^ ^ and exiled Midhat Pa§a and Namik Kemal. Soon he suspended 
the assembly, and one by one the rest of the leaders were jailed or sent into 
exile.'^  
Midhat Pa§a was dismissed and sent outside Turkey on February 5, 
1877, under the article 113 of the constitution. Soon after few days Namik 
Kemal was imprisoned and put on trial for attempting to dethrone the Sultan. 
The court, presided over by Kemal's former patron AbduUatif Subhi Pa§a, 
enumerated Kemal, but he still remained in jail. Finally he was exiled to Midilli 
(Mytilene). Later Kemal was placed at the head of the administration of the 
island. Then he was transferred to Rhodes and to Sakiz (Chios), each time in an 
administrative capacity. He died in Sakiz on December 2,1888. 
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Ziya Pa§a was placed out of the way by being appointed to the 
governorship of Syria. He was harassed by the enemies and thereafter he died 
in 1881. 
Agah Efendi was also exiled at Ankara in 1877. This was due to 
Abdulhamid's conviction that he had a hand in organising the protest of the 
softas in 1876. This issue does not fit in at all with what we know about Agah's 
character. The issue is still unsolved. Agah was pardoned and sent as minister 
to Athens, where he died in 1886. 
Nuru Bey had been appointed to a governmental post in 1876. He had 
also good relations with Sultan Abdulhamid. He remained in government 
service till the time of death in 1906. 
Resad Pa§a died in 1910. Mustafa Fazil had broken relations with the 
Young Ottomans in 1873 or 1874, and he died shortly thereafter in December 
1875. 
Ali Suavi had remained in Europe up to October of 1876. On his return 
he was made the director of the newly established Association of Galatasaray, 
but he was dismissed from his post. He had organised a coup, during this 
period, he died in 1878. Soon after Ali Sauvi's death, Murad Pa|a returned 
back to the royal seat of the state. 
By 1878, the Young Ottoman movement had came to an end.^ ° 
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The Constitutional Change: 
The Young Ottomans and their ideas represented an important stage in 
the Ottoman society, when ideology and ideological conflict started 
crystallising. The Young Ottoman ideology represented the Ottomans response 
to the various social, political and economic problems which had emerged as a 
result of the interaction between internal and external forces. These ideas may 
be considered to be the result of the institutional change and the intellectual 
diffusion. So, this ideology led to muUidimensional changes in the Empire, like 
the promulgation of the constitution of 1878 which granted certain basic rights 
to the citizens of the Empire and established a new parliament. Though, the 
constitution of 1876 was a positive step towards political modernization, in the 
sense that the Sultan himself came under the limitations of certain rules and 
regulations. In this way, they newly promulgated constitution encouraged 
wider political participation in the Ottoman society. The Young Ottoman 
theoreticians could not maintain the same ideas due to the impossibility of 
taking over the best of European political institutions and placing them in the 
Islamic framework.^ ' 
Even though the Young Ottomans failed to graft western ideologies to 
the body politic of Islam, but they were successfiil in introducing new values to 
the Turks. Towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Young 
Ottomans used the formula. They wrote, "No security without freedom, no 
endeavour without security, no prosperity without endeavour, no happiness 
without prosperity". 
80 
In the late nineteenth century, the governing ehte in the Ottoman Empire 
had expanded beyond the dimensions of a family circle and included new 
elements like the educated elite, officers, lawyer's civil servants, and journalist. 
This change reflected in the sharper conflicts in the political ground and the 
ideological polarization between the competing groups. Sultan Abdulhamid II 
adopted the processes of westernization through the replacement of the 
symbols of the western civilization by that of the Arab civilization. The 
absolute rule of the Sultan led to the strengthening of the opposition groups 
which finally resulted in the "Young Turk" revolution, in 1908." 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE YOUNG OTTOMANS 
(IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION) 
The Young Ottoman ideology was the manifestation of a serious 
reaction and deep protest against, the traditional as well as the western 
extremes. The Young Ottomans were the first ideologists in the Empire who 
tried to take the "best" of the west and graft it onto Islamic traditions.' They 
tried to maintain the balance as they thought that if the extreme conservative 
ideas were detrimental to the progress of the ottoman society, the Tanzimatists 
too undermined or ignored the richness of traditional culture. The major 
components of the ideology of the Young Ottomans were patriotism, 
constitutionalism, nationalism (with Islamic orientation), liberalism, freedom 
and separation of state from religion. 
The ideas of the Young Ottomans often differed, especially on political 
matters, and the group was not a very cohesive body. What united such very 
different personalities, as the sequel will show, was the desire to define a 
patriotic Ottoman identity. Divided as they were over the most basic questions 
of a common programme and inconsistent as was their political theory, the 
Young Ottomans were of one mind in regarding Islam as the essential 
framework within which reform must take place. When they proposed that the 
form of government should be a participatory constitutional liberalism, they 
made it clear that they were not taking this from European Enlightenment but 
they sought to root it within Islam and they forcefully emphasized the 
continuing and essential validity of Islam as the basis of Ottoman political 
culture. 
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According to §erif Mardin, the Young Ottomans represented four main 
ideological streams: 
i) Mehmed Bey, Halil $erif, and Mustafa Fazil Pa§a represented the liberal 
ideal of progress through emancipation from all remnants of a bygone 
age. They were absolutely universal in orientation and started from the 
basic demands of the brotherhood of humanity. Mustafa Fazil Papa's 
proposals were an attempt at "unification" which sought to take its 
strength from an appeal to the "people", the latter in reality consisting of 
an ideal, limited electorate.' 
ii) Namik Kemal was the other ideologist of the Young Ottomans, who 
made the first attempt to expound liberal doctrine on the basis of the 
theory of natural rights, according to which the normal condition of a 
state was to be based on the consent of its citizens, who were endowed 
by nature with certain basic rights. The function of the state was to 
provide the authority to the preservation of these rights. The right of 
sovereignty naturally belonged to all.^  This theory gave rise to the idea 
of constitutional regime based on the fundamental rights of the people in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah, and later became the basis for 
framing Turkey's first constitution promulgated in 1876. Kemal was too 
immersed in the stream of western liberal ideas, but for him "liberty" 
and "the nation" were the key ideals."* Observing the decline of Ottoman 
Empire and the supremacy of the west, he opted for a programme of 
"conscious change" through modem technological advances. He desired 
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that Turkey should acquire without any hesitation all that was superior 
and useful in the western civilization. Wherever Namik Kemal used the 
term "civilization" he referred to the western industry, technology, 
economy, press and education.^ But, at the same time, he opposed the 
subservience of the Ottoman Empire to the European economic 
interests, ^ and upheld the Islamic-Ottoman ideals. Even his ideal of 
patriotism was Pan-Ottomanist with Islamic nationalism at its roots.^ He 
took liberty and progress as the articles of faith for the survival of the 
Empire and Islam. In reality, his ideals were primarily the means to 
realise two important objectives in that historical situation: the 
unification of the Ottoman individuals and millets and to meet the 
challenge of the political and economic supremacy of the west by a 
modernised and unified Ottoman Empire. 
Namik Kemal was nearer to "the people" than Mustafa Fazil and 
Halil §erif He was in close touch with the great social femient silently 
working in the Ottoman Empire as a result of the disintegration of the 
traditional frame-work of the ottoman society. 
iii) Ali Suavi, was considered the only real representative of the Young 
Ottomans. He expressed the hostility of the middle-lower class of the 
society towards a type of westernisation which gave them only marginal 
benefits. So, he promoted a new ideological trend which emphasised the 
eagerness among the lower class to share the material blessings of the 
progress as a result of the introduction of westernization in the Empire. 
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iv) Ziya Pa§a, was a man of the palace whose primary dispute or 
disagreement was with the ministers of the Porte. He believed that the 
realization of our aims would depend upon gaining power by 
reconciliation with the Sultan.'* His ideological contribution to the 
Young Ottoman Movement was not very great, he was afflicted by an 
ideological sickness. 
Mustafa Fazil Pa§a's Ideological Reflection: 
In the year 1867, a lengthy letter was written by Mustafa Fazil Pa§a 
which was addressed to the then ruler, sultan Abdul Aziz, infonning that he 
had already established a group of Young Ottomans in Paris. This letter was the 
first manifesto of the liberals. This letter was written in French and was 
translated into Turkish by one Sadullah Pa§a. Over 50,000 copies were printed 
in the shop of the French printer Cayol, and distributed throughout the Empire 
by the Young Ottomans. The letter is as follows: 
Religion rules over the spirit, and promises other worldly 
benefits to us. But that which determines and delimits the laws 
of the nation is not religion. If religion does not remain in the 
position of eternal truths, in other words, if it descends into 
interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a destroyer of all 
as well as of its own self 
This letter contains two ideas: 
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i) that constitutional rule was the only legitimate fomi for the government 
of Turkey; and 
ii) that it was universally valid and, therefore, had nothing to do with 
religion. 
The inevitable implication was the recognition of the separation of the 
state from religion. It was this implication that led the liberals of this period 
into confusion both in their intellectual attitudes and in the field of political 
action.'° 
In the letter Mustafa Fazil Pa§a took up an idea from the "Hatti Sharif of 
Giilhane," the idea that by structural changes one could work for the arrest of 
the process of decay in the Empire. This time, however, the earlier attempt to 
create a more efficient administrative procedure had given way to the idea that 
this machinery should be controlled. According to Mustafa Fazil Pa§a, 
effectiveness in the machinery of the state could not be obtained by a mere 
increase in control, as was attempted in the centralizing moves of Mahmud II, 
but, instead by decreasing the grip of the state over the citizens. Mustafa 
contended that the truth of the matter was that the first mentor of the people 
was liberty itself Liberty was the "original schoolmaster which gave rise to all 
others". People could make use of their knowledge, only when their rights were 
guaranteed by the government. 
Mustafa Fazil Pa§a spoke of a "revolution" which was to be undertaken 
by the ruler himself He cited the example of the king of Italy who led the 
movement of liberalization in his own country. This idea was completely new 
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and therein laid its explosive quality. Mustafa's ideas can be pinpointed in the 
light of his respect toward the sovereign and his desire to see the supreme 
power within a constitutional state. It was the sovereign (sultan) who was to 
guide the Turkish nation on the road to progress, and there was no question in 
his scheme of a government responsible to the people. This idea had become 
fashionable in Europe toward the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Mustafa Fazil Pa§a summed up his programme as "seeking to base the 
Ottoman Empire upon constitutional liberty which would establish equality and 
harmony between Muslims and Christians and which, in waiting for better 
things, would give to Turkey the moral superiority over such and such one of 
its neighbours." 
Namik Kemal: 
Namik Kemal was bom in the town of Tekirdag in December 1840. He 
was the best intellectual, thinker and writer of the Young Ottomans. At the age 
of seventeen he came to Istanbul and entered the Translation Bureau of the 
customs and then of the Porte. He came under the influence of the poet, 
Leskofgali Galib. At the same time Kemal met ^inasi, and became a member of 
the poetic circle known as the council, whose members included both §inasi 
and Galib. 
Namik Kemal's philosophy can be understood by studying his activities 
from 1865 onward, by understanding his political conceptions which run 
throughout his works and productions. He wrote articles for the Hiirriyet and 
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the ibret. It is from these articles that we have to recapture his political 
philosophy may be looked at from two viewpoints: 
i) In relation to his attempted synthesis between Islamic and western 
political conceptions and therefore in terms of purpose, origin, and 
internal consistency; and 
ii) In terms of having introduced into Turkey certain key political concepts 
which affected subsequent generations of Turkish thinkers. 
Namik Kemal was credited with having used the words "fatherland" and 
millet, "nation" in their modem sense.'^ 
Nature of the Political System: 
Namik Kemal's interest in "the people" (which has often been 
incorrectly interpreted as a belief in the value of universal right) originally had 
religious and probably mystical bases. Later when he become acquainted with 
European liberalism, his focus was the idea of the participation of the people in 
the political system.'"* 
While discussing the nature of the political system, he made the first 
attempt to expound liberal doctrine on the basis of the theory of natural rights. 
The normal condition of a state was to be based upon the consent of its citizens, 
who were endowed by nature with certain rights. The function of the state was 
to provide the authority necessary for the preservation of these rights. The right 
of sovereignty lay with group from amongst them was invested with the duty of 
exercising sovereignty. The people delegated their sovereignty in different 
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ways, but the best form of government was the one that least threatened the 
Hberties of the individuals. 
The doctrine of natural rights, as developed by European philosophers, 
political scientists and jurists, may not have its counterpart in Islamic 
philosophical and legal thinking (although some European natural law 
philosophers like Saint Thomas Aquinas are said to have been influenced by 
Muslim thinkers). Namik Kemal is credited as being the first Ottoman Muslim 
to understand the real essence of liberalism and the meaning of the sovereignty 
of the people.'^ 
All his life Kemal tried to integrate the ideas of the Enlightenment with 
the Islamic traditions He was the first thinker to discuss the problems faced by 
the Muslims according to a coherent intellectual system. He also talked about 
the importance of the Shari 'ah and the observance of the basic principles of 
Islam.'* 
On the basis of his perception of Islamic culture, Kemal evolved a 
system which had the distinction of fitting rather closely the prerequisites of the 
type of liberalism that was current in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. According to him the constitution which was to serve as model for 
the Turks was the constitution of the France. He arrived at this conclusion after 
comparing the British, French, and American systems. Namik Kemal ruled out 
die unwritten constitution of England because it was based on the 
representation of an aristocracy; he ruled out the constitution of the United 
States because it was republican According to Namik Kemal, the French 
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constitution appeared to include the most suitable combination of checks and 
balances for Turkey. He proposed the three following assemblies: 
i) A Council of State (Sum - yi - Devlet), composed of forty or fifty 
members, to draft bills and regulations and to decide upon the execution 
of the administrative laws; 
ii) A Senate (Mejlis - i - Ayan) to act as a moderating power between the 
legislative body and the executive power by keeping alive the 
aspirations of the people, and to ratify for promulgation of all laws; and 
iii) A National Assembly {Sura - yi - Ummat) to legislate the bills prepared 
by the first body and to control the budget. 
His project became the basis for framing Turkey's first constitution. He 
brought two ideas: 
i) A legitimate government based upon the consent and control of the 
people, and 
ii) Legislature separate from the executive power 
In this way Namik Kemal was far in advance of the Tanzimat"s 
conception of constitutionalism. He became the central figure and the victim of 
the struggles arising from the incompatibility of these two ideas, the views held 
by others and those enshrined in the Shari 'ah.^^ 
Namik Kemal developed certain ideas of progress and of the nature and 
limits of westernization, and, finally, the idea of Islamic nationalism. 
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Namik Kemal's Idea of Progress and Westernization: 
Namik Kemal's ideas that can be traced back to the influence of Europe 
are mainly those relating to progress and westernization. This influence can 
also be noticed in the articles that he wrote and composed during his stay in 
England.^'' In his articles; he stressed the importance of modem technological 
advances in creating a new civilization in Europe. 
Kemal's studies and research led him to conclude: 
i) That the west's achievements were possible only through the victory of 
the ideas of liberty and progress over those of fatalism and resignation 
which characterised the East; and 
ii) That, for Turkey and Islam to survive, the people had to take liberty and 
progress as their articles of faith. '^ 
Namik Kemal believed that this type of progress was part of the 
dynamic move of every society and reflected the natural ability of individuals 
to progress. He also believed that this type of progress was irreversible, like the 
hands of a clock which could not be turned back. This progress was advancing 
at an increasingly fast pace and its most important characteristic was that it had 
brought "lasting order" in the society. 
Namik Kemal warned against the dangers arising from the widening 
gulf between the traditionalist conservatives and the imitative westemists. This 
led him to search both for those elements of the culture that were obstacles to 
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progress and for those aspects of western civilization that should not be taken 
over. 
Namik Kemal was the first Turkish writer to see clearly the importance 
of the economic penetration of the west. His descriptions of the evils of the 
existing economic, financial, administrative, and educational conditions were 
accurate and pioneering. He exhorted Turkey to acquire everything without any 
hesitation that was superior and usefiil in western civilization. However, when 
Kemal used the term "civilization" (medeniyat), he referred only to industry, 
technology, economy, the press, and education. He did not seem to realise 
when he insisted upon differentiating between the "good" and "bad" aspects of 
western civilization that those rational, technical, scientific, and material 
aspects of the west which he admired did not come into existence. A Muslim, 
while appreciating the technological advancement of the West may ask: where 
is the moral progress which would have been able to prevent the misuse of 
science and technology (e.g., atomic holocaust of Hiroshima)? Why the 
spiritual energy which could have brought the risks of technology under control 
has not been developed to the same extent as technological development? If 
Kemal would have anticipated the evils of unrestrained technological 
advancement, he would have qualified his call for technological development 
within the framework of morality and ethics. In an Islamic system, technology 
would be subject to the moral norms of Islam. 
Namik Kemal conceived that the future development of the Empire 
depended on intense effort, hard work and accompanied by education. He 
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believed that literature should be used as a means of inspiring the Ottomans to 
lift themselves for their own profit. His criticism of the ulema's assuming a 
double function as "professors" in traditional Ottoman institutions of higher 
learning and judges in Ottoman courts amounted to a desire to see both of these 
functions performed with the efficiency that was required by a modem society. 
His articles on economics repeat the themes first encountered in the writings of 
Sadik Rifat Pa§a.^ ^ 
Namik Kemal's Idea of Law: 
Namik Kemal calls for the implementation of the religious law, the 
Shari'ah. He believed that the Shari'ah provided the surest guide and was 
comprehensive enough to include all that the constitution and the fimdamental 
rights of the subjects will secure. This belief of Namik Kemal may be 
considered orthodox and it emphasised the role of the Ulema. 
It is because he believed in the 'common law" that he attacked the 
continental European conception of a public law which, in the form it took 
during the nineteenth century, started from the basic tenet of the superiority of 
the moral personality of the state. From there, Namik Kemal went to attack the 
conception of the general will. 
According to Namik Kemal, not only did the religious foundation of law 
solve the problem of a fixed standard of good and bad, but, it had great 
practical advantages. Since Allah Almighty revealed the Qur'an so that, the 
Muslims can understand its general principles, which are embodied in it. If 
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laws were passed in accordance with these general principles, it meant that 
every true believer would automatically have a sufficient knowledge of the 
laws of the country. In a country like France, where law was not drafted in 
accordance with such basic standards, it was of course impossible for the 
citizen to know the law. 
The comparison between Coke and Kemal may be carried further to the 
points on which Namik Kemal and Sir Edward differed that Coke had spoken 
about the particular reason of law which the king, who was not a lawyer, could 
not therefore measure. On the other hand, the Shari'at is a God's law could 
have no secular inner logic. This was the reason Kemal did not believe law 
could be based on ethics (system of Moral principles). According to him, "the 
science of what is just and what is unjust" was based on religion; it was the 
Shariat." 
Namik Kemal's Patriotic Romanticism: 
Namik Kemal's romantic ideology of patriotism was bom during his 
fight against the Tanzimat secularism. He was in favour of Islamist 
constitutionalism and he conveyed his message through his poetry, romantic 
historic novels, and plays.'^ ^ 
Namik Kemal mentioned those western political thinkers whose works, 
as well as names had great importance. Kemal derived the theory of popular 
sovereignty from Rousseau. He obtained his ideas about the double contract 
fi-om Locke's theory of social contract; he owed his theory of the separation of 
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powers to Montesquieu; he was indebted to Volney for his analysis of the 
decadence of the Ottoman Empire and to the romantic writers for his emphasis 
on feeling and emotion as well as for his conception of culture. 
Namik Kemal derived the theory of popular sovereignty from Rousseau 
may be seen in the fashion in which he described the creation of the first 
"normative force" to be "invented" in the society. 
When Kemal exposed the European ideas, he was impressed by that of 
the separation of powers almost as much as that of popular sovereignty. 
According to him, it was quite clear that as long as legislation was enacted and 
executed by the same body, the system of government would be absolutistic. 
Before 1872, Namik Kemal developed his ideas, during the decline of 
the Muslims and the influence or supremacy of the west, when Muslims needed 
change and development of a new sense of solidarity or patriotism. He thought 
that Islam should be the basis of this patriotism and that reforms could succeed 
only if they were carried on in accordance with Islam rather than by imitating 
European institutions. Finally, his belief that Islam essentially is compatible 
with a constitutional forai of government appears to anticipate similar ideas in 
almost all Muslim countries during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
For example: Jamal al - Din Afghani was the best international representative 
of these similar ideas. Afghani said that, the Tanzimat experiment served as a 
testing ground for the problems of modernization of all Muslim societies. 
Kemal's ideas were evolved as reactions, on the one hand, to the problems of 
adaptation which this experiment raised before the Muslims and forced them to 
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ask where were the bases or the power exercises for change, and, on the other 
hand, to the western assertion that the MusUms were doomed as their religion 
or civiHzation was essentially incapable of refonn and modem progress.^^ 
Ali Suavi: 
Ali Suavi was bom in Istanbul in 1839. He was the son of a paper 
merchant. He received his primary education at a Ru§diye. After his graduation 
he studied religious sciences and went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Then he 
entered the service of the state in a governmental bureau. Three years later he 
got the job of teacher in Ru^diye. When he was dismissed, he retumed to the 
capital. Suavi began writing for Filip Efendi's Muhbir; when the Muhbir was 
closed, he was sent into exile to the Black Sea. Some time later he was joined 
in Italy by Namik Kemal and Ziya Pa-^ a on his way to Paris. The three members 
of the Young Ottomans arrived in Paris together. 
Ali Suavi was the real representative of the Young Ottomans. He 
promoted a new ideological trend among the lower classes and at the same 
time, his real attachment was with the monarchy. This new emphasis placed by 
Suavi on the Sultan's leadership of his community was an important aspect of 
AH Suavi's philosophy. 
There are three fundamental disagreements between Namik Kemal and 
Ah Suavi's theories: 
i) Namik Kemal's political theory consists of a determined effort to 
introduce into Ottoman political thinking the concept of popular 
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sovereignty; Ali Suavi finds the tenn to be meaningless from the point 
of view of Islamic political theology regardless of its place in European 
political philosophy. 
ii) Kemal attempted to work into his own scheme, the principle of the 
separation of powers, and Suavi replaces this scheme by his own 
principle of the "unity of the imamate". 
iii) Namik Kemal was opposed to any act of civil disobedience that would 
go beyond verbal protests; Ali Suavi was ready to go much farther. 
According to Ali Suavi, the sovereignty that man possessed was of a 
relative nature, he was sovereign over his own self with regard to his fellow 
humans in that none of them had the right to interfere with his activities as long 
as he observed the remarks of divine law. 
His arguments on the "natural" philosophers (the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment) were obliged to admit, ultimately, the presence of an all-
pervasive ordering force. According to Ali Suavi this was a poor substitute for 
God. 
About separation of power, Ali Suavi's reaction was characteristic. He 
though that first of all the separation of powers existed in Islam, as could be 
gathered from the division of labour between the milfiil (the interpreter of the 
Shari 'at), the kadi (the judge sitting on the Islamic Court), and the vali (the 
governor acting as the arm of the executive). This was a point that had already 
been made by Namik Kemal. But while Kemal went on to accept the concept 
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of checks and balances, Suavi claimed that this was impossible. Ali Suavi made 
the point that the principle of the "unity of the imamate" required that though 
these forces carry out different tasks they be linked to one another in a 
hierarchical chain reminiscent of Kmalizade's "circle". This he described as 
follows: "the i'lmera rule over the people and the Ulema rule over the emirs and 
divine law rules over the Ulema". 
Ali Suavi's ideas converge at three points which are: 
i) His desire to infuse a new energy into the veins of the Ottomans and his 
own readiness to take active measures so as to bring the recovery of the 
Ottoman Empire; 
ii) His self- identification with the underprivileged; 
iii) His willingness to resist constituted authority. 
This latter factor is often extremely uncertain as it is accompanied by a 
search for the right type of ruler to which is surrendered the administration of 
the affairs of the state. 
Ali Suavi in the first issue of the Muhbir conceived that the Ottomans 
should begin to do things for themselves. Muslims should devote themselves to 
the development of industry, and should study mathematics, physics and other 
physical sciences. He thought that economic and commercial enterprises should 
be taken out of foreigners' hands. 
Ali Suavi thought that Islamic law was quite sufficient; to keep up with 
the pace of modem social and economic life. It has within itself built in 
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mechanism for change and growth. Only one thing was necessary: preparation 
of an "excellent book offiqh (Islamic law) in a language that everyone would 
understand". 
Ali Suavi attempted to uplift the people and made programmes of 
modernization. This aspect of his activism may be called his "populism". This 
stand had two aspects: 
i) A positive aspect which expressed itself in new educational ideas, and 
ii) A negative aspect in which he revolted against the privileges of those in 
power. 
Ali Suavi was completely against the traditional methods of teaching. 
He was convinced that a simplification of the language was necessary to 
provide for the intellectual development of "the people". He placed 
considerable faith in the political wisdom of "the people". 
His fundamental political theory consisted of a few fundamental 
principles which may be stated as follows: 
i) God was the seat of political sovereignty; 
ii) The Shari 'at was the instrument whereby this sovereignty was translated 
from the divine to the human plane; 
iii) The ulema were the interpreters of this incarnation of God's sovereignty 
on earth; and 
iv) Kings and viziers were only the executors of the interpretive decisions 
(fetvas) of the ulema as to the suitableness of basic political acts. 
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These views of Ali Suavi were inspired by the fundamental statements 
contained in the Qur'dn and by early Islam than by the political theory of the 
later jurists. 
In other words, Suavi used three types of Islamic arguments to this end: 
i) The Qur'anic obligation imposed by the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) on 
his community to conform to the good and to avoid evil ways; 
ii) Traditions attributed to the earliest caliphs. 
iii) Arguments taken from later jurists which have to be traced to their 
source to establish their full significance. 
Ali Suavi's theory of revolt, an attitude at odds with all Islamic 
traditions, would normally be brought under this category. His ideas of social 
justice and resistance to oppression were family inheritances. His first clash 
with administrative authorities at the age of seventeen anticipates by far his 
contact with western ideas. The idea of social justice was taught to him (Suavi) 
by his father, who was a member of a merchant guild. There is no doubt that it 
is in the certain (folk) traditions transmitted through Ottoman guilds that the 
origin of this aspect of Suavi's thought will have to be traced.^ ^ 
Ziya Pa§a: 
Ziya Pa§a was bom in 1825. He received his primary education in local 
Qur'anic school, and then he was admitted to Mekteb -i Maarif-i Adliyye. After 
graduating, Ziya Pa§a entered the Translation Bureau. There he came under the 
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influence of the poet Fatin Efendi under Efendi's guidance he acquired a vast 
store of classical Ottoman Islamic culture. 
The outstanding characteristic of Ziya Pa§a was his experience as an 
administrator. Ziya Pa§a differed from Namik Kemal in both personality and 
career. Kemal was a theorist. His (Kemal) articles on general principles of 
politics, Ziya Pa§a's are, in the majority, concerned with bettering 
administrative practice in the Ottoman Empire. With regard to their respective 
personalities, Ziya Pa§a was much more cautious man than Kemal. 
In 1855 Ziya was appointed secretary to the Imperial Palace. Edhem 
Pa§a advised Ziya to learn a foreign language. It was as a result of his influence 
that Ziya concentrated on French and started translations from this language. 
When Ziya, return from exile along with Kemal and Suavi, Ziya, was 
permitted to resume his administrative posts, during Abdiilhamid II period. He 
lived a miserable life in various provinces until 1880. He was died in 1881. 
Ziya Pa§a's ideas concerning the state are quite similar to these of Namik 
Kemal, but there are three aspects of his contributions which distinguish them 
from the latter. These were: 
i) Ziya was a man intimately acquainted with the Palace and this fixed 
with the idea of the imperial function. A special facet of this approach 
was Ziya's study of the decline of this function, which according to him 
paralleled and was the cause of the decline of the Empire. 
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ii) Ziya was a culture traditionalist in more ways then Kemal. This 
accounts for his violence against the adoption of "Prankish customs" 
and his fear that the Ottoman culture was to disappear. 
iii) He was not so much interested in freedom as he was in the elimination 
of the new bureaucrats. 
About the establishment of government, Ziya's theory, in giving some 
power to a judge so that he can adjudicate disputes arising in the community. 
Ziya also thought the judge to be the first person to whom authority had been 
delegated in the name of the community. 
Ziya's system reflects an aspect of Islamic theory, namely, the 
precedence of lavv' over the state. It points to the fact that to Ziya just as to 
Kemal, government meant the dispensation of justice rather than the presence 
of a machinery of the state. 
In Ziya's writings, the Shari'at seems to lose entirely its characteristic of 
a fundamental statement of political obligation and becomes no more than a 
perfect statement of law, the best available means for keeping the ruler from 
against the people. 
Ziya's ultimate explanation for "freedom" was that God had 
congenitally endowed man with freedom. He also expands the idea that 
freedom without law could not be conceived. He said that "Perfect laws were 
made according to the particular composition of every nation and according to 
its characteristics. There has never existed at any time of a tribe which lived in 
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society without regular system of laws. Thus hberty is found with the 
attachment to laws". 
Ziya stated that these laws were part of a system which was related with 
the people and that whenever the changes were brought to the system, these 
people began to decline. In reality, he wanted to express his idea that the 
Shari'at could not be abandoned without the danger of degeneration and loss of 
cultural identity for the Ottomans. 
It is very difficult to trace the origin of this idea, but it is quite probable 
that Ziya's ideas originated from Montesquieu's theories as that "there is in 
every nation a general spirit upon which power itself is founded. When it 
shocks this spirit, power settles its own foundation and thus necessarily checks 
itself. 
Ziya Pa§a saw the speciousness of this argument: "The equality which 
was proclaimed with the Hatt -1 Hiimayun of Gulhane was restricted to private 
law that is to everybody being afforded judicial remedy. Consequently to say 
that the Porte proclaimed complete (political) equality in the first place by 
passing the Rescript of Gulhane is a statement of ignorance which is contrary 
to fact and merits being laughed at". Ziya objected to conception of "equality in 
honours", the provisions of the Firman Rescript of 1856 according to which 
employment was forcibly opened up to the minorities on a proportional basis. 
Ziya pointed out that the "equality" was a meaningless tenn as long as the 
"upper class people" are there. He also demands of the Great Powers for the 
establishment of "political rights". These, however, would not be obtained by 
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employing Christians in the highest state functions but by providing them with 
an opportunity to control the government. The previous analysis has shown the 
extent to which Namik Kemal's ideas were more radical than Ziya Pa§a's 
ideas. Yet the libertarian content of Ziya's writings cannot be denied. "Popular 
sovereignty" was not a concept as widely used by Ziya as by Kemal.^'' Ziya 
Pa§a believed that the realization of our aims would depend upon gaining 
power by reconciliation with the Sultan.^' An outstanding aspect of Ziya's 
theory was that govermnent meant justice for the people. Ziya Pa§a's 
ideological contribution to the Young Ottoman was less significant. 
Although the Young Turks lacked cohesion, yet it was a great 
intellectual exercise. Their influence on Turkish thought and literature is 
immense. Modem Turkish Republic is greatly indebted to them and it is fair 
enough that it looks back to Young Turks as its spiritual ancestors. However, 
despite the shift from the Tanzimat reforms and despite the fact that the Young 
Ottomans sought to emphasize the Islamic 'core' at the heart of Ottoman 
culture, the dilemma still remained: How much westernisation, and of what 
sort? 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ERA OF SULTAN ABDUL 
HAMIDII AND THE YOUNG 
TURKS; THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF MUSTAFA KEMAL 
The history of Ottoman Empire/Turkey serves as an interesting 
laboratory for testing various models of governing a predominantly Muslim 
society, but a pluralistic society with Christian and Jewish minorities, 
surrounded by Christian European countries, and trying to modernize itself to 
catch up with the West. The first ten sultans (Osman to Suleyman the 
Magnificent) were outstanding leaders who usually led their armies in person 
and during their two and a half century rule Ottoman Empire became the 
largest Empire in world history. Their anned forces and naval power and the 
great Ghazi spirit of their soldiers were superb. Things changed. Europe 
underwent modernization: scientific and philosophic revolution, the cultural 
and theological Enlightenment, the political and democratic revolution, and 
most importantly the technological and industrial revolution. The Ottoman 
society, as other Muslim societies, did not experience this thrust towards 
modernization and were outmatched by European modernity. Further, the 
calibre of sultans (in whom all power was centralized) had also generally gone 
down and there was internal decay. (After Suleyman the Magnificent, the 
Empire had 27 more sultans and the last one Abdul Majid II was only caliph -
during their rule extending over three and a half centuries, 9 sultans were 
deposed, 1 was abdicated, 1 was murdered, 1 executed and the last who was 
just caliph exiled) Ottomans now started suffering military defeats and 
territorial losses. To meet the challenges of the West they had to borrow from 
the West and the process of reform on Western lines started. The previous 
chapters - chapter 1 to 4 - have dealt with the different modalities of reforms 
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experimented by Ottomans. This chapter deals with some other modalities 
adopted by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Young Turks and finally very sweeping 
reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. The process is still going on. 
After Atatiirk, secularism, though jealously guarded by the military, the 
Constitutional Court and other elites, religion is returning; secularism is under 
criticism; and it is being observed that the Kemalists had applied too European 
a standard to Turkey. Each reform effort in Turkey has provoked opposition. 
The problem is that an overwhelming majority of Ottomans/Turks is Muslim 
and the bed-rock on which an Islamic society stands is the Qur'an and the 
Sunna of the Prophet SAW - the society has to conform them and not vice 
versa. There is scope for change and flexibility to meet new and unforeseen 
situations but within the framework of Sharia'h. Modernization of western 
style has to pass this test. The questions raised are: To what extent it is possible 
to graft principles of an alien system onto a Muslim society? Can a viable 
synthesis be achieved without sacrificing the fundamentals of the divine law? 
The task is challenging. The Ottomans formulated various ideologies from time 
to time during their long history and the struggle is still going on as will be 
evident from our discussion in the next chapter when we will examine 
Atatiirk's reforms. 
Ideological Transformation: 
Like all major social and political transforaiations, the Turkish 
transformation from a traditional to a modem society, necessitated an 
ideological base generating socio-political developments. Turkey provides a 
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distinctive model in the entire West Asian region in the sense that the socio-
poHtical processes involving people's participation were initiated earlier in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Ottoman Empire. This particular 
development gave rise to different ideas in response to different problems. In 
this way, the ideology has remained a dominant socio-political force in Turkey, 
particularly since the Young Ottoman Movement. Thus, the ideological trends 
and forces created by them have contributed significantly to all major 
developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic' 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire in every department, brought about 
a new consciousness in the ruling class, which began to think in tenns of 
"reforms on the Western Model".'^  As already discussed earlier. Sultan Selim 
III (1789-1808) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) attempted planned and 
large-scale westernization in the administration, military, judiciary and 
commerce which were considered the initial stages of the process of 
modernization in the Empire. Sultan Mahmud II was successful in destroying 
the Janissaries completely, which reflected a significant victory for the 
modernist intelligentsia against the conservative religious forces. These earlier 
reforms prepared the way for the important period of refomis in the Ottoman 
Empire known as the Tanzimat,^ which introduced the ideas of individual 
freedom. State nationalism and democracy. Under the direct and indirect 
impact of the processes of democratization and wider political-economic 
consequences of the contact with the West, the Tanzimatists failed to pursue 
their programme of modernization systematically according to their ideological 
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expectations. But these reforms made solid bases for fiiture modernization.'^  
Another major development was the emergence of Young Ottomans, ushering 
in the liberal social-political ideas.^ The Young Ottoman ideology was the 
manifestation of a serious reaction and deep protest against the traditional as 
well as the Western extremes. The Young Ottomans were the first ideologues 
in the Empire in the sense that they tried to make the Western ideas of 
enlightenment as part of the Turkish reading public and to work out a synthesis 
between these ideas and Islam.^ The major components of the ideology of the 
Young Ottomans were patriotism, constitutionalism. Nationalism (with Islamic 
orientation), liberalism, freedom, and separation of state from religion. 
The people who took over the cultural leadership of the community 
were. Mehmed Bey, Halik ^erif, Mustafa Fazil Pa§a, Nuru Bey, Resat Bey, 
Ayatullah Bey, Refik Bey, Ibrahim Sinasi, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya 
Pa§a, who were the members of the Young Ottoman society. Namik Kemal was 
an important writer of Young Ottomans. Throughout his life he opted for a 
programme of conscious change through modem technological advances which 
would create a new civilization that referred to the western industry, 
technology economy, press and education.^ The Young Ottomans failed to graft 
Western ideologies to the body politic of Islam, but they were successful in 
introducing new values to the Turks. The position changed (as the discussion 
below will bring out). During Sultan Abdul Hamid's rule extending to over 30 
years, the Young Ottoman movement was suppressed and got scattered. There 
was ideological shift towards pan-Islamism and autocracy with only lip-service 
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to constitutionalism forced upon by harsh and repressive methods, including 
censors, spies, police and exile. To counter this repressive rule, a revolt in 1908 
brought a movement, called the Young Turk movement, which had a relatively 
short span of life and ended with World War 1 which also marks the end of 
Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic of Turkey in which the ideology 
of Kemalism, with its six arrows, was the dominant ideology. Although the 
legacy of Mustafa Kemal remains tiiere, guarded by the military, the highest 
Constitutional Court, and other elites, a change is visible. It is being thought 
that the actions and policies of Mustafa Kemal were dictated by the perils of 
the time, in which he was in power, but times have changed and the solutions 
of the 1920s are not best suited to the problems and challenges of twenty-first 
century. All these ideologies from the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid to Mustafa 
Kemal Atatiirk and the post-Atatiirk period are dealt with below in this chapter 
and in the next chapter. As we will see, the Ottoman Empire and what remains 
of it today as the Republic of Turkey offers an interesting testing laboratory of 
a number of ideologies. 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1878 - 1909) and the Young Turks: From 
Autocracy to Revolution 
After the Young Ottomans, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1878-1908) was the 
central figure on the Turkish scene. He succeeded the two deposed sultans and 
was himself deposed after thirty-three years reign, the third longest in the 
history of the Ottoman dynasty. He started with a cautious mixture of reform 
and conservatism. He has been more harshly judged by western writers than 
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any other sultan. If he had developed a suspicious nature and distrust for others, 
which led him to concentrate power in his own hands, there were reasons (both 
internal and external) for that.'^ In many respects his complex character was 
strikingly different from his predecessors. Austere and pious in his personal 
life, frugal rather than spendthrift, a teetotaller, physically and mentally 
healthy, an extremely hardworking person, an intelligent and impressive ruler, 
but a ruler who meant to save the Empire and improve it by ruling himself. He 
could be ruthless but "he was not gratuitously cruel or vindictive." He was 
dedicated to the survival of the Empire and welcomed all modernizing refoniis 
which might strengthen its defences while maintaining personal despotism. He 
has certainly left his stamp on Ottoman history - "the stamp of one who was at 
the same time an autocrat, a repressor, a reformer, an Ottoman patriot, and a 
victim of circumstances.'"" 
The new sultan got busy with spadework for the promised constitution. 
Midhat Pa§a chaired the commission charged with framing the constitution and 
four days before the promulgation of the constitution he was appointed grand 
vezir [But 6 weeks later he was exiled; later found guilty, along with several 
others, for the murder of Sultan Abdul Aziz and sentenced to life imprisonment 
and sent to Taif, Hejaz, where he was murdered in 1884 on the orders of the 
sultan. Abdul Hamid had always mistrusted Midhat who had deposed two 
sultans]. It appeared that the aspirations of the Young Ottomans might at last be 
realized. As we have already observed in the previous two chapters, the young 
ottomans were not united in their objectives and methods, but their ideas could 
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be characterized as a defence of liberal values with Islamic roots in contrast to 
what they saw as the Tanzimat bureaucrats' imitation of western norms which 
had removed ottoman political culture adrift from the Islamic roots. On 
December 23, 1876 (just three months after his accession), Sultan Abdul 
Hamid proclaimed an Ottoman Constitution - the first written constitution in 
Ottoman history - and created a parliament. The constitution provided for a 
council of ministers, an appointed senate, an elected chamber of deputies, an 
independent judiciary and a bill of rights. The -sultan retained the power of 
approving legislation, appointing ministers, convoking or dismissing the 
chamber. He was declared to be the caliph (The title of caliph had been used by 
Ottoman sultans from the time of Selim I who was invested with this office by 
the last Abbasid incumbent.) Islam was declared the religion of state. Equality 
of all subjects was emphasized. The chamber held two sessions and when the 
parliament assumed some independence, the sultan dissolved it, but six months 
later he recalled it, hoping that in the continuing international crisis created by 
the Russian menace it would be more docile. But, once the Treaty of Berlin 
was concluded in January 1878, parliament renewed both its accusations 
against certain ministers of the sultan and its demand that they should appear 
before it to answer those charges. This time Sultan Abdul Hamid felt strong 
enough to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution indefinitely. The 
suspension was to last for thirty years. The reform movement of young 
ottomans was crushed and destroyed. Abdul Hamid was of the view that 
salvation could only be achieved by reversing the liberal and constitutional 
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developments introduced by Midhat Pa§a and other young ottomans and by 
vesting all the powers in the suhanate which had passed to govermnent and 
bureaucracy under Tanzimat reforms. 
While Abdul Hamid had no sympathy for constitutionalism or 
democracy (his promise to promulgate the constitution might have been given 
just to gain the throne), he was not a reactionary. He was a modemizer rather 
than a westemizer. In the first decade of his rule there was acceleration of 
certain Tanzimat programmes. Considerable progress was made in the field of 
higher education, including the opening up of the University of Istanbul in 
1900. There was also very significant development in the Empire's 
communication and transportation. He succeeded, to some extent, in 
reinvigorating the failing Empire, but it was too little too late. The Empire was 
passing through very critical times: internal discontentment and nationalist 
uprisings and external threats from European powers bent upon crushing it. 
Further, the economy was in poor shape. Almost 30% of the annual 
expenditure of the state went towards servicing the public debt. While military 
and administrative expenditure rose to 60%, only about 5% of the annual 
budget was spent on public works, education, health, agriculture and trade.'^ 
Much of the Ottoman European territory was lost when Ottomans had to sign 
the Treaty of San Stefano. Some modifications were later made in this treaty in 
1878 at the Berlin Congress held under the chairmanship of the German 
Chancellor Bismarck but the damage had been done. The independence of 
Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro were recognised, Austria was allowed to 
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occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria was divided into two 
provinces one of which, Eastern Rumelia, was allowed to remain a Turkish 
self-governing province. Turkey was a heavy loser, but something had been 
saved which led Bismarck to comment, "There is once again Turkey in 
Europe". However, for Sultan Abdul Hamid the Treaty of Berlin was a 
conspiracy against the Ottoman Empire and Islam. Under its terms, the Empire 
lost 8% of its territory - much of it rich and productive—and almost 20% of its 
population. Almost 4.5 million people, mostly Christians no more remained 
Ottoman subjects.'^ There was influx of Muslim refugees from Caucasus, the 
Crimea, Kazan and Azerbaijan. Three-quarters of state population was now 
Muslim and Abdul Hamid thought that a new basis for the loyalty of the state 
was needed. So he supported the foraiulation of a new and more relevant 
ideological principle. He took the latent notion of Ottoman sultan as caliph and 
refashioned it to coirmiand the allegiance of not just his own people but of all 
Muslims. He did not like wholesale adoption of Western-style reforms and he 
also was not inclined towards "ottomanism" or Tanzimat secularism; he laid 
stress on Islamic heritage and favoured pan-Islamism consistent with his 
assertion of the position of caliph. This was perhaps the only way to secure his 
endangered Empire. We find numerous examples in Islamic history where 
sultans/rulers have used Islam for their own political ends and did everything 
they could to take the wind out of the sails of the critics of their refomis. 
As noted above, external events in the early years of Abdul Hamid's rule 
were unfortunate as Turkey lost its European territories at the Treaty of Berlin. 
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In 1881 France occupied Tunis, making it a protectorate; next year Britain 
occupied Egypt; in 1885 autonomous Bulgaria annexed Eastern Rumelia. 
Besides these losses, the growing nationalist feelings amongst non-Turkish 
groups were another source of trouble. It was the Greeks, Bulgarians, and 
Armenians more advanced in self-consciousness than the Arabs and Albanians 
who caused greatest headache to the sultan. Abdul Hamid, however, ruthlessly 
suppressed nationalist separatist movements, notably Armenian nationalist 
agitation and uprising in Crete in 1897. Armenian revolutionary groups, 
supported by foreign powers, were a serious menace and Abdul Hamid 
suppressed these insurgents in a series of brutal massacres in which about 
3,00,000 Armenian are said to be killed. He employed the so-called Hamidiye 
regiments of irregular Kurdish frontier forces against the Armenians. Abdul 
Hamid's repressive measures increased. And this gave rise to Young Turk 
Movement. 
The Era of the Young Turks (1908 -1918) and the Revolt of 1908 
The real rebellion against Abdul Hamid came from a wholly different 
source, which lay much closer to Istanbul. The most important and effective 
reforms which Abdul Hamid had taken over from his predecessors was the 
improvement and expansion of education, including military education. This 
had produced a sizeable number of educated middle class. The Young 
Ottomans (already discussed in previous chapters) who wished to end the 
sultan's despotism were disorganised and disunited and were effectively 
scattered and suppressed in the first years of Abdul Hamid's reign, but their 
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ideals survived and re-emerged towards the end of the century in a 
revolutionary movement known as the Young Turks. This spread rapidly 
among the students in the military, medical and law colleges in the capital and 
provinces. In the year 1889, some students of the military medical college 
founded a secret society which aimed to restore the constitution and parliament. 
The society was discovered, however, and those of its members who evaded 
arrest fled to Paris where they continued their opposition to the Sultan. 
Resistance to Abdul Hamid's rule coalesced in 1894 when a variety of 
underground factions adopted the umbrella name "Conunittee of Union and 
Progress" (CUP), popularly known as the 'Young Turks'.''' Their ideal of unity 
and equality of all races and creeds within the Empire attracted the support of 
other groups who were against the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Links 
were established with the Turkish exiles in Paris. Thus, the Young Turks 
movement comprised three separate protest groups: 
(1) An exile community of long standing, existing in Paris, Geneva from the 
time of Young Ottomans. Members of the royal family, including Prince 
Sabahuddin, a nephew of sultan, joined the opposition in Paris and 
organised a congress in 1902 which was followed by a second congress 
held in Paris in 1907 under the presidency of Ahmed Riza, Sabahuddin 
and others, 
(2) A group of students and discontented civil servants, and 
(3) A coalition of disaffected army officers stationed in Ottoman Europe. A 
group of officers of Third Army stationed in Salonika staged a revolt in 
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the summer of 1908 demanding the restoration of the constitution with a 
threat that if the suhan does not act they would march to Istanbul and 
restore the constitution themselves. 
The Sultan conceded this demand and on July 24, 1908, the Constitution 
again came into effect. Elections to the new Parliament were held; CUP 
candidates won a majority of the seats; and Sultan Abdul Hamid II opened a 
bi-cameral parliament on 17 December 1908, which he had dissolved thirty 
years ago.(Ahmed Riza, sultan's critic during two decades in exile was elected 
president of he Chamber). In spring 1909 a counterrevolution broke out against 
the new govermnent. The soldiers invaded the Chamber, ousted the CUP-
installed government and took control of Istanbul. It was led by common 
soldiers and theological students in Istanbul. This time the Third Arniy directly 
intervened; General Mahmud Shevket Pa§a and his Army marched into 
Istanbul from Salonika and suppressed the revolt. Abdul Hamid was accused of 
fomenting this trouble and the chamber decided to remove him from office. 
(What an irony of fate? At the beginning of his reign Abdul Hamid had 
convened the chamber of deputies and then dismissed it; at the end of his reign 
he had again convened the chamber, and it dismissed him). A four-member 
Parliamentary delegation consisting of Aram Efendi, an Annenian, Karasu 
Efendi, a Jew, and two Muslims, Arif Hikmat Pa§a and Esad Pa§a arrived at the 
palace and announced that 'the people' had deposed the sultan. The 
constitution neither provided for the deposition of a sultan nor recognised the 
principle that sovereignty lay with the people: parliament, therefore, did not 
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have sole power to remove the suhan. However, the constitution provided 
Islam to be the religion of the state - so Islam could still be used to sanction the 
actions of those directing the state. So the juridical opinion of sheikhul Islam 
was obtained and the parliamentary delegation that went to see the sultan had 
this opinion with them. The counter-coup was almost bloodless, but the CUP 
retribution was ruthless. More than eighty persons, including 50 soldiers, 2 
Pa§as, and the editor of Volkan newspaper and members of sultan's household 
were hanged. Many were imprisoned and sent for hard labour. There were 
repercussions of this also. Abdul Hamid II was exiled to Salonika, the 
birthplace of revolution, and replaced as sultan by his younger brother, Resad, 
as Sultan Mehmet V (1909-1918), who was just a figurehead. 
Unlike the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks did not have much 
interest in political theories - their approach to government was practical and 
empirical and their overriding aim was to strengthen the Empire's defences. If 
the Young Turks paid tributes to the French Revolution it was because they 
believed that slogan of "liberty, equality and fraternity"' had welded the French 
people into a united force which overwhelmed the opponents of the Revolution. 
They thought that all Ottomans whatever their religion or creed would behave 
in the same way. Zia Gokalp was an ideologist who advocated the pan-
Turanism movement which called for the union of all Turkish speaking people. 
The CUP did not adopt this pan-Turanism programme, though some of its 
leading figures like Enver Bey were attracted to it. The dominant outlook of 
the CUP was secular and nationalist rather than pan-Islamic'. After the 
121 
unsuccessful counter-coup (for which Abdul Hamid was blamed), the CUP was 
in full control of the Empire. They invoked death penalty more frequently than 
Abdul Hamid. Many members of the new parliament who favoured 
constitutional government and some degree of decentralization feared that the 
CUP was proving even more despotic in its methods than Abdul Hamid. The 
Empire was now being effectively ruled by a triple dictatorship of Enver, Talat 
and Jamal Pa§a. By 1914 the CUP had ruled the Empire for just six years. 
Young Turks' greatest achievement was in the field of education. They 
were the first rulers of an independent Muslim country to create a state 
education system for girls which earlier were confined to the daughters of the 
wealthy classes. Turkish women could enter public life as lawyers, doctors, 
administrators etc. 
Some important measures were taken by the CUP government which not 
only had an immediate transforming impact but had important long term effects 
on the future development of the Turkish Republic. The CUP's attempt to 
break the Empire's economic dependence on foreigners was an important 
change, particularly at a time when Empire's trade and investments were in the 
hands of firms of countries at war with the Empire. In 1914, the CUP 
renounced the Capitulations, introduced protective tariffs, brought foreign 
enterprises under Ottoman control and levied Ottoman taxes. Government 
contracts were now given to Muslim entrepreneurs. 
Westernization had stepped up during Young Turk rule. Secularism also 
increased. By an amendment in the constitution in August 1909 Sultan's 
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powers to dissolve the chamber was severely curtailed. The grand vezir now 
appointed the ministers and the cabinet was collectively responsible to the 
parliament for its actions along western European lines. Freedom of speech 
and freedom of press were being availed of. After an incident in 1913 when 
Enver, the hero of 1908 revolt shot dead the Minister of War, the CUP 
controlled the government, transformed itself into a political party and set up 
its branches in provincial towns. But the shift was towards authoritarianism 
rather than democracy and it was now clear that the arniy officers are now 
going to stay in politics. 
Enver's wrong decision to side with Germany in World War I proved 
disastrous for the Empire. The Young Turk era ended in the chaos of defeat. In 
November 1918, the CUP dissolved itself Some 120 persons, including war 
time cabinet ministers and top CUP functionaries, faced trial for Armenian 
massacres and deportation before a military tribunal set up under orders of 
Sultan Mehmed VI at the behest of Alhes. The tribunal concluded that the 
deportations were engineered by the CUP central committee. Various 
punishments were given to those found guilty, including Talat, Jamal, Enver 
and four other CUP leaders who had all fled Istanbul and were found guilty in 
absentia and sentenced to death. Although the CUP was officially defunct, 
some of its members had continued their activities. Its former leaders met in 
1923 and brought out a manifesto in which they offered cooperation with 
Mustafa Kemal which the latter rejected. An attempt on Mustafa Kemal's life 
in 1926 provided him a pretext to rid himself of all the remnants of the old 
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CUP. The tribunal which tried the accused found that the 1923 meeting of the 
CUP leaders was the origin of the assassination plot and in this way the leading 
members of the CUP were executed. 
Taking a short term view, the Young Turk regime failed, but in the long 
run "it not only transmitted to the future the progress made during the 
preceding 100 years, but also contributed to the institutional, ideological, and 
social development that underiay the emergence of the modem Turkish nation 
and Turkish republic." 
During this critical period in Turkish history emerged Mustafa Kemal. 
As a young officer he had been involved in the Young Turk movement before 
the 1908 revolt. He had also been a member of the CUP but then stayed away 
from that organisation after 1909 and he did not like its leader Enver. Mustafa 
Kemal wanted Ottoman Empire to remain neutral in World War I but it was 
Anwar, the War Minister, who pushed Turkey to enter the war on German side. 
When Turkey suffered defeat, Enver along with others who were dominating 
the CUP fled away and it was left to Mustafa Kemal to create modem Turkey 
from the mins of the Ottoman Empire. The remaining part of this chapter and 
the next chapter now deal with this legendary hero. 
The First World War and the Emergence of Mustafa Kemal: 
The assassination of Austrian heir-apparent Archduke Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo by a young student, armed and briefed by a secret Serbian terrorist 
organization on 28'^ June 1914, led to Austria's invasion of Serbia. This 
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triggered World War I with Britain, France and Russia pitted against Germany 
and Austria-Hungary.'^ The majority of CUP leaders favoured a policy of 
neutrality but some of them within the government thought that it was a good 
opportunity to strike at Russia, the traditional enemy of Ottomans. Enver Pa§a 
entered into a secret alliance with Gemiany and when Ottoman fleet 
bombarded several Russian ports on Black Sea, the Ottoman Empire entered 
the War. '^  
In Sofia Mustafa Kemal strongly argued against Turkey's entry into the 
war siding with Germany. He said that if Germany lost the war Turkey would 
lose everything. Mustafa Kemal did not like Anwar Pa§a and also disliked and 
mistrusted the Germans; he was unsure of their capacity to win. However, 
when Turkey did enter the War, Mustafa Kemal threw himself into the war 
with his full energy and in a patriotic spirit. The first few months of the war 
proved disastrous for Turkey. Few days later, Mustafa Kemal decided to leave 
Sofia, despite orders to the contrary and was even ready to enlist himself as an 
ordinary soldier. However, just before departure he received a telegram from 
Anwar Pa§a's deputy, Ismail Haqi Pa§a, at the Ministry of war, appointing 
Kemal as a commander of the nineteenth Division on 2"^ * February, 1915, with 
instructions to report to Constantinople. When Kemal reached there, he was 
met by Limon Von Sanders, chief of the Gennan military mission in Istanbul, 
whose offices were in the Ministry of War. After a long discussion between 
Kemal and Sanders, on the war strategy, Kemal was posted and he established 
his headquarters of the nineteenth division at Maidos, Gallipoli Peninsula, on 
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25'^  February, 1915. Kemal had just a month in which to organize his troops 
before the Allies attacked '^  
The Hero of Gallipoli Operations (1915-1916): The Emergence of 
Mustafa Kemal: 
Mustafa Kemal knew the Gallipoli Peninsula from his operations against 
the Bulgarians in Balkan war. He had strong opinions about its defence, which 
conflicted with those of his fellow staff officers. There after Kemal discussing 
these tactics with Rauf, who was as a naval officer? Rauf agreed with Kemal's 
opinions. 
As dawn broke on 25 April 1915 the allied troops landed in force, as 
Kemal had guessed, on two groups of beaches - the British at Cape Helles and 
Australians and New Zealander north of Gaba Tepe. This was accompanied by 
a raid by the French on the Asiatic coast and a demonstration by the Royal 
Naval Division at Bulair. Some 60,000 Australians and 18,000 New Zealanders 
were part of a larger British force. 
When Mustafa Kemal received a report that a "small enemy force" was 
advancing up its western slope to the southerly crest of Chunuk Bair then he 
knew that the Chunuk Bair was the key to the entire Turkish defence. Its 
capture would enable the enemy to dominate all sides of the Peninsula. A 
single battalion would be totally insufficient to hold it. The whole of his 
division would be needed. Meanwhile Kemal, once again without authority, 
had ordered a second regiment composed of Arab troops into the line to 
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reinforce the first. Then he rode back to corps headquarters at Midos to report 
to Asad Pa§a and urged upon him the necessity for an all - out attack with 
every man available. Asad agreed with his appreciation, approved of his 
actions and handed over to him the remaining regiment of the nineteenth 
Division, thus putting him in command of the whole Sari Bair front. 
Kemal himself spent the night without sleep, riding over the whole 
front, trying to obtain infonnation and giving orders for the following day. 
Kemal's surviving troops were exhausted and his new units were unused to the 
region. The naval bombardment had demoralized all. His force for the moment 
was spent. After severe naval and land battles, he drove the enemy back. 
Colonel Mustafa Kemal emerged as the hero of the war. He had held the 
heights, which he had seen to be the key to the peninsula. By his commanding 
ability, timely action, bold and courageous leadership, he saved the Turks from 
a defeat which might well have opened the road to Istanbul.'^ Thus Chunuk 
Bair was captured by the Turks. For the first time Turks had won a victory 
against a European power, and also first time Mustafa Kemal's name barely 
mentioned in the newspaper. In 1916 Mustafa Kemal was promoted to die rank 
of lieutenant general and elevated as Pa§a by the Turkish government. Both 
sides' suffered heavy losses. Some 26,000 Australians and 7571 New 
Zealanders were wounded and 7594 Australians and 2431 New Zealanders 
were killed. The Ottoman losses were terrible: some 80,000 dead and 1,65,000 
wounded.'^ 
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Life of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881 -1938): 
Mustafa Kemal, the father of modem Turkish Republic, was the 
charismatic leader of the Turkish Liberation Movement. He was a 
distinguished Turkish soldier, reformer and statesmen. He was the founder and 
First President of the Turkish Republic, was bom at Salonika (now 
Thessalonica, Greece) on March 12, 1881, in a modest family of Ottoman 
Muslims.^ *^  His parents were Ali Reza and Zubaida Khanam. He lost his father 
at an early age. '^ He received his early education under the guardianship of his 
mother Zubeda Khanam. His mother wanted to raise Mustafa Kemal as a pious 
scholar, but he was differently interested. He reminded his mother that his 
father had given him a sword at birth, a sign that he wanted his only son to join 
the military. He spoke to his mother in a dramatic way: "I was bom as a 
soldier" and that "I shall die as a soldier". At the age of twelve years, he 
entered the military school at Salonika. There he excelled. Mathematics was his 
favourite subject and because of his quality performance, his teacher 
complimented him with an honorary title of "Kemal" (perfection). After 
completing secondary education, he entered the Military Training School at 
Manastir (in Yugoslavia) in 1895." On March 13*, 1899; he entered the 
Military Academy in Istanbul, from where he graduated with honours. On 
January 11'^ , 1905; he passed his diploma as Staff Captain from the Military 
Staff Academy, and soon after he posted to Fifth Army at Damascus, in Syria. 
During these days he also took keen interest in politics. He was especially 
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influenced by Namik Kemal, and other Turkish poets. But he did not allow his 
new political interests to interfere with his military education.^ '* 
During his student life, he joined a nationalistic student society known 
as "Vatan" or "Fatherland" and he became its head. On July 24'^ 1908, 
Mustafa Kemal joined the "Committee for Union and Progress" (CUP), and 
played an active part in the "Young Turk Movement", which forced Abdul 
Hamid II to restore the constitution of 1876 and recall Parliament. Mustafa 
Kemal devoted all his time and energy to his profession as he was a bom 
soldier and leader. By his hard labour and ability he was promoted to the rank 
of Major on November 27, 1911. On October 27, 1913, he was sent to Sofia, 
where he acquired a good knowledge of western civilization, and in 1916 he 
was promoted Brigadier General of the Turkish Army. 
As a Staff Officer his work was soon appreciated. Between 1905 and 
1918, he obtained with merit, superior grades in the Military Hierarchy. He 
showed exceptional qualities of organisation and control while at the head of 
the Army. He was an outstanding general and army commander who led his 
armies successfully at various war fronts. He represented Turkish Armed 
/forces at several military manoeuvres in Europe. In 1911 he fought against 
Italians in Tripoli to defend Ottoman Libya, and in 1914 he was Military 
Attache in Sofia. During the First World War he fought against the British and 
Russian forces.^ ^ 
At the end of World War I, Mustafa Kemal played a leading role in 
defending Turkey against the Allied powers. After his appointment as Inspector 
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- General of the Armies in 1919, he made up his mind to fight for the total 
National Independence of Turkey. He started preparations for the war of 
National Independence from Samsun, a port on the Black Sea Coast. He stated 
his aim very clearly "This country, under all circumstances, will become 
modem, civilized and innovative". He wanted to establish a compact nation, 
and a prosperous, modern stale to be respected by all other nations of the 
world. He also believed that this could be achieved if the nation was prepared 
for a new struggle.^^ 
Modem Turkish history may be said to begin on the morning of May 19, 
1919, with Mustafa Kemal's landing at Samsun on the Black Sea Coast of 
Anatolia. He told a cheering crowd that the Ottoman Sultan was a prisoner of 
Allied Powers and that he wanted to prevent the nation from slipping through 
the fingers of its people. This was his message to the Turks of Anatolia. 
Through the medium of congresses which he launched at Erzumm (23'^ '' July -
6"^  August, 1919) and at Sivas (4"' - 13"^  September, 1919) he demanded 
National Independence and unity of Turkey. At both congresses Mustafa 
Kemal was elected as a President. On ly^ April, 1920, he assembled the First 
Grand National Assembly (GNA) at Ankara, which elected him President. For 
his decisive role in military campaigns, especially against Greeks, the Grand 
National Assembly bestowed on him the title of Gazi and rank of Marshal, on 
19'^  September, 1921.^ ° 
After the attainment of National independence in the Lausanne 
conference (20"^  November, 1922 - 24"^  July, 1923), Mustafa Kemal's main 
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activities focussed on reforms aimed at modernizing the Nation. He abolished 
the Suhanate in 1922 and founded a new Party in 1923, known as the Peoples 
Republican Party. On ll"' August, 1923, he assembled the Second Grand 
National Assembly, the majority of whose members belonged to the Peoples 
Party. On 29* October, 1923, Turkey proclaimed a Republic and Mustafa 
Kemal became its first President and remained in that post until his death in 
1938. The caliphate as well as all theocratic institutions was abolished in 
1924.'" After assuming the power he declared that he would destroy those 
vestiges of Islam in the life of Turkish Nation which blocked the way to 
progress of the country. Mustafa Kemal wanted to give the Turks the 
opportunity to build a new Turkey. 
On becoming the President of the newly formed Republic of Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal introduced a programme of refonns in the religious, social, 
cultural, political, and economic and almost all the fields in order to improve 
the life of his people. He established secular schools of western style. The 
whole Ottoman legal system was modernised, a new civil and penal code was 
adopted.^ ^ Adoption of International calendar and time, adoption of Latin 
alphabet, law changing the situation of women in economic and social life 
(right to vote and be elected) are some of his main reforais. Atatiirk's guide in 
life was science. His views on education were "required generations which 
were absolutely free in thought, conscience and education". He declared 
Sunday as legal holiday. 
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The basic idea and spiritual and intellectual aspect of Atatiirk's views 
were based on universal Peace. All his life he considered war as a crime. 
According to him, war was justified, however, as an instrument to defend 
justice. It is in the light of this belief, that Atatiirk fomiulated the most essential 
principle of the Republic of Turkey: "Peace at home, and peace in the world"." 
While President of the Turkish Republic he first himself renounced the 
titles of Gazi and Pa§a, and chose a name Atatiirk. In this way he became 
Atatiirk, or Father of the Turks. On 10 November, 1938, he died of cirrhosis 
of liver disease caused by alcoholism.^ '* 
The Emergence of Mustafa Kemal: 
The Young Turks rule got involved in a series of wars including World 
War I. They failed to save Ottoman Empire because of the internal conflict and 
the beginning of the First World War. This was the very crucial period for the 
Ottoman Empire. Neighbouring countries wanted to crush the Ottoman Empire 
and annex its territories. In the war the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and it 
was close to being wiped off from the map of the World when Mustafa Kemal 
started the resistance movement. 
As a boy gloomy, rebellious, unpopular Mustafa Kemal became a 
soldier, joined the secret revolutionary society of the Young Turks, and later 
joined the "committee for Union and Progress" in 1908. He did not take an 
active part in the policies or practices of the Young Turks who had control of 
the government. His defence of Gallipoli won him national acclaim.^ ^ He 
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devoted all time and energy to his profession as he was a bom soldier and 
leader. By his hard labour and ability he was promoted to the rank of major, 
and in 1916 he became Brigadier of the Turkish army. 
Mustafa Kemal took part in overthrowing the corrupt regime of the 
Sultans. When their leader Anwar Pa§a proclaimed a Parliamentary 
Constitution, at this juncture Mustafa Kemal disagreed with Anwer Pa§a's 
policy, especially his association with Germany; he concentrated on soldiering, 
and distinguished himself by his brilliant tactic at Gallipoli. 
Mustafa Kemal emerged from World War I as a Brigadier General. He 
was one of the youngest and outstanding comjnanders among the fighting 
soldiers and accorded prestige and popularity at home. Yet the finality of their 
defeat faced the Turks with the problem of presei-ving their very existence 
against the victorious Allies, who were bent upon dismembering what 
remained of the Empire. Mustafa Kemal resisted this with great courage and 
though he could not recapture the territories lost he stopped further 
dismemberment and thus assumed decisive military and political leadership. 
His conviction was that a nation's right to full independence is fought for, not 
granted - a postulate central to the National Struggle of 1919 - 1922 and 
demanding the absolute loyalty of the professional soldiers to it. 
When the Allies carved up the Ottoman Empire, Kemal rallied the 
remnants of the Turkish army and created a Turkish Republic, proclaiming 
himself President. His numerous reforms, radical, imaginative and genuinely 
democratic in intention, were dedicated to reviving, in new terms, the patriotic 
133 
spirit of the Turkish people, and in a Uttle period he transformed his country 
into a strong, efficient and respected western power. 
The First World War sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. At the end 
of the First World War, Mustafa Kemal played a leading role in defending 
Turkey against the Allied powers that were much eager to dismember the 
Turkish Empire. By thwarting these sinister designs and whipping up the 
enthusiasm of the masses to fight to the death for their country, he became a 
national hero. Mustafa Kemal's aim was to safeguard the independence of 
Turkey within its natural frontiers. He wanted to establish a compact nation, 
and modem state respected by all other nations of the World. He also believed 
that this could be achieved if the nation was prepared for a new struggle. 
The Struggle for National independence: 
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the 
Armistice was signed between Turkey and Britain at Mudros on 30 October, 
1918. According to this agreement the Turkish troops surrendered their arnis.^^ 
Soon after most of the leaders and supporters of the Union and Progress were 
arrested. Anwer Pa§a and Jamal dismissed from the army in 1919. Both of 
them found an eventual refuge in Russia, and later they were assassinated.^'' 
The condition of Ottoman Empire was miserable. The sultan and other leaders 
had become a puppet of the Allies who now ruled. Total administrative control 
was in the hands of the British.^ ^ The Sultan was ready to accept any thing that 
the Allies chose to impose on them. The Muslim Turks were replaced by the 
Christians in most of the local government's functionary.^" 
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The Armistice, for Mustafa Kemal was not an end. It was a beginning. 
Undefeated in battle he was more than ever undefeated in spirit. Now there 
would be peace of a kind. But he knew that a just peace would have to be 
fought for, and that the struggle would be hard and long. He began to face 
himself as a leader in this struggle.'"' 
Events developed at a fast pace. The Peace Conference, assembled in 
Paris in January 1919, where Greece claimed Smyrna. On 15 May, 1919, 
despite all warnings and protests, twenty thousand Greek troops landed at 
Smyrna, which aroused immediate resentment tliroughout Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal was appointed Inspector - General of Ninth and later 
Third Army in Anatolia on 30"' April, 1919. Soon he landed at the Black Sea 
port of Samsun in northern Anatolia on 19"^  May, 1919. 
Thus, four days after the Greeks had set up their standard of conquest on 
the shores of the Aegean, Mustafa Kemal set up his standard of liberation on 
the shores of the Black Sea of Anatolia. The Battle for Anatolia was about to 
begin. With this, a new chapter had been opened in the history of the Turkish 
people." '^ 
The government and Mustafa Kemal held different objectives arising out 
of the political condition of the country: 
i) Sultan and his government in Istanbul whose aim was to preserve and 
save the monarchy. 
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ii) Mustafa Kemal and his followers in Anatolia whose aim was to unite the 
whole army and the Nation of the Ottoman Empire through the ideas of 
Secularism and nationalism."*^  
Later Mustafa Kemal issued the "Declaration of Independence"' at 
Amasya on IT' June 1919. He made up his mind to fight for the total 
independence of Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal who now embarked on the crucial phase of himself and 
his country's career was a seasoned and self- confident campaigner, who had 
proved himself as an outstanding soldier in fourteen years of hard service. He 
had now to prove himself as an able politician and statesman. 
Secret within him was the hint of an extra dimension, of a singularity of 
tempo and rhythm and scale which outranged the companions around him. It 
was this "extra dimension" in Kemal that his friends needed and valued at this 
initial stage of the national struggle which they all had at heart. 
So the Kemalist Revolution was bom. The four friends who had planned 
it in Istanbul now met together, here in Amasya, to draft its "Declaration of 
Independence". Ali Fuad and Rauf were the first to arrive, and Refet joined 
them the next day. Kazim Karabekir was informed of their arrival by telegram. 
Mustafa Kemal now disclosed his intentions ."^^ 
The Erzurum Congress: 
Before the Sivas congress was called, the "Society for Defence of the 
Rights "of the eastern provinces had arranged a regional meeting to be held in 
136 
Erzurum, under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, on 23 July to 6 August, 
1919, in response to the threat of further Armenian aggression in the east. A 
few days later Istanbul government ordered Kazim Karabekir to arrest Kemal 
and Rauf, but Kazim refused and instead declared his own revolt as well as his 
acceptance of Kemal's leadership."*^ 
From Erzurum Mustafa Kemal was launching its political programme. 
In his opening speech to the congress he laid down the twin principles which 
were to become the foundations of the revolutionary programme. 
i) The Rights of the Nation; and 
ii) The Will of the people. 
The Erzurum congress prepared a draft version of a declaration which 
was later to be imown as the National Pact. The Pact was circulated in the fonn 
of a manifesto throughout the country, and to the representatives of foreign 
powers. It was with some justification that Kemal told the assembly that it had 
"passed serious resolutions and had proved in the face of the whole world the 
existence and the unity of the Nation". 
As the Erzurum congress ended a telegram arrived at army headquarters, 
from the Minister of War. 
After Erzurum congress, next was the Sivas congress. This was the most 
crucial stage in the foundation of the Turkish Resistance Movement."*^ 
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The Sivas Congress: 
The second most important congress opened on 4 September at Sivas 
under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. The Sivas congress was to raise the 
National counsels from the local to the National plane. This conference was 
attended by the delegates not only from East but also from all over the Nation. 
The main aim of this Nationalist congress was to fulfil all the decisions taken in 
the conference of the Erzurum congress,''*'and it also sought confirmation of the 
National Pact. Mustafa Kemal established the Representative committee for the 
Defence of Eastern Asia Minor. 
Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to the Sultan asking him to dismiss the 
Prime Minister and to call for a new election to the Ottoman Parliament. This 
time Sultan proceeded to do so.''^  As a result of nationalists demand and 
pressure the new grand vazier was instructed by the "Ministry of Conciliation", 
to hold early elections for a new parliament. Soon after Grand vazier called 
election on 7"" November, 1919, in which Kemal and his supporters won the 
clear majority. 
The new Ottoman Parliament met in Istanbul on 16* January, 1920. 
This was the first parliament with a Kemalist majority; it survived for a bare 
two months. For the Allies at once showed their hand."*^  On 16'*' March 1920, 
the British forces captured Istanbul. The British realised that it would be hard 
to cope with the decisions of such a parliament and so they arrested the 
deputies and many nationalist supporters who were deported to Malta. The 
Sultan was forced to denounce the nationalists. Shaykh al- Islam declared that 
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the whole nationaUst movement was against Islam. On this issue Mustafa 
Kemal gathered in a holy place of Anatolia, and they issued a counter - fetva 
denouncing the Shaykh al- Islam.^" In the protest against the arrest and 
deportation Mustafa Kemal immediately ordered the arrest of all remaining 
British officers in Anatolia.^' Soon after Mustafa Kemal dissolved the 
Parliament on 11'^  April, 1920, and called for a new election. So the 
nationalists established the First Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 23'^ '' 
April, 1920," in which Mustafa Kemal was elected its President. 
With the creation of the Grand National Assembly, there were virtually 
two govermnents in Turkey, but the more powerful and popular one was the 
nationalist govermnent in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal made excellent use of the 
opportunities which presented themselves. After the war, the French had much 
larger economic investments in Turkey than the British. At this time French 
bondholders were afraid that the Turkish nationalists might cancel all debts the 
way the Bolsheviks had done. The Italians were not satisfied with the coming 
of the Greeks. Both France and Italy wanted to gain as much as they could 
without going to war, and they did not mind wounding Britain in the process." 
In June 1921 the French government sent M. Franklin - Bouillon to 
Ankara, whose mission was to explain the tenns of a separate agreement 
between France and Turkey, Franklin and Mustafa Kemal talked freely with 
each other, Kemal insisting on the National Pack, Franklin on the Treaty of 
Sevres. But the gap was gradually narrowed, and in due course Franklin was 
able to return home with an optimistic report for the French government. Later 
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Franklin came back to Ankara and signed an agreement with Mustafa Kemal 
on 20* October, 1921, amidst strong protests from Britain. Thus Ankara 
agreement came to be known as Turco-French Treaty. 
This agreement gave the Turks all they needed. It allowed for the 
evacuation of Cecilia, an adjustment of frontiers to Turkey's advantage 
between Cecilia and Syria, and the establishment of a special regime in 
Alexandretta to safeguard the interests of the Turkish population. In return the 
French obtained the economic concessions. 
On the French side the agreement represented a realistic move to reduce 
unpopular military commitments and to strengthen their position in Syria, 
where their true Middle Eastern interests lay. Now they handed over to the 
Nationalists large stocks of arms, including creusot guns, and other war 
materials, this went far to redress the military balance between Turks and 
Greeks.^ ^ 
During the Turco-French treaty in 1921, the Italians had also revised the 
Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920, in the light of the new situation. The Itahans 
had reached a friendly agreement with Nationalist government, by which Italy 
would support Turkey's territorial claims in return for similar economic 
privileges over a wide area of southern and western Anatolia.^ ^ 
The most important supporter of Mustafa Kemal was the Soviet Union. 
The Bolsheviks were involved in a civil war of their own and were not in a 
position to give military assistance to Mustafa Kemal. But his friendship with 
Lenin's government was good for Turkish morale and secured them from east's 
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attack. When the nationalist army under the Grand Kiazim Bekir captured Kars 
from the Armenians on 28"^  September, 1920, the Bolsheviks welcomed it. On 
3'^ '' December, 1920, they officially surrendered Kars, Ardahan, and a large 
portion of eastern Asia Minor to the Turks. Few months later Mustafa Kemal 
signed a treaty of friendship and collaboration with Soviet Union against the 
western powers on 16'*^  March, 1921"''^ , which is known as the Turco - Russian 
Treaty or the Treaty of Moscow. 
Same year the Grand National Assembly bestowed on Mustafa Kemal 
the title of "Gazi" and rank of '-Marshal" (on 19"" September, 1921) for his 
decisive role in military campaigns - especially against Greeks. 
The War between Turkey and Greeks: 
The Greeks were under the care of the British and were used by them as 
an agent to defeat the plans of Mustafa Kemal's forces. The Allies wanted to 
establish their power in Asia Minor and also take control of Istanbul. So they 
used Greeks for their own benefit. The Greek forces landed in Smyrna on the 
western shore of Asia Minor on 15 May, 1919, with Allied approval. 
British plans for the control of the Ottoman state were blocked by the 
resistance of Mustafa Kemal." During 1921; the British authorities had been 
divided into two camps, one supporting the Greeks and the other supporting the 
Turks. The diplomats were generally pro-Greek, especially Prime Minister 
Lloyd George who wanted to help the Greeks to destroy Mustafa Kemal. The 
Soldiers and many of the British people were generally pro-Turk ^^ , who had 
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just finished a long and bloody war and were in no mood to fight against the 
nationalists in Turkey, because the public opinion in England was that they did 
not support fighting against a people who were demanding self-determination. 
Between, 22"'' June - 9"" July, 1920, the Greek army advanced into 
Anatolia from Smyrna and captured Bursa; it advanced slowly until it reached 
near Ankara in 1922. Between, 26"^  August - 9'*^  September, the Turks were 
able to launch an offensive under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal; within two 
weeks the Nationalist forces defeated Greeks and captured Smyrna, and Greeks 
were thrown back to the Sea. The Greeks' dream was shattered and Mustafa 
Kemal moved toward Istanbul.^ 
On 23'^ '' September, 1922, The Nationalist forces entered Neutral Zone at 
Chanak. After a long crisis at Chanak, a peace conference took place at 
Mudanya on 3'^ '' October, 1922; Kemal appointed Ismet as his delegate. At the 
end of the peace conference an agreement was made on the basis of Amiistice 
between Allies and Nationalist Government. Mustafa Kemal had won his 
battle. This ended the Chanak's crisis.^° 
Soon after the military victory against the Greeks and the political 
victory against the British, the Grand National Assembly '^ accepted the 
demand of Mustafa Kemal proposing the abolition of the Sultanate. 
On a proposal for a nominal vote Mustafa Kemal rose and said, "I 
believe that the Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which will for 
ever preserve the independence of the country and the nation." The chairman 
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put it to vote and on f November 1922 Mustafa Kemal obtained vote 
abolishing the sultanate. 
The Grand National Assembly deposed Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin, 
and sent him into exile. His cousin, Abdul Mejid, the eldest surviving male of 
the dynasty, was designated as a caliph. This was the last act in the decline and 
fall of the Ottoman Empire.^ ^ 
The Lausanne Conference and Treaty: 
On 20* November, 1922, opening of Peace Conference at Lausamie 
Turkey was represented by Ismet Pa§a, later known as Inonu. Britain was 
represented by Lord Curzon.^ "* Many issues were discussed in the Conference, 
such as straits issue, Mosul issue and capitulations issue. The main issue was 
the oil rich provinces of Mosul, which the Turks demanded, but Lord Curzon 
did not want to surrender. 
After a stoniiy session the Lausanne Conference was suspended, without 
agreement, on 4'*' February, 1923, resuming again on 23^'^ April, 1923. This 
time Lord Curzon was not present, and Britain was represented by Sir Hours 
Rumbold and General Ismet Pa§a for Turkey.^ ^ After a long session the Treaty 
of Lausanne was finally signed on 24"" July 1923 by Britain, Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Rumania, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The 
United States already withdrawing from World affairs, and sent his observers 
to Lausanne Conference.^ ^ 
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Soon after Mustafa Kemal telegraphed his congratulations to Ismet Pa§a: 
"You have thus crowned with a historic success a life which consists of a series 
of eminent services rendered to your country".^^ 
In this Treaty, Turkey got complete independence and National 
frontiers. Turkish sovereignty was recognised over all areas claimed by the 
National Pact except Mosul in Northern Iraq. Turkey was recognised as master 
of all of Asia Minor, the straits, and eastern Thrace. The straits were 
internationalised under the League but the chairman of the commission was to 
be a Turk and straits also open for the trade ships. The Mudanya agreement 
regarding Thrace was confinned, and in regard to the large Greek minorities in 
Turkey and Turkish minorities in Greece, both countries agreed to an exchange 
of population, with the exception of the Greeks of Istanbul and the Turks of 
Western Thrace. In this way about 1.5 million Greeks moved to Greece from 
Turkey, and about 500,000 Turks left Greece territory for Turkey. The question 
of Mosul was left to negotiation by the Turks and Greeks. 
There were important economic provisions in the Lausarme Treaty. 
Turkey secured the abolition of the surrendering the frontiers and the service of 
administration. Foreign controlled states arising from the time of partition 
agreed to take on taxes and customs dues of the goods. Soon after the Treaty 
the United States got interested in oil and communications. This was the first 
time when the United States secured a stakes in West Asia's oil. In the process 
Turkey encouraged her hard - won independence in a key area. 
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During 1923, some important political developments took place in 
Turkey, just after the abolition of the Sultanate. The country's religious power 
came in the hand of the caliph, and thus the political power in the hand of the 
Grand National Assembly. There was strong opposition among some 
conservatives in the Grand National Assembly who considered the government 
and caliphate inseparable. 
But Kemal bent them to his will and on November 1, 1922 the 
Assembly passed a resolution that separated the caliphate from the sultanate 
and eliminated the sultanate. Mehmed VI Vaideddin, the 36 and the last sultan 
of the line stretching back six centuries to Osman, left Istanbul under British 
protection. The Assembly then designated his cousin, Abdul Majid, as caliph. 
The abolition of the sultanate represented the end of the Ottoman political era 
and the election of the caliph of Islam by a democratically elected body of 
national delegates marked the beginning of the Turkish one. Mustafa Kemal 
realised the whole situation and thought that the time had come to dissolve his 
Parliament. This first Grand National Assembly, elected for the conduct of the 
war, had outlived its purpose. So Mustafa Kemal thought that a new Assembly 
was needed for the future plan and development, a body more adult than the 
old, more moderate, more responsible and more manageable. 
Mustafa Kemal called upon a meeting of the cabinet. It took place in his 
house and continued all might. It was agreed to dissolve Parliament and to hold 
th 
new elections. The first Grand National Assembly met for the last time on 16 
April, 1923. 
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Before the new elections, Mustafa Kemal had taken two steps: 
i) He announced to the press his intention to form a new party, the Peoples 
Republican Party, to replace his Parliamentary group, and 
ii) called upon the educated men of the country to help him in drafting its 
programme/' 
Mustafa Kemal also issued a nine - point election manifesto on April, 
1923, in which he proposed to transform the Defence Association into a 
political party. The manifesto also included a declaration to the effect that the 
caliphate depended on the Grand National Assembly.''^  
The Peoples Republican Party which was founded by Mustafa Kemal, 
on 9"^  August, 1923, came out of the new elections.^^ With a majority. The 
Second Grand National Assembly convened on 11"' August, 1923, and Mustafa 
Kemal appointed Fethi Bey as a Prime Minister, in place of Rauf Bey. 
On 2"'' October, 1923, the Allied forces evacuated Istanbul. Thereafter it 
came under the control of the Turkish forces. This was the end of an 
occupation which had lasted the whole duration of the First World War. 
Mustafa Kemal decided that Istanbul will remain the home of the 
caliphate, and Ankara will be the capital of Turkey. On \3*^ October, 1923, 
Ankara was proclaimed the capital of Turkey.'''' 
Proclamation of the Turkish Republic: 
After the First World War, Mustafa Kemal had saved and revived 
Turkey. He had also transformed a crumbling and struggling Empire, 
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surrounded by the enemies, into a compact homogenous, manageable and 
strong viable state. 
Mustafa Kemal had reached his first objective, to save his country; his 
next objective was to create a new country. 
In the eyes of Mustafa Kemal, the religio-political structure of Turkey 
and organisation of Islam was medieval based. So he wanted to re-establish the 
religion because, according to his thinking, that barred the way to progress. 
Mustafa Kemal had made up his mind to constitute Turkey into a 
Republic. After the victory from Samsun to Erzurum, Sivas, Ankara, Smyrna 
and now Lausanne, his position was now very strong to achieve his design. 
When the idea of the Republic had taken concrete shape in his mind during the 
summer, he invited a few friends, including Ismet and Fethi, to dinner at 
Chankaya, there he announced, "Tomorrow we shall proclaim the Republic". 
There was no disagreement among them, as he briefed Fethi and his colleagues 
about the tactics; the meeting then adjourned. Mustafa Kemal and Ismet called 
another meeting that completed the draft of the Republic, in the form of 
changes in the existing Constitution and this sentence was also added, "The 
form of the Govermnent of the Turkish State is a Republic". Its President 
would be head of the state and would be elected by the Grand National 
Assembly. President would appoint the Prime Minister, who would then 
appoint the other ministers with the approval but no longer on the initiation of 
the Assembly. ^ ^ 
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According to Mustafa Kemal's instruction Fethi Bey (Okyar) and his 
other ministers resigned from the cabinet, on 27'^  October, 1923 and the 
Deputies tried to agree on a new cabinet which'might have a chance of general 
acceptances^ 
Soon after, the draft amending the constitution was announced in the 
Assembly. After long protests, the amendments were passed in the Assembly. 
On 29"'October, 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Mustafa 
Kemal, was elected its first President (for Life) by the Assembly. Mustafa 
Kemal appointed Ismet Pa§a (Ismet Inonu) as a Prime Minister of the 
Republican Turkey. The news of the proclamation was celebrated throughout 
Turkey with a salute of a One Hundred One guns. 
On 3 March 1924, six months after the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic, the Assembly voted to abolish the caliphate and ordered the Ottoman 
dynasty - some 120 member's altogether - into exile. The Assembly was not 
quite unanimous as those who had esteem for caliph were upset by the way 
the faction around Mustafa Kemal had pushed through the proclamation of the 
constitution. The abolition of caliphate spoiled relations between more 
determined nationalists like himself and moderates like Rauf Orbay and Kazim 
Karabekir who had both visited Caliph Abdul Mejid shortly before the office 
was abolished. This clearly showed the strong hold which Mustafa Kemal and 
his most trusted colleagues had over the Assembly. After coming into power, 
Mustafa Kemal launched various programmes of reforms, to change the social 
political and economic life of the Turkish people. On 20"' April, 1924, the first 
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Republican Constitution having Western European Pattern was adopted, and it 
abolished the Sultanate and the caliphate followed by other refonns in the 
coming years. Mustafa Kemal wanted to give the Turks the opportunity to 
build a new Turkey. 
The Turks were the only one of the central power able to overturn 
immediately the vindictive settlements imposed by the Allied powers following 
the First World War because Turkish resistance ultimately was led to success 
by Mustafa Kemal, and this proved that he created it in a magnificent way. 
Really Kemal did more than any one else to create the Turkish Republic from 
the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, but he accomplished this by bringing together 
elements of resistance that had already emerged. Mustafa Kemal coordinated 
their efforts expressed their purpose, described their ambitions, and led them to 
victory.^' 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE TURKEY OF MUSTAFA 
KEMAL: FROM EMPIRE TO 
REPUBLIC 
We have discussed in chapter 5, the emergence of Mustafa Kemal as the 
most successful field commander. The battle of Gallipoli was one of the very 
few occasions when ottoman army defeated European forces in World War I. 
The reputation of Gallipoli was reaffinned on other fronts. The victory at the 
three-week battle of Sakarya with Greeks followed by another great victory in 
September 1922 inflicting a devastating and humiliating defeat on Greeks are 
other military successes which Mustafa Kemal achieved. He was against 
Turkey's entry into World War on Germany's side as he could foresee the 
consequences. If Enver, the then War Minister, would have followed his 
opinion, Turkey would have been spared of the trauma of defeat. He had an 
aptitude for military service from his childhood. When his mother wanted her 
to join a religious school, he rebelled and reminded his mother that his father 
had given him a sword at birth, an indication that he wanted his son to be a 
soldier. So Mustafa said, "I was bom as a soldier" and "I shall die as a soldier." 
Throughout his military career, he always secured a high ranking in his class. 
His performance on the battle-field and during his military service confirmed 
that he was really an outstanding military commander. We now proceed to 
examine how this military hero acquits himself as the head of a state of which 
he himself was the chief architect which he managed for about 15 years (1923-
1938). 
He showed great leadership qualities in organizing the nationalist 
movement and the war for independence which culminated in the emergence of 
the modem Turkish Republic. After World War I, the Allies controlled Istanbul 
and the Ottoman government and they were determined to punish the 
Ottomans. They had secretly planned to carve up what little remained of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Sultan was a prisoner of Allies. Resistance movement 
started and Turks in Anatolia took matters in their own hands. They began to 
come into armed conflict with local non-Muslims and it was apprehended that 
they would soon confront the occupied forces fearing anarchy, the Allies urged 
the Sultan to control the situation. The Sultan deputed Mustafa Kemal. After 
arrival in Samsun, Kemal, instead of quelling the popular resistance movement, 
got involved in organizing the movement to defend the country. Avoiding 
dismissal by the Sultan, he resigned from the army service. At this critical time 
when he was just a civilian. General Kazim Karabekir, commander of the 15 
Army Corps of 18,000 soldiers, placed his army at Kemal's disposal. Kazim 
also convened a Congress of all defence-of-rights associations held in Erzurum. 
Mustafa Kemal was elected as head of the Erzurum Congress and thereby he 
got an official status. Later developments are all dealt with in the previous 
chapter. Suffice to say that at this crucial hour when the weakened Sultan 
could not stop Allies (as is further evident from the fact that the Treaty of 
Sevres 1920, a death warrant for the Ottoman Empire, was signed by the. 
Sultan under pressure from Allies), Mustafa Kemal mobilized the local 
resistance groups, calling themselves the societies for the defence of rights, into 
a national movement culminating into a Grand National Assembly. Kemal set 
up an opposition government that fought both the Allies and the rebellious 
ethnic groups within the Empire. This was a great political achievement. The 
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Lausanne Treaty (1923) was a remarkable diplomatic victory for Kemal and his 
government. The aspirations expressed in the National Pact of 1920 were fully 
achieved. Bernard Lewis well observed, "Turkey alone among the defeated 
powers of First World War, succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, 
rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the 
acceptance of her own terais." 
The above brief discussion shows that Kemal was gifted with qualities 
of leadership. He had the talent of moving, inspiring and mobilizing the masses 
of people so that they act together in pursuit of an end. It is also important that 
leaders should lead by persuasion and not by force; force only when necessary. 
No leader is infaUible and making a cult of a leader is always a mistake. With 
this in the background we now proceed to examine the achievements, together 
with failures, if any, of Mustafa Kemal who was elected as President (with 
Ismet Inonu as Prime Minister) of the Turkish Republic created on October 29, 
1923. 
The Reforms of Mustafa Kemal 
Most of the Middle Eastern rulers, including Ottoman sultans, who 
wanted to modernize their countries on Western lines sought to adopt selected 
European technological improvements and organizational methods for their 
armed forces and later in spheres other than the military. They did not intend to 
completely westernise their states and their countrymen. Mustafa Kemal was 
not a selective reformer but a committed westemiser and a secular nationalist 
who wanted to abandon Ottoman legacy and transform Turkey into a modem 
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European state. On assuming office as President, he initiated a series of radical 
reforms in the poUtical, social and economic life of the country with the object 
of rapidly transforming Turkey into a modem state. As Davis puts it, 
"Although Turkey has come a long way since Atatiirk's death, the guiding 
policies which he had laid down have fundamentally been followed: the 
creation and preservation of a territorially limited national state for the Turks; 
the inculcation of a Turkish national consciousness; the breaking of the hold of 
Islam over state, law and education; the westernisation not only of material life 
but of institutions, minds and customs; the rapid development of the economy; 
the avoidance of class divisions and growth of a sense of solidarity; a devotion 
to the republican form of government; and finally, the pursuit of peaceful 
foreign relations."' Although some of these aims - the republic, the 
secularisation and the nation-state - were Atatiirk's contribution, the 
groundwork was prepared during a century of refonn effort before him. The 
Republic had emerged from the faihires and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
but also out of Empire's experience and progress which itself had a history of 
600 years. To say that the Republic was just a clean slate which bore only the 
Atatiirk's revolution would be an exaggeration. The Tanzimat reforms had laid 
the foundations of a secular state. The Young Turks, along with their attempts 
to preserve the Empire, had given a powerful impetus to the cause of Turkish 
nationalism. During the War days, some secularisation was initiated and 
universities and public positions were opened to women. Some law courts 
which were under the control of religious authorities were placed under the 
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jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Refoims were also made in 1916 in the 
rules governing marriage and divorce. Mustafa Kemal carried the process much 
further boldly and even rashly, as the discussion below will bring out. His task 
of refonn was made easier due to several factors. As just stated, the Ottoman 
Empire had already established a trend towards westernisation - westernisation 
of institutions, thought and customs (chapters 1 to 5 of this study have already 
spelled out these developments). The Empire was now very small in size, a 
very large number of non-Turks who were creating uprisings and revolts, were 
now out leaving a relatively homogeneous population to administer. Further, 
the Republic inherited capable elite of bureaucrats, officers and professional 
men to guide its destiny, together with experience in parliamentary forms, a 
complete system of local government, the begiimings of a new educational 
system and of a westernised law, and much more. Unlike most of the 
developing countries of today, Turkey had never entirely lost its independence, 
the traditions and experiences of ruling and decision-making were there to 
draw on. Furthermore, and the Republic had a great advantage over the 
Ottoman Empire that it was at peace through the whole course of its 
development. Once the shackles of sultan/caliph eliminated, opposition from 
conservative Muslims (like Sheikh Said's revolt in which more Turkish 
soldiers died than in the war of independence) removed, and opposition from 
old CUP leaders put down by invoking the draconian Law for the Maintenance 
of Order, 1925, the road was now clear for Kemal to go ahead with reforms and 
innovations. 
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Before going into a detailed and critical discussion of Atatiirk's refomis, 
one more general comment may be made here. Many writers of Ottoman 
history seem to be so much enamoured with Ataturk that they have completely 
ignored other important individuals who resisted the partition of the Empire 
proposed by the Treaty of Sevres and worked to save what remained of it to 
establish a homeland for the Turks. According to recent studies, the resistance 
struggle that followed World War I was planned and carried out by the CUP. 
Mustafa Kemal and his supporters were not at first among its leaders.^ Mustafa 
Kemal promoted a cult centred on him by encouraging the erection of his 
statues in his honour. A very talented military commander, Kazim Karabekir, 
who was also amongst the architects of the Republic, wanted to publish his 
own contribution in the form of a memoir, but that was suppressed."* Mustafa 
Kemal was ruthless with those who opposed his refonns. When an attempt was 
made on his life in 1926, it provided him with a pretext to rid himself of 
leading members of CUP. Fifteen of them, including Javid Pasha, the brilliant 
finance minister during CUP days, were hanged; some were exiled and some 
acquitted. Opposition was effectively broken.^ 
At the beginning of the war for independence, Kemal saw the Empire in 
ruins and he had a vision of constituting it into a Republic guided by the 
principle of separation of church and state on the model of laiicist France. In 
1922 in the new capital, Ankara, the Grand National Assembly abolished the 
sultanate and in 1924 the caliphate, the religious and political institution which 
had lasted for a millennium Thus, for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler 
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claimed the spiritual leadership of Islam. Turkey, as heir to the Ottoman 
Empire, should have got this leadership. The abolition of caliphate was 
symbolic of the change in Turkey's relationship to the Muslim world. Charles 
Gallagher remarked, "Turkey was exiled voluntarily from its own historical 
cultural world and turned toward its own program of separatist national 
secularism."^ In the name of the sovereignty of people, the GNA proclaimed 
the Republic. The office of Sheikh al-Islam was abolished and so the Shariah 
courts dealing with matters relating to family law. Soon the religious schools 
(Madarsas) were closed, Sufi orders and monasteries abolished and compulsory 
state schools and co-education for all children and young students introduced. 
The property of religious foundations (Wakf) was put under state control. The 
Mejelle, the civil code dealing with family relations on the basis of Shariah was 
replaced by the Swiss Civil Code. The change of Islamic to Western calendar, 
outlawing the fez for men and frowning on the veil for women, both garments 
traditionally associated with religion, the replacement of Arabic script with 
Latin script, the call for prayers in Turkish were other refonns bearing on 
religion. The Hagia Sophia, (Emperor Justinian's 6 century Basilia which was 
converted into a mosque by Mehmed II) was made into a museum. These 
reforms, as observed by Bernard Lewis, made Islam a department of state; the 
ulema had become minor religious servants. The summary way in which all 
these reforms were endorsed by the GNA without much discussion reminds 
one of the Napoleonic ways of doing things. 
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Mustafa Kemal formed the Republican People's Party (RPP) which 
became the exclusive political instrument for carrying out his reform agenda. 
In 924 the Grand National Assembly framed a constitution providing a legal 
framework for the government with guaranteed civil rights. Having been 
elected as President by the GNA, he appointed Ismet Pasha as his Prime 
Minister, handpicked his cabinet, and then continued his brisk efforts to 
modernize the RepubHc. Given below is; 
A summary of Atatiirk's major reforms placed in 
Chronological order 
Year Refonn 
1922 Grand National Assembly abolishes Sultanate (Nov.l) 
1923 Republican Peoples Party formed. Treaty of Lausanne gives 
Turkey almost its present forai (July 24); Allies evacuate Istanbul; 
the Ottoman Empire is dissolved Declaration of Turkish Republic 
with capital at Ankara and Kemal elected first President (October 
29) 
1924 Abolition of Caliphate; Ottoman dynasty exiled (March 3); 
Traditional religious schools closed; office of Sheikh al-Islam 
abolished; Constitution adopted (April 20). 
1925 Dervish brotherhoods abolished; Fez outlawed by Hat Law (Nov. 
25); Veiling of women discouraged; Western clothing for men and 
women encouraged; Western (Gregorian) calendar adopted. 
Ministry of religious endowments abolished. A drastic law, Law 
for the Maintenance of Order passed by GNA under which Sheikh 
Said, the leader, and more than 40 rebels executed. This law 
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invoked when an assassination attempt on Kemal's life was 
allegedly discovered involving Kemal's political opponents. 13 of 
whom were hanged, several exiled and some acquitted. 
1926 The Assembly voted to abolish the Mejelle. Swiss Civil Code was 
adopted along with penal and commercial codes modelled on 
Italian and German codes. Millet system ended. 
1927 First systematic census. Mustafa Kemal makes six-day speech. 
1928 New Turkish alphabet (modified Latin forni) adopted; State 
declared Secular (April 10); Constitutional provision relating to 
Islam as the religion of the state deleted. 
1933 Islamic call to worship required being in Turkish. Aya Sofya, the 
great Byzantine church which since 1453 had been a mosque, was 
secularised as a museum. 
1934 Women given the right to vote and the right to hold office; Law of 
Surnames adopted - Mustafa Kemal given the name Kemal 
Atatiirk (Father Turk) by the Grand National Assembly; Ismet 
Pasha took surname Inonu. 
1935 Sunday adopted as legal weekly holiday; State role in managing 
economy- Etatism or Statism, the 6 Arrow - written into the 
constitution. 
Mustafa Kemal sought to unite the whole arniy and the nation of the 
Ottoman Empire through the ideas of secularism and nationalism. To him all 
were Turks who were residing within the boundaries of Turkey and further that 
church/religion and state are separate. In this way, a new Turkish nationalism 
took place under the clashing push and pull of imperialism. The Erzurum -
Sivas Congress (1919) and the National Pact (1920), which provided for a 
Turkish government on the basis of national will, territorial integrity and 
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complete independence, showed the consolidation of the ideas of Turkish 
nationalist consciousness.^This national solidarity made the war of liberation a 
great success in 1923. The Turkish National Liberation Movement represented 
the collective will of the Turks under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his 
new "revolutionary elite" which was a substitute for the Ottoman ruling elite. 
During the liberation movement, nationalism was the main ideology of the 
Turks and it prepared them for future changes in the Turkish Republic. After 
the successful war of liberation against Western imperialism, the Turks 
emerged as a new national entity which represented a logical culmination of the 
nationalist ideas of the "Young Ottomans".** 
Mustafa Kemal was very much influenced by the thoughts of the Young 
Ottomans in the form of Nationalism and Populism. He also stated that "the 
aim of the reforms which we have already carried out and are continuing to 
carry out was to transform the Turkish society into a modem society in every 
aspect". This was the basis of the Kemalist reforms. 
The most important contribution of Mustafa Kemal was not so much 
originality of ideas but the ability to choose a set of interrelated, consistent, and 
relevant ideas and build them into a practical programme. He was more a child 
of the Young Turks than of the Young Ottomans and more a Turkist or a pan-
Turkist. His idea of Turkification was not the imposition of Turkish language 
and culture on non-Turks, but getting rid of non-Turkish elements, including 
territories with non-Turkish population.^ 
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In reality, Mustafa Kemal was a true Turkish patriot and used all 
ideological means capitalist, socialist. Islamic and secular to integrate and 
develop his nation. Broadly speaking, the elements of Westemism, Modernism, 
Nationalism, and Secularism, contributed in determining various prominent 
features of the Kemalist idealogy.'^' 
Westernization: 
The emergence of the Turkish Republic as an independent state signified 
an end to the process v^hich had created a duality in the old Ottoman System 
and finally led to its dissolution. The Republic represented a new national 
identity implying renunciation of the international postures of the Ottoman 
Empire and adoption of the ideals of Turkish cultural heritage, Turkish 
language and Turkish territorial boundaries." The Turkish nationalism was 
adopted as the state ideology in the Republic which made it a source of 
moderate ideological control. 
Mustafa Kemal was the supreme commander and the founder and first 
President of the Turkish Republic. Since his personality had developed in the 
military environment, he thought in a mechanical way, talked in absolute terms 
and acted decisively.'^ After assuming the power he was in a position to 
formulate the state ideology of Turkish nationalism according to his likes and 
dislikes. This does not necessarily mean that his associates were denied a role 
in the formation of the Turkish state ideology. 
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Mustafa Kemal's aims and objects of this transfomiation were as 
follows: 
1. To modernize Turkey. 
2. To free it from foreign economic tutelage; and 
3. To secularize it. 
The basis of this transformation was symbolised by the "Six Arrows" 
that came to be known as the "Six Principles of Kemalism", which were 
adopted by the Republican People's Party, with the addition in 1931 of Statism 
and Reformism to the four previous principles of Nationalism, Secularism 
(Laicism), Republicanism and Populism. Each was interlocked with the other -
Statism insuring through populism against exploitation; populism guaranteed 
against it by secularism; all protected by nationalism against foreign 
aggression, and kept alive by the revolutionary dynamic. Later in 1937, these 
were formally incorporated into the Turkish constitution. These Six Principles 
expressed the fundamental political philosophy of new Turkish Republic.'^  
165 
SIX PRINCIPLES OF KEMALISM 
OR 
SIX ARROWS 
1. => Republicanism 
2. => Nationalism 
3. ==> Populism 
4. => Statism (in economic policy) 
5. => Secularism (Laicism) 
6. =^ Reformism (Revolutionism) 
1. Republicanism: The Turkisii Republic (established in 1923) made a 
somewhat biased use of Namik Kemal, highlighting those aspects of his 
thought that focused on the defence of the "fatherland". In fact, this use of 
patriotism was more in tune with the Turkish nation-state that emerged after 
First World War than with the Ottoman Empire. During the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal completely ignored the idea that 
constitutionalism should be harmonised with Islam.'^  But it is also true that 
Mustafa Kemal witnessed the debacle of the Turkish Empire, and he had no 
other alternative except to go to the extreme against the ideals of the Ottomans. 
Republicanism represented a political system in which the goverrmient 
did not retain the absolute authority, but accepted the right of peoples' 
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participation at all levels. It stood for "the form of government which 
represents and realises the ideal of national sovereignty".'^ In the Turkish 
Republic, it led to the creation of a patterned set of modem institutions and 
initiation of political processes for the running of political system characterised 
by the largest political participation. This republican set-up provided sufficient 
stimulus to the process of modernization in all fields. 
In the Turkish Republic, it had created a strong movement of 
modernization and revolutionized many aspects of the Turkish society. Thus, 
the traditional order underwent change and gave rise to new organisations, 
institutions, processes, attitudes, beliefs, roles, behaviours, and relationships. 
The age - old ascriptive - hierarchical system was abolished and new, mobile 
and achievement - oriented system was initiated. The new socio-political set-
up gave rise to new groups with specific opinions about their status and 
interests which they demanded and defended. As a result of these 
developments, the Republic experienced a multi-dimensional change in the 
new political enviromnent. The major political measures like abolition of the 
Sultanate and the Caliphate, declaration of the Republic, introduction of the 
constitution, the representative assembly, the political party and the national 
political system had changed Turkey.'^ The new political system legitimised 
the functioning of political parties which necessarily meant the involvement 
and participation of different groups in the political system. 
During the Kemalist era, the state was absolutist. It was because the 
Kemalist elite intended to carry out a patterned and controlled change through 
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the state and prepared the society for a democratic stage. The Kemahst high -
handedness to introduce reforais was regarded as a must in order to ensure the 
success of westernization and to root out reactionary forces. 
2. Nationalism: The ideal of nationalism appeared (in the Ottoman 
Empire) first among the non-Muslims, mainly the Ottoman Christians, then 
among the Albanians and Arabs, and finally among the Turks. The fact that it 
appeared last among the Turks was not accidental: The Ottoman state was 
formed by the Turks themselves. At a time when the Ottoman Empire was 
multi-national, nationalism would have appeared as its repudiation. The state is 
a nation already established (nation de fait) whereas the ideal of nationalism 
meant the nucleus of a nationality based on will (nation de volonte).^^ 
The intelligentsia needed a more sophisticated interpretation of 
nationalism because they were concerned with the fate of the state. The real 
beginning of Turkish nationalism came through the linguistic movement 
initiated by the Young Ottomans like Ziya Pasha, '"* Namik Kemal, "^^  and AH 
Suavi, through this movement they wanted to reach the greatest number of 
people who could understand only a simplified Turkish language. This Turkish 
nationalism was extolled as a supreme and sacred ideal in the Republic. In 
essence, it was an ideal stressing special Turkish character, unification of the 
Turkish population, national organic solidarity^^ and strengthening of the 
Turkish linguistic unity and cultural homogeneity.^^ However, it got identified 
with the form of political absolutism in all spheres of society. So, all problems 
were examined with a "nafionalist mind" which had positive effect of social 
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integration and national consensus within the national boundaries. This type of 
nationalism renounced the above - national Islamic - Ottoman character and 
the expansionist outlook to live with limited distinction in the community of 
modem nations. Though nationalism in Turkey was of the western origin, the 
Turkish form differed substantially from the original model because of the 
modifications made at the local level. In spite of the fact that the Turkish 
nationalism represented broadly a consensus model in the Republic, the 
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conservatives used it as a "safe shield against the unorthodox ideas", and the 
modernists tried to negate the impact of the orthodoxy through the creation of 
nation culture and universal understanding. 
Mustafa Kemal was very much influenced by the thoughts of the Young 
Ottomans in the form of Nationalism. This idea developed through the medium 
of the Young Turks revolution of 1908. It was time when the giant 
multinational Empire was about to sink. As a matter of fact the period 
following 1908 up to First World War may be described as a period of 
emergency for the nation. This actually forced Mustafa Kemal to base his 
thinking on a scientific way. 
After the First World War, Mustafa Kemal united the whole Nation of 
the Ottoman Empire through the ideas of Nationalism. Nationalism was the 
main ideology of Mustafa Kemal and it helped them for future changes in the 
Turkish Republic. His idea of Turkish Nationalism which claimed Turkey for 
the Turks and rejected jurisdiction over territories with non-Turkish 
population.^^ 
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3. Populism: The Kemalist idea of the sovereignty of the people was 
conceived differendy from both the liberalism and the communist doctrines. It 
took shape parallel with the struggle against communism, imperialism, 
sultanate and caliphate, and was expressed in the principle of populism.^^ 
Populism based not on religion or race but on common citizenship, 
national unity, sovereignty and devotion to the national ideal. According to 
Mustafa Kemal, populism was "the social principle that seeks to rest the social 
order on its work and its law and Turks to struggle as a whole nation against 
the imperialism and the capitalism".''' So it was directly related to the 
"Government of the people and not of the ruling class".^^ The underlying 
assumption of this doctrine was that all Turks fornied a social whole, though 
with certain differentiation but, at the same time, with non-class fonnation. The 
Turkish society was devoid of antagonism of the class society but was rather 
marked by consensus and conformity. This situation gave rise to a new social 
order based on the national sovereignty, hamiony of interests, and proclaimed 
the absolute equality of all classes of people before the law." 
Mustafa Kemal was very much influenced by the thoughts of the Young 
Ottomans especially Namik Kemal in the forni of populism. Namik Kemal was 
the first Muslim who got interested in "the people", and also understood the 
real essence of liberalism and the meaning of the sovereignty of the people.^ '* 
The Young Ottomans failed to graft Western ideologies to the body politic of 
Islam, but they were successful in introducing new values to the Turks.^ ^ 
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Populism had developed under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, and it 
was adopted by Grand National Assembly on 20"^  January, 1921, that is, after a 
five month struggle. So, populism became the manifestation of an urge for 
national-social solidarity through the peoples' rule. Mustafa Kemal himself 
explained the idea thus: 
"The aim of a people's organisation as a party is not the realization of 
the interests of certain classes over against those of other classes. The aim is 
rather to mobilize the entire nation, called people by including all classes and 
excluding none, in common and united action towards genuine prosperity 
which is the common objective for all.^ ^ 
4. Statism (economic policy): It referred to a system in which the state 
participated actively for general and vital economic interests of the people 
(through private work and activity as a basic idea) in order to lead the nation 
and the country to prosperity in the shortest possible time. In other words, this 
principle of massive capital investment gave opportunity to develop the country 
by rapid industrialization. Mustafa Kemal said: 
"The statism that we are implementing is a system peculiar to 
Turkey, engendered by its own needs. It means that while 
recognising private entrepreneurship as the main basis, but 
recognising that many activities are not undertaken, the state 
must be given the control of the economy to face all the needs 
of a large country and a great nation". 
This was aimed at developing national economy by liberating it from 
foreign dependence and encouraging local enterprises under state supervision. 
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This idea came from the thoughts of Namik Kemal, who was the first 
Turkish writer to see clearly the importance of the economic penetration of the 
West. His descriptions of the evils of existing economic, financial, 
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administrative, and educational conditions were accurate and pioneering. 
The major political decisions, adopted by the Kemalist elite and 
implemented by the absolutist slate, resulted in certain socio-economic 
changes, it is felt that these cliangcs were not basic primarily because the 
economic power was retained by the commercial bourgeoisie without 
disturbance in the post-revolutionary era. However, certain socio-economic 
changes were eminent which are explained here. While the abolition of 
capitulations through the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July, 1923, led to the 
emergence of new native classes of the nature of small- bourgeoisie, the 
adoption of the statist economics had far-reaching impact on the consolidation 
of the national bourgeoisie. Thus, statist policy provided certain sections of 
population with additional income and employment possibilities at the cost of 
others. Statism gave rise to certain social groups and classes like peasants, 
workers, small businessmen and intellectuals. The penetration of money 
economy into rural areas changed the relatively self-sufficient traditional 
economy, relationships based on it and the pattern of urban-rural relations. In 
actuality, statist policies fulfilled the wider needs and intensified the broader 
processes of modernization including industrialization.^^ 
5. Secularism (Laicism): It established the principle of the separation of 
religion from politics, state and social life.'*° The main objective of secularism 
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was to evolve a non-religious consciousness in order to replace the traditional 
concepts of loyalty like Islam and Ottomanism. According to Bernard Lewis, 
the purpose of the Kemalist secularism "was not to destroy Islam, but to 
destabilise it to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social 
and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters of belief and worship".'*' 
The development in the fonn of separation between religion and state 
took place throughout the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Meshrutiyet 
(constitutional) periods, and that this development was not in the right 
direction. But the Kemalist approach to secularism differed radically from the 
approaches of the Tanzimat and the Meshrutiyet. Moreover, the emphasis on 
rationality in the religious affairs became a deistic conviction of secular 
colouring in Turkey. In this context, the abolition of the caliphate was 
presented, as "liberating" Islam from its "unreasonable traditional associates" 
and preparing the ground for its emergence as a rational religion.''^ 
The Kemalist secularism was not "anti-religious" in the sense of 
liquidating religion systematically."*^ Although the official fonnulation was 
content to separate the worldly from the divine, and to oppose the exploitation 
of religion for political purpose, in reality Kemalist "Laicism" became an 
instrument for control and supervision of Islam by the state.'*'* 
According to the Kemalist, it was an attempt to evolve a "rationalised-
humanised" and "enlightened" Islam. Mustafa Kemal's understanding of Islam 
was purely logical, and he recognised that "our religion is most rational and 
natural religion".'*^ In reality, Islam enjoined enlightemnent and freedom; 
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religion should preach these things for the betterment and understanding of the 
people. 
Mustafa Kemal's experiment was not to Turkify Islam for the sake of 
Turkish nationalism, but to Turkify Islam for the sake of religious 
enlightenment. So, in the Kemalist secular framework, the believer had the 
ideal conditions for his religious expression."*^ 
Secularism proved to be the main feature of modernization during the 
Kemalist era because of the religious character of the Turkish society. In the 
Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal introduced systematic reform in the religious 
field through the steps like abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, Shariat 
Laws, religious orders, and restriction on religious education in the schools. 
The change in the cultural symbols and social practices, removal of Islam from 
the constitution, and finally change of the Turkish script from Arabic to Roman 
(Latin) strengthened, the trend of reform wiiich signified a decisive victory of 
the secular-modernists over the religious conservatives in a struggle which had 
started in the nineteenth century. The immediate influence of these reforms was 
de-functionalization of the men of religion in the civil administration and 
public life, and isolation of the new generation from the traditional religious 
clerical class. In fact, Islam was not defunctionalized but depoliticised during 
the Kemalist era. According to E. D. Ellis, the Kemalist reforms were not 
directed against religion but social and political institutions that had developed 
as adjuncts to the Islamic faith. 
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In the Turkish Republic, the Kemahst attitude towards religion created 
two types of reaction. These were: 
i) A pathological phenomenon indicative of social and cultural disintegration 
giving rise to the need for a new set of values and ideas. This reflected 
crudely in the conversion of three Turkish Muslim girls to Christianity in 
1928. On the basis of this situation, religion became a topic of free 
discussion in the secular state but with three main limitations which were: 
1. Legal prohibition of the formation of associations on the basis of religion or 
religious sect; 
2. Legal prohibition of the formation of political association or political parties 
seeking religious support; and 
3. Legal punishment for the acts contrary to secularism. 
In this particular context, the Kemalists had to lend a cautious 
encouragement to the progressive model of religion which was completely 
devoid of political implications. They accepted religion as a social 
institution simply to meet the needs of social-cultural life. 
ii) That secular reform had faced strong opposition from various violent 
and non-violent groups. The violent groups' reaction, initiated with the 
religious devotion, was to be stopped forcefully, the non-violent groups' 
reaction became serious because it argued about the fiitility and 
superficiality of some secular reforms like that of the adoption of the 
European hat by the Turks. "The opposition to this law", according to 
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Halide Edib, "had a note of wounded self-respect rather than of 
objection". Some faithful Turks have minded about this reform 
because European hats presented a problem during the practice of the 
prayer. They have no other option, so they pray with bare heads or with 
a cap turned backwards."*^ Mustafa Kemal thought that a change in 
Turkish attire might change the people's outlook. The change of attire 
and the draconian methods employed to enforce the change has been a 
source of great controversy and is being debated even today. In view of 
its importance, we have dealt with this subject in some detail later in this 
chapter. Anyway, this reform gave huge economic benefits to the 
western companies in and out of Turkey. 
6. Reformation (Revolutionism): It emphasised the determination to 
change and bypass tradition and precedent if they did not serve national 
interest.^^ In this process, "modernism was the goal and refonnation the 
means", '^ and progressive-evolutionary principles as guides to the radical 
transformation. On 5* October, 1925, Mustafa Kemal said: 
"The Turkish Revolution signifies a transformation for broader 
than the word revolution suggests. The Turkish revolution 
means replacing unity based on religion with nationality. This 
nation has means of survival for nations in the international 
struggle for existence lies in the acceptance of the 
contemporary Western civilization. This nation had also 
accepted the principle that all of its laws should be based on 
secular grounds only, on a secular mentality that accepts the 
rule of continuous change in accordance with the change and 
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development of life's conditions as its law. The time has come 
to lay the legal foundations and educate new men of law 
satisfying the mentality and needs of our Revolution". 
Through revolutionism, Mustafa Kemal's aim was to change the overall 
traditional social order and revolutionise the Turkish way of life in its entirety. 
It also provided the stimulus and social dynamism to the process of nation -
building and modernization in Turkey. 
Islam rejected the principle of separation of the spiritual and the 
temporal; it penetrated all aspects of life and controlled all things by laws. Not 
only prayer and pilgrimage, but government and commerce, peace and war, 
sex, marriage and divorce, and even food and attire were regulated either by the 
Qur'an and the Hadith or by mores and customs that had become binding. 
Consequently, all the reforms which are discussed have some relationship to 
Islam. From 1922 to the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, the major activities 
of the government and the people of Turkey consisted of abolishing institutions 
or laws or ways of life and substituting others in their place.^ ^ 
Some Further Thoughts on Nationalism: 
According to Gabriel Trade, the idea of nationalism has been the 
product of the newspapers, and it has given a common consciousness to those 
who speak the same language by uniting then into a "public". In addition to this 
influence, which has been made rather unconsciously and unwillingly, the 
newspaper which has spurred the feelings of honour and sacrifice in the 
masses, merely to increase its circulation, has consequently aroused a 
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consciousness of nation traditions and of cherished ideals. The sentiment of 
nationality once it arises amongst the masses spreads easily over neighbouring 
peoples. Once awakened, it leads to revival in moral life, in language, in 
literature, and in economic and political life by reinforcing the feelings of 
solidarity, sacrifice, and struggle among its supporters.^ "* 
The emergence of nationalism among the Arabs also played a most 
prominent part in the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs and 
the Turks lived side by side for more than four hundred years in a multi-racial 
Ottoman Empire as members of one great community, united by their Islamic 
faith and their allegiance to a Muslim sovereign. But towards the end of the 
19 century and the beginning of the 20 century, the reign of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II and subsequently the "Young Turks" led to increased discontent and 
rebelliousness in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and starting their 
detachmment.^^ Thus the Turkish intelligentsia, under the impact of the 
Ottoman Christian nationalism, Arab nationalism and nation-consciousness of 
the West also started to exhibit national awakening. It was also natural for the 
Turks to be the last nation in the Ottoman Empire to develop nationalism, 
because they were in certain respects in closest approximation to a ruling race, 
and for them to be nationalistic would be an open repudiation of the multi-
national Ottoman Empire.^ ^ Therefore, nationalism among the Ottoman Turks 
was started at the later stage and Mehmet Ziya better known by his pen name 
of Gokalp is the real father of the Turkish nationalism. Gokalp was very much 
influenced by the thoughts of the Young Ottomans in the form of nationalism. 
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After assuming the power, Mustafa Kemal Pasha later known as Ataturk was in 
a position to formulate the state ideology of Turkish nationalism according to 
his likes and dislikes " , and builds it into a practical programme. 
According to Ziya Gokalp, "each religion existing in the world 
constitutes an Ummet. The common connecting element in each Ummet is 
religion. In the grouping called, "nation" on the other hand, language, morals, 
law and political institutions, fine arts, economic organisations, science, 
philosophy, and technology, are also common unifying elements, in addition to 
religion. Within a certain nation on the other hand, these spheres of social life 
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have to have a uniformity and unity. Thus he defines nation as a group of 
people sharing a common language, religion, morality, and aesthetics which are 
characteristics of a particular culture. Therefore, characteristics of culture, in 
his opinion, are the foundation of Turkish nationalism. 
Change of Attire and Recent Developments: 
A very dramatic measure adopted by Kemal was the Hat Law of 1925. 
The 'Fez' was mocked as an Ottoman 'carnival dress' and replaced by the 
European hat. This was done by the so-called Hat law which banned the 
wearing of fez and made it a criminal offence. The measure was enforced even 
in the mosques. The opposition was suppressed even with some hangings - a 
shock treatment to dissuade people from a relic of the Ottoman past. Some time 
ago on a trip to Europe Kemal had been the brunt of ridicule for his tassled red 
felt hat. Stating that civilized men must wear civilized headgear, Kemal chose 
to wear the more modem Panama hat, much like Sultam Mehmud II (The 
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'Conqueror') had replaced the turban with the more modem Fez, about a 
century ago. However, Mahmud's imposition of the new headgear on his new 
army proved remarkably problem-free. The Fez was already worn by the 
military forces of the Maghreb provinces and Egypt, as it was by the troops in 
the retinue of the Sharif of Mecca. So there was no religious objection to it. 
The Fez had already made its appearance in the Ottoman anny worn by 
musketeers fighting against rebellious Balkan notable Pasvanoglu Osman 
Pasha of Vidin.^'' Then its wearing was extended to government employees in 
1829. The support of Islamic scholars was sough and preachers in the mosques 
convinced the people that it was acceptable. However, the Clerics out-rightly 
rejected Mahmud's demand that they too wear fez in place of turbans. 
Mahmud's reform was gradual, based on persuasion and even Ottoman Jews 
and Christians also wore the fez. Kemal's military approach 'Do or die' may 
not be a viable approach while dealing with age-old traditions and mores of the 
community. The European hat was more than a symbol, "it was a psychological 
tool - perhaps the head under a western hat would think western thoughts."^° In 
regard to veil worn by women. Kemal's approach was quite sensible; he 
discouraged it but left it to the changing fashion of the people themselves. 
But Kemal's legacy in the matter of dress is still a serious issue in 
Turkey. Headscarves worn by ladies were banned from University campuses in 
1990s. With the coming into power of the pro-Islamic political parties things 
started changing. The present ruling party(AKP: Justice and Development 
Party), with its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah 
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Gul, got a law passed by the I\niiiament in Febnjary 2008 allowing women to 
attend Universities wearing lieadscarves. The Republican People's Party 
challenged this in the Constitutional Court, the highest court in Turkey. The 
Court held that the parliamentary legislation violated the principles of 
secularism as laid down in the Constitution and was, therefore, 
unconstitutional. The ruling states the stage for a showdown between Turkeys' 
secular elite and Mr. Erdogan, an observant Muslim with an Islamic past. The 
RPP hailed the verdict as a triumph of justice and said that it showed that 
secularism and democracy were constitutional principles which camiot be 
separated from one another. Mr. Erdogan calls the case a matter of individual 
rights contending that all Turks should be able to attend universities no matter 
what they wear or believe. The interesting, rather unfortunate, thing is that the 
voice of the women, the concerned party, has been lost in the debate. The 
Muslim women, who are good practising Muslims, are playing an important 
role in the social and economic life of Turkey. They are doing well in the field 
of education, business, trade, commerce, and professions. More and more 
headscarves women can be seen driving cars and other means of transport and 
working in government offices and business houses. Many secular Turks fear 
that there is still a group within the AKP that is remembered for their Islamic 
past. But should this be a reason for headscarf ban? 
Reform of the Legal System: Importing European Law 
Mustafa Kemal dictatorially introduced a new legal system, as the 
fundamental to the ftinctioning of a new state. As mentioned earUer, some 
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portions of western law had already been introduced during the Tanzimat and 
Young Turk periods in a gradual way. But the process was pushed to a sudden 
climax in 1926 by Kemal with the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the penal 
code based on Italian model, and the commercial code modelled after Gernian 
and Italian codes. The most fundamental was the importing of Swiss Civil 
Code, whose content and language Kemal thought to be the best in the world. 
This Code was principally the work of a single scholar, Eugen Huber of the 
universities of Basle and Berne. This Code is simpler and easily 
comprehensible compared to codes of other countries. Under orders of Kemal 
this code was translated into Turkish, passed by Parliament, and became the 
law of the land. According to various observers this was the core of the Turkish 
Revolution. Kemal expressed his viewpoint, while inaugurating the new Law 
Faculty at Ankara in 1925: 
This nation has accepted as an immutable truth the principle that the 
knowledge and means to create vitaHty and strength in the arena of the general 
international struggle can be found only in cotemporary civilization. In short, 
gentlemen, the nation ... esteems as a condition of the very existence of the 
principle that its general administration and all of its laws be inspired solely by 
temporal necessities and a secular administrative mentality .^ ' 
The new civil code which replaced Mejelle embodied the above 
statement of Kemal and extended the Swiss family law and divorce to Turkish 
women. Family is the nucleus of a nation and the law governing it is the most 
important and influential law regulating family relations. The Muslim family 
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law being a part of Islamic law is based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet Muhammad (SAW). In India, despite the provision for a uniform civil 
code in the Directive Principles of State Policy of the Republican Constitution, 
Muslims have all along fought and not allowed their personal law to be 
integrated under one common civil code. Further, Islamic law contains within 
itself enough flexibility to accomjuodate new situations. For example, the 
Hanafi law being strict in matter of dissolution of marriage which caused 
hardship to women, Muslim scholars found a way out within the Shariah. 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, a great Muslim jurist and scholar, wrote a 
monograph titled Al-Hilatul Najiza which was circulated amongst Muslim 
scholars within and outside India and on its basis a law, called the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 was enacted by the Indian legislature. 
Principles from schools of Muslim jurisprudence, other than the Hanafi School, 
were borrowed which Shariah pemiits and in this way the problems were 
solved. 
With the westernisation of law on European lines, the millet system was 
also done away with and all non-Muslims in Turkey were now under one code. 
This reform aroused great opposition. In fact, the civil code was not 
uniformly followed throughout Turkey. Kemal's refomis were not so 
effectively followed in the rural areas where bulk of the Muslims lived. Law 
and particularly the law relating to family relations grows and evolves 
according to the customs, traditions, mores, religious practices, ethos and 
aspirations of the community. It cannot be just imported from an alien 
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environment and bulldozed in a different social set-up. The Mormon Christians 
in U.S.A. have been practising polygamy, as a part of their denominational 
faith, for years despite the fact that polygamy is strictly prohibited. In India, 
recent legislation reforming the Hindu law of succession whereby men and 
women given equal share in property caused great heartburning and violence, 
particularly in the rural areas involving agricultural land. In order to make the 
law really effective, we have first to change the mind-set of the people, create a 
favourable social environment to internalise the new law and then introduce 
legislation, otherwise it may remain law on paper and cause great friction in 
society. Before transplanting law of a non-Muslim society to a Muslim 
community, one has to see if it is really possible to graft elements of an alien 
culture onto a Muslim society which stands on the bed-rock of the Qur'an and 
Sunnah? Can a viable synthesis be achieved? 
Confrontation of non-European societies, including Muslim society, 
with European modernism has created what Samuel Huntington calls in his 
well-known work on 'Clash of Civilizations' "the tier" in the non-European 
societies by creating a new elite of natives in a European image. The 
European colonizing powers did that and sowed the seeds of conflict. For 
example, the Britishers tried to create a race of "Brown Englishman" ruling 
over India thereby tearing a segment of Indian society from itself culturally, 
linguistically and religiously. The French and other colonisers did this in their 
areas of influence. Where external colonialism did not succeed, as in Turkey 
and Iran, Westernized locals such as Mustafa Kemal in 1920s and Shah of Iran 
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in 1930s militantly Europeanized their societies. The process created a cultural 
tier between the society and its lulers who belonged racially to the indigenous 
civilization but aspired mentally and culturally to the West, thereby belonging 
fully to neither. In Hunington's language, Ataturk and the Shah of Iran "tore" 
their societies. They were European in mind-set and sought to forcibly 
transform their societies according to a western image. Sometimes this was 
done in absurd ways. The Shah, for example, used his police force to compel 
women to remove their veils/'chadors' and Ataturk forced Turks to wear 
European hat in place of Fez. But not all leaders are swept away in this 
fashion. A notable example of someone who was brought up in the colonizer's 
traditions (Barrister-at-Law who studied in England before being called to the 
Bar and practised Law outside India), but who did not turn his back on his 
native traditions was Mahatma Gandhi. Returning to India, he did just the 
opposite: he gave up western dress; he knew how to draw the line between the 
identity of the colonizer and the colonized and how to champion the dignity of 
the native, holding the native identity equal with that of the foreign in a way 
that was appreciated by people on both sides of the divide. Which of these 
examples has history demonstrated to be more truly resonant with native 
traditions and aspirations and at the end of the day more admired, even in the 
West? " 
Turkey Since Ataturk 
A recent 3-volume biography of Ataturk is entitled ''TekAdam" Unique 
Man - no one like him. The word 'Tek' m.eans unique and also solitary/alone 
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which he was.^ "* This charismatic war hero and statesman by his single-minded 
driving force brought about such a big transfonnation in such a short time is 
amazing. He is a great leader. Leaders confer great benefits; they also cause 
harm. They are not demigods; they are not infallible. Under his leadership, the 
republic was firmly established; independence and national sovereignty 
achieved; foreign relations placed on a sound footing; westernisation made 
progress; secularisation was thmst but it had had problems; economic progress 
was slow. Atatiirk's revolution mostly affected the urban elites; it did not make 
significant dent in villages where majority of Turks live. 
President Inonu, who assumed office in 1938, followed the policies of 
Atatiirk. However, in view of growing criticism against the monopolization of 
power by a single political party (Atatiirk's RPP), Inonu conceded a multi-party 
system. Democratic Party took birth and in the 1950 elections, they won 396 
seats in the National Assembly and RPP got only 68. After 27 years rule, the 
party founded by Atatiirk, was thrown out of office. The DP stood for greater 
freedom for traditional religious practices During its 10-year rule, several 
changes were made, e.g., the call of prayers were restored in Arabic (since 
1934 it was in Turkish), religious instruction was allowed in primary schools, 
about 5000 new mosques were constructed and old ones repaired at 
government expense. In 1951 government schools were established for students 
who had completed elementary school. In the late 1980s there were eight 
faculties of divinity in Turkey. In 1985 the faculty of divinity of Ankara 
University had 1311 students (1040 males and 271 females)'^^ Religious 
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education of primary and secondary school children was made compulsory in 
the 1982 Constitution. In the late 1980s, the Presidency for Religious Affairs 
continued to organise and finance Qur'anic schools which had a completely 
religious curriculum. In 1983-84, 102,523 students (60175 females and 42,348 
males were studying in 3047 Qur'anic Schools.^ ^ In 1984; the Presidency for 
Religious Affairs administered 54,667 mosques. In spite of concessions made 
to the religious sentiment of the population, the split between secularism (the 
official policy of the state) and religion continued to exist. The religious-
secular controversy arose when the Council of Higher Education prohibited 
female students from wearing headscarves in the classes in 1987. The 
controversy continued until the present government got a law passed by the 
Parliament permitting girl students to cover their heads in the campus of 
universities. Bur, as already discussed, the Constitutional Court of Turkey 
found the law violative of the principle of secularism and held the 
parliamentary legislation as unconstitutional. This gave a jolt to the progress 
which suggested an open reappearance of the religious sentiment which was 
present all along but was repressed under Atatiirk's secularism. 
However, the military, the self -appointed guardian of secularism, has 
thrice thrown out of power the elected governments. In 1960, the DP 
government, a duly elected government was overthrown in a military coup on 
the pretext that it has deviated from the philosophy of Kemalism. Again in 
1965 the new Justice Party got elected but was removed from the office in 
1971. The military returned Turkey to civilian rule and this time it was the 
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RPP. But it could only form a coalition government with the support of 
National Salvation Party which proved to be a marriage of inconvenience. The 
NSP in 1980 held a massive national rally in which the crowd demanded the 
return of the Shariah and they refused to sing the national anthem. Once again 
in 1980 the military intervened to uphold the principles of Kemalism. The 1983 
elections were won by Motherland Party composed of Islamic revivalists and 
liberal secularists. In the November 2002 elections of Turkey's 58* 
govermnent, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 363 out of 550 
Parliamentary seats. The Republic People's Party secured 178 seats. In the July 
22, 2007, elections the AKP won 46.6 % votes, followed by CHP 20.9%, MHP 
14.3%, and Independents 5.2%. The new parliament sworn on August 4, 2007, 
included 341 AKP members, 97 CHP, 7 Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 
20 Democratic Society Party (DTP), 13 Democratic Left Party (DSP), 1 
Freedom & Democratic Party (ODP), 1 Grand Unity Party (BPP), 5 
Independents. Edrogan re-appointed Prime Minister and Abdullah Gul became 
the President. The AKP is considered an Islamic-oriented party though its 
approach is very cautious and it does not want confrontation with the military. 
However, in March 2008 the Constitutional Court agreed to hear a case to close 
down the AKP because of its alleged anti-secular activities that contravened the 
Turkish Constitution. Seventy-one AKP members, including the President and 
the Prime Minister, were named in the case and if the case would have gone in 
favour of the petitioners, all the 71 members would have been barred from 
politics for 5 years. On July 30, 2008, the Court voted 6 in favour and 5 against 
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closing down AKP. Seven votes were required to close down the Party. The 
Court, however, decided to cut down the party's state funding worth about $58 
million in half. None of the AKP members were barred. This was a very 
narrow escape. But it presents the political scenario of Turkey in which the 
confrontation between secularism and religion continues. The ruling pro-
Islamic party is proceeding cautiously and its efforts to continue courting 
Turkey's membership of European Union (EU) augurs well. It has been 
remarked in EU circles that Turkey's army should be placed under civil control 
like all other armies in EU member-states. But it is always easier for the 
military to take over than to abdicate it. 
The resurgence of Islam at the global level in the late twentieth century 
has been a testimony to the vitality of Islam. It is the dominant symbolic and 
ideological force in the Muslim world, infonning social institutions, education, 
banks, commercial and financial institutions and politics. Islam has re-emerged 
as a significant force in public life. Secularization of society has not proved a 
necessary pre-condition for social, political and economic development. 
Everywhere religion keeps returning. After Atatiirk's death. Secularism 
was increasingly criticized in Turkey. The Turkish specialist Udo Steinbach 
observes, "at the end of 1940s it became evident that they (the Kemalists) had 
applied too rational, too European, a standard to Turkey."^' Why was there a 
return of religion, a constant growth of religious parties in Turkey, the 
resurrection of Sufi schools and brotherhoods and revival of religious 
institutions? Atatiirk and his followers could not and would not understand the 
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rule that Islam played and still plays for the personal identity of Turks, which 
has always also had an emotional existential component. ^^  
We conclude our discussion by quoting extensively the concluding 
remarks of a recent researcher: ^ 
The military and their civilian supporters who appointed themselves to 
share the burden of guarding the Turkish state and the fanning of the flame of 
Kemalism perpetuate and interpret Mustafa Kemal's legacy to convince the 
citizens of the modem republic to confonn to the values which he embodied -
not only its secularism and forward-looking modernity in public life, but also 
such authoritarian inclinations as the crushing of dissent and constraints on the 
freedom of speech. Mustafa Kemal's actions were informed by the perils of the 
years during which he was in power, but times have changed, and solutions 
prompted by the ideals and fears of the 1920s are not best suited to the 
problems and challenges of the twenty-first century. The past weighs heavily, 
however, and many Turks would disagree with the disparaging western view 
associating Kemalism with "militariasm, authoritarianism and ethnic 
nationalism; for them, Kemalism is "synonymous with progress and, therefore, 
with freedom." Emphasis added) 
There are encouraging signs today that greater divershy of expression is 
becoming acceptable and the place of the military in public life is receding. 
Over the past five years, as Turkey has tried to harmonize its laws and 
government structure with those of the EU as part of the process of becoming a 
candidate for EU membership; the military profile in Turkish life has been 
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trimmed. For example, its weight in the National Security Council has been 
reduced; military courts have been abolished; the defence budget is now 
subject to Parliament's review. Since its February 1997 "post-modem coup" to 
bring down the Erbakan government, the military has largely stayed out of 
Turkish politics. Atatiirk held the same view: military should stay away from 
politics. 
191 
Notes and References: 
1. Davis, Roderic H., Turkey. Prcnlicc-Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
USA (1968), p. 1 
2. Davis, Roderic H., op. cit., supra n I, pp 128-129 
3. Zurcher, Erik-Jan, 'From Empire to Republic' TULP, cited in Finkel Caroline, 
Osman 's Dream - The History of the Ottoman Empire, Basic Books, New York 
(2006), 553, n. 87 
4. Mango, Andrew, Atatilrk, London (1999), p 462, cited in Finkel Caroline, op cit 
supra n. 3, at p 553 n.80. When an extended version of Kazim Barabekar's 
memoirs was published in 1960 (the year of the first military coup which 
toppled an elected government - the other two coups took place in 1971 and 
1980), the publishers were sued and memoirs impounded which were released 
after 9 years when the trial ended. 
5. Finkel Caroline, op. cit., supra n 3 551-52, citing Zurcher, Erik-Jan, supra n.3 
6. Gallagher, Charles F. Contemporary Islam: The Straits of Secularism, New 
York (1966), cited in Turkey- A Country Study, Ed Paul M Pitman III, US Govt., 
1988, p. 127 
7. Sadiq, Mohammad, "Intellectual Origins of the Turkish National Liberation 
Movement", International Studies (New Delhi, 1976), vol. 15, p. 521. 
8. Ibid. Robinson, Richard D., The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in 
National Development (Cambridge, 1965), p. 71. 
9. Armajani, op. cit., p. 243. 
10. Ibid, p. 325. 
11. Sadiq, op. cit., p. 511. 
12. Adnan, Abdulhak, - Adivar in Taylor Young, ed., Near Eastern Culture and 
Society (Princeton, 1951), p. 128. 
13. Tamkoc, Metin, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security 
and Modernization of Turkey (Utah, 1976), p. 111. 
192 
14. Landen, Robert G., The Emergence of Modern Middle East - Selected Readings 
(NewYork, 1970),p. 238. 
15. Kinross, op. cit, p. 457; Armajani, op. cit., p. 244. 
16. Encyclopaedia, p. 410. 
17. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 4. 
18. Erven, L., "Turkey at Crossroads", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade, 
1965), vol. XVI, p. 25. 
19. Cohn, Edwin J., Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change - The 
Development of a more Prosperous and Open Society (New York, 1970), p. 7. 
20. Lewis, Bernard, "Democracy in Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs, (New York, 
1959), vol. X, p. 59. 
21. Allen, Henry Elisha, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and 
Religious Development (New York, 1968), p. 90. 
22. Berkes, tr. and ed., Turkish Nationalism & Western Civilization - Selected 
Essays ofZia Gokalp (London, 1959), pp. 71-72. 
23. Ibid 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 4. 
26. Karpat, op. cit., p. 257. 
27. Shaw & Shaw, op. cit., p. 376. 
28. Karpat, op. cit., p. 253. 
29. Armajani, op. cit., p. 244. 
30. Berkes, op. cit, pp. 461 -462. 
31. Lewis, Bernard, op. cit., p. 458. 
32. Shaw & Shaw, op. cit., p. 378. 
33. Armajani, op. cit., p. 244. 
34. Berkes, op. cit., pp. 210-211. 
193 
35. Majeed, op. cit., p. 45. 
36. Berkes, op. cit., p. 463. 
37. Karpat, op. cit., pp. 330-331. 
38. Berkes, op. cit., pp. 215-216. 
39. Ellis, Ellen Deborah, "Turkey. 1955", Current History, (Philadelphia, 1955), 
vol. 29, p. 92. 
40. Armajani, op. cit., p. 244. 
41. Lewis, Bernard, op. cit., p. 410. 
42. Berkes, op. cit., pp. 480-483. 
43. Eren, Nuri, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization 
(London, 1963), p. 91. 
44. Encyclopaedia, p. 411. 
45. Sadiq, op. cit., vol. 15, p. 515. 
46. Berkes, op. cit., p. 484. 
47. Ellis, op. c/7., vol. 29, p. 92. 
48. Adivar, op. cit., p. 224 
49. Armajani, op. cit., p. 247. 
50. Ibid, p. 244. 
51. Karpat, op. cit., p. 324. 
52. Berkes, op. cit., p. 470. 
53. Armajani, op. cit., pp. 244-245. 
54. Berkes, tr. & ed. op. cit., p. 71. 
55. Algeria was the first among the Arab states to be detached from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
56. Lewis, Bernard, op. cit., pp. 344-345. 
57. Landen, op. cit., p. 238. 
58. Berkes, tr. & ed., op. cit., pp. 223-224. 
194 
59. Finkel Caroline, op. cit., supra n 3, at p 441 
60. Davison. R.H., op. cit., supra n 1, at p 131 
61. Ibid. p. 232 
62. Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations" in Foreign Affairs 72-3 
(1993); it has also come out in book fonn. We agree with the concept of "tier" 
of societies as referred in the text, but that does not mean that we agree with his 
main thesis of his study. 
63. Imam Faisal Abdul Rauf, What is Right With Islam: A New Vision for the 
Muslims And the West, Harper, New York (2004), pp 2-5, 170-171 
64. Davison, R.H., op. cit., supra n.l, p 243,, citing Sevket Sureyya Aydemit, Tek 
Adam, 5 vols. (Istanbul 1963-65) 
65. Pitman III, Paul M. Ed., Turkey, A Country Study, U.S. Govt. 1988, pp 130-31 
66. Ibid. 
67. U. Steinbach, Islam in Der Turkei (2002)25, cited in Hans Kung, ISLAM: past. 
Present and Future, Oneworld, Oxford (English Trans. 2007), 464, n. 15. 
68. Hans Kung, p. 463 
69. Finkel, Caroline, op cit., supra n 3, p 554 
195 
CONCLUSION 
Mustafa Kemal died seventy years ago (November 10, 1938). His legacy 
lives on and even to this day Turks continue to pay homage to their Father-
Turk (Ataturk) by observing a minute of silence at 9-05 A.M. each November 
10. Ataturk is omnipresent in Turkey. His portrait is in every home and place 
of business and on the postage and bank notes. His statues are every where. He 
certainly left his stamp on the nation more indelibly than any other person. In 
Ulus Square in Ankara stands a large equestrian statue of Ataturk and on its 
pedestal is carved a tree with a huge branch shattered near the trunk, and a new 
vigorous growth springing from the top; the Turkish Republic growing from 
the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the Republic had risen out of the failures and 
collapse of the Empire, but also out of the Empire's experience and progress. 
As already discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the Republic and its founder both 
owe a lot to the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk was a product of military institutions 
established by the Ottoman sultans and later served as an official of the sultan. 
The process of Westernization had started by the refonning sultans' long back 
(chapters 1 to 4 deal with the process). Ataturk speeded up the process and 
embarked on a bold and sometime rash transformation, keeping in view the 
predominantly traditional leaning of the Anatolian rural population. Historians, 
mainly Europeans, are so much enamored by Ataturk that they have 
downplayed the continuities between the Republic and the Empire. This 
"received wisdom" that the Republic was a clean slate which bore only the 
imprint of Ataturk is being challenged by recent researchers. Justice has not 
been done to the Ottoman Empire and its Sultans by a number of writers. For 
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example phrases like "sick man of Hiirope" or "'oriental despotism" used in the 
heat of confrontation between the Western states and Ottoman Empire have 
been so much repeated and recycled as to give an impression that these are the 
general characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. This is incorrect. Ottomans built 
up the largest and militarily the strongest power in the world at that time which 
played a unique and vital role in world history. Despite continuous wars with 
European powers and despite internal decay, how come that the "sick-man" 
survived for about two and a half centuries - his total life exceeded 600 years. 
After the World War when Gennany and those who fought on hs side, 
including Ottomans, were defeated, how come that Turkey alone mustered so 
much power as to inflict two devastating defeats on Greeks, forced the Allies to 
sign the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), and evacuated all the AlHed forces from 
Turkey. All this shows that the Ottoman Empire had a strong base, it was a 
strong military power and had a capable bureaucracy. Similarly sweeping 
remarks against sultans and others as if it is a "parade of salacious sultans, evil 
pashas, hapless harem women, and obscurantist clerics" would be uncalled for. 
There may be some sultans and other top bureaucrats who may not be upto the 
mark, but that does not justify such general denigrations. On the whole 
Ottomans established a vast empire with multi-religious and multi-racial 
communities who lived in hamiony, had a strong military force, an efficient 
administrative and executive branch and a fair administration of justice. 
A good deal of rich and valuable source material about Ottomans is in 
Ottoman language. The change of alphabet by Ataturk in 1928 from Arabic to 
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Roman script had the effect of cutting the younger generation off from access 
to the rich heritage of Ottoman hterature. However, Turks are curious about 
their past history and are trying to equip themselves with the Ottoman language 
History teaches us that civilizations flourish, die and disappear. 
Sometimes they die swiftly, sometimes in a slow lingering death. And 
sometimes as with the Roman or Ottoman and others, echoes of that 
civilization find new life in later cultures. To forget or distort the entire 
civilization is tragic, because each civilization no matter how grand or flawed 
is a laboratory of human ideas and ideals, of dreams and nightmares. We can 
learn from them 
However, 18'*^  century turned out to be a century of defeats for 
Ottomans. Internal decay and military failures and territorial losses started. 
These are spelled out in Chapter 1. Islamic world, including Ottoman Empire, 
now faced European modernism. Euro|:)e was now far more powerful than that 
which the great Sultans of the past had defeated. The lesson for the Ottomans 
was that if they have to survive tlicy have to borrow from the West technology, 
and other advancements brought about by various thrusts of modernism. The 
process of Westernization now makes a beginning. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with 
this. Every refonn offer in Turkey met with opposition. The question raised 
was to what extent can norms of an alien system be grafted on to a Muslim 
society which is to be governed by the Sharia'h? 
The Republic of Turkey stepped up the process of Westernization. 
Ataturk wanted to transform Turkey into a modem state. He must have 
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developed these ideas from his early age. He did not go to the religious schools, 
but he did study Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire and above all Auguste 
Comte, a radical modemizer who studied French Revolution in great detail. He 
did not like the model which the Reforming Young Turks had conceived. 
Instead, he wanted a "modern, bourgeois, secular Turkish Republic on the 
model of laicist France and its separation of church and state." After the Treaty 
of Laussane when the political problems in the aftermath of World War I were 
settled, Ataturk now proceeded to reform the Turkish society in a very 
comprehensive manner. His vision and philosophy is contained in the Six 
Principles (Six Arrows) which he sought to implement. The most controversial 
and troublesome principle turned out to be Secularism. There was opposition, 
but Ataturk's towering personality overpowered it. Sheikh Said's revolt was 
ruthlessly crushed. Ataturk also got rid of his opponents, some of whom had 
been very close to him, by holding their trial on alleged charges of attempt to 
assassinate him. However, after Ataturk's death, the position changed when his 
successor, Ismet Inonu, conceded to the demand of a multiparty system. The 
1950 Parliamentary elections brought Democratic Party to power and since 
then there has been a return to religion creating a situation of confrontation 
between the pro-Islamic ruling parties and the secular elites (the military and 
the Constitutional Court, the so-called guardians of Kemalism). This has 
created "a tier" (to borrow from Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of 
Civilizations") in the Turkish society. The two decisions handed down by the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey in 2008, and referred to in chapter 6, highlight 
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this confrontation. Islam still plays an important role for the personal identity 
of Turks. It is being remarked that Kemalists have applied "too rational and too 
European a standard to Turkey." However, many Turks would take "Kemalism 
as synonymous with progress and, therefore, with freedom." 
Despite the foregoing criticism, Ataturk w ill be remembered as the 
savior of Turkey, the most successful military commander and charismatic 
statesman that Turkey ever had. Under his leadership, the country and the 
nation have been fimily established. 
Westernization made great strides. Secularization had made advances, 
though with some problems. A comprehensive biography of Ataturk written by 
a Turk is entitled Tek Adam "Unique Man". This is a fair characterization of 
Ataturk there is no other like him. The word Tek also means solitary/alone 
which he was also. By his single-minded driving force, Ataturk did so much 
and heralded such vital changes in Turkish society in such a short time that he 
rightly deserves to be titled as Tek Adam. 
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Osman, founder of the Ottoman dynasty, born 
1299 
Osman declares the independence of his small principality from the Selcuk 
sultanate of Konya 
1326 
Orhan Gazi captures Bursa, which becomes the second Ottoman capital (the 
small town of Sogut was the first capital). 
1361 
Murad I captures Edime (Adrianople). As the third Ottoman capital, Edirne 
now becomes the head-guarters for the further expansion. 
1386 
The conquest of Sofia (capital of present-day Bulgaria). 
1396 
The final conquest and annexation, under Bayazid I the Thunderbolt, of the 
territories of the medieval kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia. 
211 
1400-1401 
A new force out of the plains begins to maice its presence felt in West Asia, 
forcing the Ottomans to over-extend themselves two distant fronts. 
1402 
The Battle of Ankara between Timur (Tamerlane) and Bayazid I. Alienated by 
Bayazid's hasty push of rapid centralization, the forces of the recently annexed 
Turcoman principalities of Anatolia cross over to the side of the relatively 
semi-tribal Timur in the heat of battle, deserted by all expect his Serbian allies, 
Bayazid is captured and eventually commits suicide. 
1402-1413 
The Interregnum : Bayazid's four sons fight each other for the throne, which is 
eventually won by Celebi Mehmed 1 (1412-1420). 
1423-1430 
War between Venice and the reconsolidating Ottoman state-the first of many 
for supremacy in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, and ultimately for control 
over the traditional trade routes of the Old World. 
1448 
Second battle of Kossova consolidates the Ottoman rule in Balkans. 
1451 
With the death of Murad II, his son Mehmed II ascends the throne for the 
second and final time, and immediately launches preparations for... 
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1453 
The conquest of Constaninople (Istanbul), which becomes the fourth and last 
Ottoman capital. The remaining 29 years of Mehmed II's reign witness the 
decisive conquest or re-conquest of Serbia, Albania and Greece in the West as 
well as most of Anatolia. The whole course of this second great Ottoman 
advance into the Balkans is marked by wars with Venice for control of the 
Adriatic shoreline. 
1454 
Construction work begins on the Topkapi Palace. 
1454-1481 
Greece, Trebizond and Crimea conquered. 
1481-1512 
The peaceful reign of Bayazid 11 is marred by a consei-vative religious reaction 
against the Conqueror's cosmopolitan cultural outlook and strong centralization 
drive. From 1500 onwards, the Safavids of Iran begin to take advantage of 
Ottoman passivity in pushing their Shiite proselytizing efforts into Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia. 
1514 
Selim I the Grim, who with janissary support, dethroned his father in 1512, 
relies on his cannon to defeat Sah Ismail at the battle of Caldiran, conquers 
Tabriz, secures his left flank for the subsequent advance into Egypt, and returns 




In lightning campaigns marked by the continued superiority of Ottoman field 
artillery, Selim I completes the conquest of Eastern Anatolia, Northern Iraq, 
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and the Hicaz. 
1519-1522 
Portuguese Magellan circumnavigates the world. 
1520 
Luther launches attack on Roman church. 
1521 
The capture of Belgrade marks the second year of the long reign of Suleyman I 
the Magnificent (1520-1566). He resumes the westward drive towards the rich 
markets and trade crossroads of Central Europe. 
1522 
The capture of Rhodes, a manifestation of rising Ottoman naval power. 
1526 
Ottoman firepower destroys the flower of the Hungarian nobility at the battle of 
Mohacs; the conquest of Buda and Pe§te follows. That same year, Francois 1 
appeals to Suleyman, who agrees to provide military and economic assistance 




Szapolyai, king of Hungary, accepts Ottoman overlordship 
1529 
The first siege of Vienna by the Ottomans, who are, however, unprepared for a 
long and all-out effort. 
1606 
Treaty with Austria gives Hapsburg Emperor titular equality. 
1607 
The high tide of the Celali uprisings, rebellions against the land tenure system 
of the provincial fief-holding cavalry. This turn-of-the-century upheaval marks 
the end of the Classical Age and the opening pf a new chapter in Ottoman 




Work begins on the Blue Mosque. 
1618-1648 
Thirty Years' War' in central Europe. 
1622 
Osman 11 the Young, the first Ottoman sultan to fonnulate a reform program 
(and to lose his head for it), sets out on his Hotin expedition - essentially to 
overcome the developing crisis of confidence and to re-establish charismatic 
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leadership over the army. 
1623-1640 
Murad IV restores order. 
1638 
Murad IV, who succeeded by imposing his unusually harsh will to halt 
progressive anarchy and destabilization, sets out on his great expedition to the 
East. His journey culminates in the capture of Baghdad. He is the last great 
centralizing sultan. 
1644 
China's decaying Ming dynasty swept away by Manchurian Qing dynasty. 
1703 
Peter the Great founds St Petersburg. 
1711 
The battle of Pruth against the Russians under the command of the Grand Vezir 
Baltaci'Mehmed Pasha. According to a spicy tradition, Pasha surrounded Peter 
the Great's arniy but then let them avoid humiliation because he was 
"persuaded" by a secret nocturnal visit to his tent by the tsar's mistress (later 
empress) Catherine. 
1712 
Peace treaty with Russia. 
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1717 
Death of Aurangzeb presages decline of Moghul power in India. 
1718 
The Treaty of Passarowitz with Austria following yet another lost war. 
1720-1730 
First Ottoman ambassadors sent to western capitals. 
1730 
Patrona Halil rebeUion against taxation and western influences; Ahmet III 
deposed, Tulip Period ends. 
1739 
Peace of Belgrade returns Belgrade to the Ottomans; Russians forced to sign 
separate peace. 
1750 
Another great Istanbul fire burns covered markets to the ground. 
1754 
A major earthquake in Istanbul. 
1757 
Clive's victory at Plassey establishes British in India. 
1769 
War with Russia renewed. 
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1770 
The Crimean Tartars switch sides to conclude an anti-Ottoman alliance with 
Russia. 
1773 
Cin-Ali Bey, who had proclaimed himself sultan of Egypt, is defeated in battle, 
and his rebellion crushed. Nevertheless, esraf and ayan (newly crystallizing 
dynasties of provincial notables) are on the move throughout the empire. 
1774 
Disastrous Treaty of Kucuk Kainardji with Russia. 
1776 
American Declaration of Independence. 
1779 
Russia annexes Crimea. 
1782 
A fire in Istanbul lasts 50 hours. 
1789 
Selim 111, a dedicated refonner, ascends the throne in the same year as the 
French Revolution. Some of his social experiments are inpired by the same 
democratic ideologies which motivated the French. 
1790 
Ottoman-Prussian alliance against Austria and Russia. 
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1798 
Napoleon's Egyptian expedition becomes stranded after Nelson destroys the 
French fleet at the battle of the Nile. Napoleon advances into Syria, but is 
forced to retreat the next year in the face of determined Ottoman resistance. 
1799-1815 
Napoleon Bonaparte reshapes map of continental Europe. 
1807 
The British navy attempts to force the Straits; the Ottoman government 
declares war on both Britain and Russia. 
1808 
An Istanbul revolt instigated by conservative elements within the ruling elite 
and led by Kabakci Mustafa, a man of the urban underclass, dethrones Selim 
III. The sultan first is imprisoned and later killed when an army of provincial 
reformers led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasa advences on the capital to rescue the 
Sultan. Alemdar, nevertheless, succeds in overthrowing Mustafa IV and putting 
Mahmud II on the throne. 
1815 
Congress of Vienna 
1821 
The Greek revolt and war of independence: the first step in the formation of 
new nation-states by the fonner Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
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1826 
Massacre of the Janissaries by Mahmiid II. 
1827 
Greece's European allies help defeat and destory the combined Ottoman-
Egyptian fleet. 
1828 
Fez introduced, along with judicial, military and administrative reforms on 




Anglo-Turkish Trade Treaty marks the incorporation of the Ottoman internal 
market into world economy. 
1839 
Noble Rescripf promulgated, a liberal charter of reform. All creeds and 
declared equal. 
1853-1856 
Crimean war pits Turkish, English and French troops against Russia. 
1861-1865 
American Civil War. 
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1864 
The signing of the Protocol of Istanbul. It marks the birth of Romania with the 
unification of Wallachia and Moldavia. 
1867 
Abdulaziz visits Europe on the invitation of Napoleon III. 
1868 
Meiji Restoration in Japan. 
1875 
Empire declares bankruptcy. Balkan uprisings. 
1876 
The Empire continues to crumble, revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina, war 
against Serbia and Montenegro. 
1876-1877 The short-lived First Constitutional Period. 
1877 
War against Russia, known in Turkey as "the campaign of 93", after which the 
Russian army dictates the Treaty of Ayastefanos. Sultan Aldulhamid II uses the 
crisis to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution. 
1878 
Treaty of Berlin - to which Ottomans are not invited - establishes partial 
Bulgarian autonomy. 
1881 
The French invade Tunisia. 
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Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is bom in Selonika. 
1882 
The British invade and take over Egypt. 
1895 
Last Ottoman province in the Balkans, Macedonia, succumbs to civil war. 
1908 
Mutiny in Monastir, calling for restoration of the constitution. Committee of 
Union and Progress triumphs. Bulgaria declares independence. Crete unites 
with Greece. 
The Young Turks Revolution overthrows Sultan Abdulhamid II. The Second 
Constitutional Period begins. 
1909 
Muslim counter-revolution thwarted. Sultan deposed. Constitutional monarchy 
declared. 
1911 
Republic in China. 
1912 
Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria launch joint assault on European Turkey. 
1913 
The victors turn upon each other; Turkey recaptures Edime. 
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1914 
Turkey enters World War I on German side. 
1918 
Armistice. CUP leadership flees. Civil War erupts, followed by war with 
Greece in Anatolia. 
1918-1921 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk secures boundaries of a new Turkish state. 
1919-1922 
The War of Independence culminates in the creation of the modern Rupublic of 
Turkey in 1923. 
1922 
Deposition and exile of last sultan, Mehmed Vahiduddin 
1923 





MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA 
1881 
Birth of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to Ali Riza and Ziibeyda at Salonika 
1893 
Young Mustafa enters Military Secondary School at Salonika and is given the 
additional name of Kemal. 
1895 
Mustafa Kemal enters Military Training School at Monastir. 
1896 
Revolt by students of Military Medical School in Istanbul suppressed. 
1899 
13 March. Mustafa Kemal enters War College in Istanbul. 
1902 
Mustafa Kemal graduates as Lieutenant, General Staff College in Istanbul 
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1905 
11 January. Mustafa Kemal graduates from the General Staff College with the 
rank of Staff Captain and is posted to the Fifth Army, based in Damascus 
1906 
Mustafa Kemai helps to found Fatherland (Vatan) Society in Damascus. 
1907 
20 June, Mustafa Kemal promoted Adjutant-Major. 
September, Mustafa Kemal posted to Third Army at Salonika. 
1908 
24 July, 'Young Turk' Revolution in Salonika, Committee of Union and 
Progress forces Abdulhamit to restore Constitution of 1876 and recall 
Parliament. 
Mustafa Kemal sent to Tripolitania on mission for Committee of Union and 
Progress. 
1909 
13 April. Counter-revolution in Istanbul. Union and Progress striking force, 
with Mustafa Kemal as divisional chief of staff, marches on the city from 
Salonika. 
27 April. Deposition and exile of Abdulhamit. Succession of Mehmet V as 
Sultan 
Mustafa Kemal attends Congress of Union and Progress Party in Salonika. 
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6 September. Mustafa Kemal appointed Commander of Third Arniy and later 
Commander of Thirty-eighth Infantry Regiment. 
1910 
Mustafa Kemal serves as Chief of Staff in suppression of revolt in Albania. 
Mustafa Kemal sent to Paris with military mission to attend French army 
manoeuvres. 
1911 
13 September. Mustafa Kemal is posted to the General Staff in Istanbul. 
5 October. Italian invasion of Tripoli. 
Mustafa Kemal with Turkish Forces at Tobruk and Dema. 
27 November. Mustafa Kemal promoted to Major. 
1912 
8 October - 3 December. Beginning of First Balkan War. Montenegro, Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Greece at war with Ottoman Empire. Severe Turkish defeats. 
Salonika falls to the Greeks. Mustafa Kemal leaves Cyrenaica and returns to 
Istanbul. Coup d'etat against Government by Union and Progress officers. 
25 November. Mustafa Kemal appointed Director of Operations for relief of 
Adrianople. 
Fall of Adrianople. 
1913 
27 October. Mustafa Kemal appointed Military Attache in Sofia. 
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1914 
1 March. Mustafa Kemal promoted Lieutenant-Colonel. 
28 June. Assassination of Archduice Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. 
16 July. Mustafa Kemal sends despatch to War Minister from Sofia, urging a 
policy of Turkish neutrality in the event of war, with a view to possible later 
intervention against Bulgaria and the Central Powers. 
28 July. Austria declares war on Serbia, with support of Germany. 
2 August. Ottoman leadership signs secret alliance with Gennany. 
1915 
2 February. Mustafa Kemal appointed to reorganize and command Nineteenth 
Division in Thrace. 
25 February. Mustafa Kemal establishes Headquarters of Nineteenth Division 
at Maidos on Gallipoli Peninsiihi. 
18 March. Allied navy fails to force the Turkish Straits. Mustafa Kemal 
demonstrates outstanding skills as a soldier and commander throughout the 
battle at Canakkale. 
25 April. Allied military landings at Aribumu (Anzac Cove). Advance 
checked by Mustafa Kemal with his outstanding leadership of the Nineteenth 
Division. 
1 June. Mustafa Kemal promoted Colonel. 
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8 - 9 August. Mustafa Kemal appointed to command of Sixteenth Anny Corps. 
Checks second Allied advance on Gallipoli Peninsula. 
1916 
9 January. Allied evacuation of Gallipoli Peninsula complete. 
14 January. Mustafa Kemal posted to Adrianople in command of Sixteenth 
Army Corps. Transfer to Caucasus front. 
1 April. Mustafa Kemal promoted General and Pasha. 
6 - 7 August. Mustafa Kemal recaptures Bitlis and Mu§ from Russians. 
1917 
5 March. Mustafa Kemal appointed second-in-command effective Commander 
of Second Army. 
5 July. Mustafa Kemal appointed Commander of Seventh Army in Syria. 
20 September. Mustafa Kemal sends report to Government on the poor state of 
the army and the country, and relinquishes his command. 
October. Mustafa Kemal returns to Istanbul. 
15 December - 5 January 1918. Mustafa Kemal visits Germany with Crown 
Prince Vahdettin. 
1918 




5 August. Mustafa Kemal divorces Latifa Khanam. 
30 August - 2 September. Mustafa Kemal tours Kastamonu province, 
announcing abolition of fez, suppression of religious brotherhoods, and closing 
of sacred tombs as places of worship. 
1926 
17 February. Adoption of new Civil Law code. 
15 June - 13 July. Attempted assassination of Mustafa Kemal in Izmir is 
uncovered. 
1927 
1 July. Mustafa Kemal revisits Istanbul. 
15-20 October. Mustafa Kemal makes historic speech to Congress of People's 
Party (CHP). 
1 November. Third Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal re-elected 
President of the Republic. 
1931 
15 April. Foundation of Turkish Historical Society. 
4 May. Fourth Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal re-elected President 
of the Republic. 
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1934 
24 November. Mustafa Kemal adopts the surname "ATATURK" which is given 
to him by the Turkish Pariiament. 
8 December. Women made ehgible to vote in Parliamentary elections and to 
become members of Parliament. 
1935 
I March. Fifth Grand National Assembly. Ataturk re-elected President of the 
Republic. 
1936 
Visit of King Edward VIII to Ataturk in Istanbul. 
1938 
II March. Illness of Ataturk is officially announced. 
10 November. The death of Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk," the leader of the 
Turkish War of Independence and founder of modem-day Turkey. 
11 November. Succession of Ismet Inonu as President of Turkey. 
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IV 
LIST OF PRESIDENTS 
OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
1. Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk: October, 1923 - November, 1938 
2. Ismet Inonii: November, 1938 - May, 1950 
3. Celal Bayar: May, 1950 - May, 1960 
4. Cemal Gursel: October, 1961 - March, 1966 
5. Cevdet Sunay: March, 1966 - March, 1973 
6. Fahri S. Korutiirk: April, 1973 - April, 1980 
7. Kenan Evren: December, 1982 - November, 1989 
8. Turgut Ozal: November, 1989 - April, 1993 
9. Siileyman Demirel: May, 1993 - May, 2000 
10. Ahmet Necdet Sezer: May, 2000 - August 2007 
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